

The deployment of emergency beat patrols is generally organized from the dispatch room, who assign the officers to the respective situations or incidents. The unit that arrives first is then in charge of the operation and feeds the information back to the control room. The main task is the prosecution and prevention of criminal acts, the establishment of public order and security and law enforcing. Officers are managing tasks that are forwarded by the dispatch centre. These include congregations, criminal acts, misdemeanours, missing persons, traffic accidents and accidents at work, suicides, domestic violence, alarms, suspicions, fire, search warrants, riots, harassments, assistance, the obstruction of traffic, enquiries, mentally ill persons and escaped convicts. Prevention is also a task of the emergency beat units, usually brought about by the open presence of officers. Moreover, police patrols also serve for the detection of situations that would not be covered by the control room.

In emergency situations the operation is built up by the control room who assign officers to a specified location. From there, officers notify the control room of the situation. This is generally done by radio. An information system provides the officer in charge with an overview on the officers' actions and availability. Nearly every action consists of direct measures and further processing, that can reach from arresting to questioning, searching, photographing, reporting etc.

#### *Specific local circumstances in Münster*

The focus of the emergency patrol services in “Nord”, “Mitte” and “Süd” differ in accordance to the character of the respective areas in which they are deployed. Beside the occurring deployments, policing within district “Nord” comprises the protection of buildings and the supervision and patrolling of the social hotspots Gievenbeck, Kinderhaus and Coerde in order to enhance the citizens' overall feeling of safety. Police work in “Mitte” focuses on routine work, as well as on the policing of special events, which occur quite frequently. Main points are the central station, the promenade, the Aasee lake and the harbour. The *southern* district is regarded as rather quiet, resulting in fewer deployments of officers. However, during observation time, a street gang was active in the areas of Berg Fidel and Osthuesheide so that this had been of additional interest. Besides the daily routines, officers also have to accomplish special tasks that are ordered by the home office, such as alcohol controls or belt screenings.

#### *District policing in Münster*

District policing in Münster is carried out by 30 officers, allocated to 19 areas, which are again subdivided into 5 locations. Generally, one officer is allocated to an area covering 10000 citizens. However, due to its specific structure and higher numbers of incidents, more officers are deployed in the inner city centre and the northern areas of Münster that can be described as socially deprived. Contrary, fewer officers are deployed in the more quiet areas such as Mecklenbeck and Albachten. With more than 45 years, district officers are on average older than their colleagues from the emergency patrol. Recruiting procedures for this service make a point of an officers' ability to communicate and to act self-reliant, as they will need to self-allocate working procedures, and tailor them to the circumstances and needs of their respective district. District officers in Münster are working from Monday to Friday within a period from 6am to 10pm. Working times also have to be allocated individually, only two late shifts are required. However, during specific projects, such as traffic screening, the head of the district police can officially order working times.

According to the interviews and observations, district police generally patrols on foot, by bicycle or moped. A main task of the work is the constant engagement in communication with the citizens, this may be related to an official cause or not. In so doing, the officers are openly present at public squares, playing grounds, schoolyards and parks. During official and

unofficial conversations with citizens, officers gain information about local circumstances, her or his presence also aims to provide a feeling of protection and security for the citizens. Officers further monitor delinquents in their district, persons that can be found regularly on specific locations. Often the officers know these persons by name and engage in talks about the situation in the area and within their social peer group. In general, district officers are well-known contact persons for the citizens in their district. Their work is designed to mediate between citizens and the police as a governmental institution. Sometimes their work exceeds the normal police work and officers may also help people to deal with application for social benefit or to get in touch with social institutions.

In addition to their direct presence in the district, officers provide their own consultation hour. Dependent on the district this can be in a mobile station (that would be a police van, used as a small office), or inside a youth club or citizens' organisation. The consultation-hours are announced verbally, by posters or by using the internet. Further, district officers are in contact with the societal groups, institutions and organisations of his or her area and take part in meetings and workshop. They gain information about citizens' concerns, developments, incidents and special focus points; on the other hand, they can serve as a contact person for all aspects of police work.

The officers also engage in road safety education and consultation in nursery and primary schools, old-people's homes and other facilities. Particularly the work with children has been an essential part of the current observations, also exceeding the mere traffic education. Working with children often starts during circle time in the kindergarten or school. Children shall be familiarised with the police as somebody who can support, facilitate or protect them. This counteracts a threatening image of the police which is communicated in some families and the children are threatened to be taken away by police, when they misbehave or disobey parents' orders. The officers' aim is rather to encourage children to turn to the police in dangerous or threatening situations. With the start of primary school, police officers conduct trainings with the children where they walk along the school way and particularly avert to dangerous spots. However, officers also take on a protective role, when they monitor dangerous sectors and spots close to the school. A lot of communication between police and children, but also between police and parents is taking place here and the children often know the officers already from their times in nursery school. This positive relationship facilitates officers' aims to point at dangerous situations and explain safe behaviour. With regard to traffic, officers are also deployed at actual traffic spots, due to accidents or road works.

The daily work of district officers furthermore comprises the enforcement of arrest warrants and court summons and the execution of requests of administrative assistance from other institutions. The district Nord even runs an own "arrest warrant"-team, consisting of two officers, respectively. In the smaller areas (Mitte, Ost and Geist), these tasks are individually allocated and the officers decided – dependent on the particular circumstances – if a job should be carried out in a team or by a single officer. If a known person is to be arrested, the officers sometimes settle an agreement with the district attorney for a payment in instalments. Sometimes officers are allocated to spanned tasks, such as traffic screenings or crowd events, (this is generally ordered from the HQ-staff). These tasks are then coordinated by the head of the district police.

#### *Cooperation between EP and CBP*

At specific locations, EP officers support their colleagues of the community patrol, particularly in order to show open presence. This support is seen to have a preventive impact and is carried out at social hot spots, meeting points of youngsters, locations that are known starting points for criminal actions or where conflict between citizens occurs repeatedly. The

information about these deployments is passed on to the EP officers by internal mail from the district unit. Email is used for direct information of the respective group leader. Important information that district officers gain during their shift is also filed in a computer system, so that, for example in cases of stalking, information can be retrieved if further institutions like the municipal department of public order has already been informed. The cooperative activities can also involve the crime investigation unit. In cases of domestic violence, German law allows a 10-day order to stay away from the house against the offender. The case is registered at the crime investigation unit, who store the data of the offender in their system for 10 days. A copy of the operation is passed to the district officers who then check the abidance of the order, again using a computer system (see also below). Dependent on the situation, CBP also takes over tasks from their EP colleagues, particularly in time of high pressure or emergencies, when all EP patrols are unavailable. Such deployment is agreed on between the heads of the district police and emergency patrol. In addition, in cases of major incidents, EP patrol is called in to support their colleagues. However, this is carried out situational but not on a regular basis.

### *Computer systems and information sources in Münster: EP*

#### *The common operational picture*

The situational picture is one of the most important information sources for EP work. It is set up by the central operation centre, and contains all incidents and information that are relevant for police work in a certain district. The report appears each morning and serves as a basic feature within the daily group meetings and as a basis for further planning of actions. The common operational picture may for example report a series of car break-ins. Based on this information the officers will increasingly check on persons in that particular area. The data gained there is forwarded to the criminal investigation unit who will check if these persons have been involved in criminal acts on other occasions. If so, this may then initiate the deployment of further officers for tracing and search.

#### *The daily briefing*

Emergency patrol starts with a briefing, headed by the group leader, who informs the officers about the common operational picture and further information that is relevant for their work, for example legal information concerning traffic regulations. A further aspect of the briefing is the preparation of special deployments, for example, when a demonstration is announced within the area, or focus points that arise due to actual occasions, such as strikes or flooding. A very important part of the briefing is the information about dangerous persons, particularly those who have openly threatened the police, announcing the use of fire weapons. Supplementary to the briefings, information can also be passed on to the officers using email.

#### *Information the group leader gets*

The head of a group is informed by the common operational picture, generally via email, specific traffic information is passed on by the traffic section, meets with the head of the previous shift where information about the past incidents is passed on. Special actions (such as safety-belt or alcohol controls) are ordered by the home office, other super ordinate instructions come in via email to the head of the station and are passed on to the group leaders.

#### *Control room (Leitstelle)*

While on patrol, information is also directly transferred from the control room by radio. The officers; on the other hand, inform the centre about a situation or ask for supporting colleagues. The centre records the incidents in writing, which is filed for future deployment or fed in the common operational picture. Analogue radio is the main – official – communication device between the control room and the officers on patrol (see Bochum section).

#### *Databases*

In cases of checks on persons, vehicles or items, such as stolen goods, the officers on patrol address the operational centre, which then carry out the respective databases. However, while demands can be put forward by all officers, the access to the data bases is limited to operation centre-staff, superiors and the heads of the groups.

Typical searches concern: checks at the residential office (EMA), Schengen-wide person checks using POLAS. Checks on motorists are forwarded to the “city’s program of driving licences” and the Federal Motor Transport Authority in Flensburg.

#### *Computer systems and information sources in Münster: CBP*

#### *Radio communication and mobile phones*

District officers on patrol are using the same radio system and procedure as their colleagues from the emergency patrol unit, i.e. information and checks are transmitted via the central operational centre. One team also used a mobile phone. Some officers, however, have also organised private mobile phones, as a reaction to difficult and poor radio communication.

#### *Persons*

The head of the district police receives about 80 to 100 messages per day, according to the operational picture or single information that come in via email. Those relevant for the officers on the ground are then forwarded to the individual units or used in briefings.

#### *Criminal files*

Internal criminal files are an important source for administrative assistance, in particular in cases of arrests warrants or checks on the residential status of a person. The officers for example take a copy of a photo in order to recognise the person or check on information on potentially dangerous or violent persons. This is primarily important for the officers’ own safety.

#### *The grounds under observation*

The research in Bochum and Münster was carried out according to the empirical design of the overall PSE study. The two police forces and the areas that they covered differ substantially, both from each other and from the average PSE numbers (table 5.1). Emergency patrol police in our Bochum observation was staffed with 275 officers, covering an area of 32km<sup>2</sup> with 123000 inhabitants, while in Münster 68 EP officers covered an area of 155.5 km<sup>2</sup>, nearly five times larger than the one in Bochum, with 10000 inhabitants. This compares to an average of 145 employees of the total PSE observations – of which the two German cities diverge in two directions, respectively. The average ratio of inhabitants per employee amounts to 480, which is nearly matched by 450 in Bochum, one officer in Münster statistically deals with 1470 persons, this being about three times as many as their colleagues in Bochum and in most of the other cities that had been observed. The average of the PSE observations amounts to 480. The population densities of the areas differ similarly, with 3800 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup> in Bochum, compared to 640 in Münster. With regard to the average PSE, the low population

density of Münster – though being seen as a rather rural area – still exceeds the average of 510 inhabitants/ km<sup>2</sup>.

*Table 5.1: strength of the German police teams under observation, police-inhabitant ratio and population density*

	Strength (number of employees) *	Area covered by EP (km <sup>2</sup> )	Inhabitants in this area #	Inhabitants per employee	Population density (inh./km <sup>2</sup> )
Bochum	275	32.0	123,000	450	3,800
Münster	68	155.5	100,000	1,470	640
<i>Average PSE</i>	<i>145</i>	<i>137.2</i>	<i>69785</i>	<i>480</i>	<i>510</i>
<i>TOTAL PSE</i>	<i>1,741</i>	<i>1,646.9</i>	<i>837,420</i>	<i>480</i>	<i>510</i>

\* : including all employees: law enforcement officers as well as administrative staff.

#: number of inhabitants in the area covered by Emergency Patrol (EP) – the area under observation.

In total, 2089 incidents around EP deployments and 2094 of community beat patrols were observed in this study, with about 174 incidents on average. Both Bochum services dealt with more incidents than their colleagues in Münster; 167 of the emergency patrol compared to 129. The Bochum community beat patrol dealt with 196 incidents, while the numbers in Münster amount to 162. Put down to numbers of incidents per hour, Bochum matches the average PSE numbers of 1.8 incidents per hour for EP and 2.6 for CBP (2.7 in Bochum). In both cases, the workload of Münster police is lower. The EP officers deal with 1.3 and their CBP colleagues with 2.1 incidents per hour. In about half of the cases a citizen calls the emergency patrol: 79 of 167 in Bochum and 72 of 129 incidents in Münster. The calls for community beat patrols are substantially lesser. In Bochum the CBP is called in 20 of 196 incidents, similarly Münster community officers are called in 18 of 162 cases. However, the numbers do not include incidents that involved answering questions from the public or chatting with citizens, which accounted for high numbers of incidents, particularly in Bochum (see below).

*Table 5.2: work load*

	<i>Observed incidents</i>	<i>... of which are calls *</i>	<i>Inc./hour</i>	<i>Calls/hour</i>
	<i>Emergency Patrol</i>			
Bochum	167	79	1.8	0.9
Münster	129	72	1.3	0.8
<i>Average PSE</i>	<i>174</i>	<i>76</i>	<i>1.8</i>	<i>0.8</i>
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>911</i>		
	<i>Community Policing</i>			
Bochum	196	20	2.7	0.3
Münster	162	18	2.1	0.2
<i>Average PSE</i>	<i>175</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>2.6</i>	<i>0.4</i>
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.094</i>	<i>323</i>		

\*: calls are all incidents to which a citizen took the first step, excluding ‘answering a question from the public’ (var06=65) and ‘chatting with the public’ (var06=84).

### 5.3 Sort of Incidents Involved in Patrol Work

#### *Traffic*



With regard to the total PSE numbers, traffic rather seems to be an issue of emergency patrol than of community policing. It further seems to be a rather German issue as the two German cities both exceed the average PSE numbers of 41.6 by nearly 16 points in Bochum (57.5) and 10 points in Münster 41.6, though this value is not statistically significant (table 5.3). The share of those incidents that were initiated by citizens is particularly high in Bochum, with 38.6, where it nearly doubles the average PSE of 18.9. Citizens initiated more than half of the traffic incidents in Bochum. They reported an accident they either caused themselves, or that they witnessed (see example below). This also included cases of hit-and-run driving. Further incidents were reported due to illegal parking, particularly when this hindered other motorists.

*A citizen reports to have damaged another car on a parking site. Having arrived at the location, the officers check the man's driving licence and the vehicle documents. They ask for his mobile number and issue a ticket of 20 Euro (this is the minimum in such cases). The officer attaches a note to the damaged car, informing the owner about the happenings and informs the man who caused the damage about the further proceedings considering the insurance.*

Incident on May 18, 2006, code 200605051143

In Münster, it is more the officers who initiate the incidents. The rather high score of 82.7 versus the PSE average of 62.9, however, has to be seen in the light of the specific context of the city. More than any other city in Germany, Münster is known for its high proportion of cyclists. This does also show up in the numbers measured here as nearly a quarter of the incidents relates to cycling, e.g. riding without light at night or the illegal transport of an additional person (see example below). This is only exceeded by incidents that occurred during a special speed control that was carried out during observation time and that itself accounts for a quarter of the incidents – all of which were observed on one day. Further, incidents observed in Münster concern to the use of safety belts.

*The officers observe a father cycling along the wrong direction, his son on the carrier. They stop the man and inform him about his wrongdoing, then one officer asks for an ID. The man said that his son (about 7 years) had persuaded him to this action. The officer quite firmly explains that he, being the father, was responsible for the behaviour, not the son. The fault was on him. The father is issued a bill and the officer notes the personal data. Then he asks the father – also referring to his function as a role model, for a more responsible behaviour in future. The officers say goodbye.*

Incident on May 18, 2006, code 200609041245

Table 5.3: proportion of traffic

	Incidents on the initiative of the police		Incidents on the initiative of a citizen		All incidents	
	Number of traffic and non-traffic incidents	Percentage of traffic incidents	Number of traffic and non-traffic incidents	Percentage of traffic incidents	Number of all incidents	Percentage of traffic incidents on initiative of police or public

	<i>Emergency Patrol</i>					
Bochum	84	76.2	83	** 38.6	167	** 57.5
Münster	52	* 82.7	77	29.9	129	51.2
<i>Total PSE</i>	1.074	62.9	1.015	18.9	2.089	41.6
	<i>Community Policing</i>					
Bochum	111	35.1	85	10.6	196	24.5
Münster	113	41.6	49	6.1	162	30.9
<i>Total PSE</i>	567	39.5	658	6.7	2.094	29.2

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

### *Maintaining the law and other main themes in policing*

For the total PSE observations, the highest numbers were found for “maintaining the law” in both EP and CBP incidents. However, the community police work in Bochum differs substantially from this category with significantly lower numbers: 21.9% as opposed to the average of 37.1% for all PSE observations. Accordingly, very few incidents relating to serious crimes were observed with CBP in Bochum (see tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6). Also internal tasks do rather seem to play a minor role for community policing in Bochum and only account for 1.5% compared to a share of 11.6% for the overall PSE observations. The CBP work in Bochum is largely concerned with “networking” and “giving assistance”, particularly answering questions from the public, which differed highly significantly from the total PSE numbers with 27.6 versus 11.4% (see table 5.5).

These differences are in no point paralleled by the other German city and the Bochum-approach seems to be somehow unique for community policing within this study, as about 60 percent of the work refers to ‘answering questions from the public’ and ‘networking’, tasks which are totally in line with the community policing philosophy. The qualitative data reveals that CBP in Bochum was carried out by one officer only. As officers are rather free in determining their style of policing, the explanation for these huge differences may be ascribed to personal traits or preferences. In Münster, on the other side, numbers for “Giving assistance” differ significantly from the average PSE with regard to the work of the emergency patrol. Officers here were for the most part engaged in the acquisition of accident data, assisting helpless persons (see example below) or helping out with rioting people, e.g. at psychiatric departments. Particularly during night shifts, the officers assisted in calls due to the disturbance of the peace.

#### “Giving assistance, EP Münster”

*A female citizen stops the patrol car in the pedestrian zone. She asks for help for an elderly woman with a walking frame. Due to unforeseen road works, she had missed her bus. Now the woman, exhausted because of her handicap, would not know how to get back home. The officers offer to take the woman home. They fold up the walking frame and put it in the boot. Then the infirm lady gets into the patrol car and the officers take her home. In front of her door, she asks the officers how she can make up for it. They say, they had been happy to help. She thanks them and goes home.*

Incident on September 13, 2006, code 200609131155

Table 5.4: patrol work subdivided into main categories (percentages)

	<i>N</i>	<i>Maintain- ing the law</i>	<i>Maintain- ing public order</i>	<i>Giving assistance</i>	<i>Networking</i>	<i>Internal job</i>	<i>Else</i>
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>							
Bochum	167	61.1	8.4	22.2	3.0	0.6	4.8
Münster	129	47.3	3.9	** 38.8	1.6	1.6	7.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>56.8</i>	<i>8.1</i>	<i>23.0</i>	<i>4.9</i>	<i>3.3</i>	<i>4.0</i>
<i>Community Beat Patrol</i>							
Bochum	196	** 21.9	4.6	** 32.7	* 31.6	** 1.5	7.7
Münster	162	34.0	9.3	17.3	22.2	14.2	3.1
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.094</i>	<i>37.1</i>	<i>5.8</i>	<i>18.4</i>	<i>21.4</i>	<i>11.6</i>	<i>5.8</i>

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to 'Total PSE').

Table 5.5: patrol work subdivided into subjects (percentages)

	Traffic				Law		Order/ Assistance					Other		
	Coll.	Viol.	Check	Other	Serious crime	Other	Social problem	Quest. from public	Trouble -some youth	Public order	Other	Net- working	Int. job.	Else
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>														
06 Boch	*12.0	28.1	13.2	4.2	14.4	3.6	4.2	1.2	0.6	4.2	7.8	3.0	0.6	3.0
06 Munst	**17.8	25.6	5.4	3.1	10.1	3.1	13.2	3.1	0.0	0.8	10.1	1.6	1.6	5.4
Tot PSE	6.1	21.9	10.1	3.4	15.5	5.4	8.6	3.8	1.2	5.3	7.6	4.9	3.3	2.8
<i>Community Beat Policing</i>														
06 Boch	1.5	15.8	3.6	3.6	** 1.0	0.5	2.0	** 27.6	0.0	4.6	4.1	** 31.6	** 1.5	2.6
06 Munst	0.6	15.4	** 9.9	4.9	5.6	1.2	1.9	13.0	0.6	6.8	3.7	22.2	14.2	0.0
Tot PSE	0.7	21.5	3.2	3.8	7.4	2.6	3.7	11.4	1.3	3.3	4.3	21.3	11.6	3.8

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

### Serious crimes

Considering the total PSE numbers, serious crimes are generally dealt with by the emergency patrol work, with the majority of incidents initiated by citizens; this is rather clearly matched by the observations carried out with the emergency patrol in Bochum, with 25.3 percent compared to 24.6 to the total PSE. In general, however, the proportion of serious crimes in police patrol work in Germany is in all four forces lower than the average PSE. The CBP in Bochum hardly deal with serious crimes at all, where the number of 1 percents differs highly significantly with the total PSE of 7.4. This goes along with the above findings about the work of Bochum CBP, where the officer is for the main part engaged in mostly positive interaction with citizens. Though not statistically significant both EP and CBP in Münster also deal to a lesser degree with serious crime than the average in PSE.

Table 5.6: proportion of serious crimes

	Incidents on the initiative of the police		Incidents on the initiative of a citizen		All incidents	
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>						
Bochum	84	4.8	83	25.3	167	15.0
Münster	52	1.9	77	15.6	129	10.1
	90		85			
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.074</i>	<i>8.0</i>	<i>1.015</i>	<i>24.6</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>16.1</i>
<i>Community Beat Policing</i>						



Bochum	111	* 0.9	85	1.2	196	* 1.0
Münster	113	3.5	49	8.2	162	4.9
	120		55			
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.436</i>	<i>7.4</i>	<i>658</i>	<i>7.8</i>	<i>2.094</i>	<i>7.5</i>

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

## 5.4 Police Mobilization

Questioning what determines police patrol work we are now looking more closely into those incidents that occurred on the initiative of police officers (table 5.7). Broadly distinguishing between traffic and non-traffic incidents the observations in both Münster and Bochum go along with the average numbers of the overall PSE observations in which about  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the initiated incidents relate to traffic. Regarding non-traffic incidents the numbers in Münster differ significantly from the total PSE with 14.3 percent in Münster versus 32.6. The qualitative descriptions reveal that approximately half of these took place during nightshifts: concerning the assistance of colleagues, actions due to calls from the radio or dealing with helpless people and examining conspicuous sites. Further activities during the day also involved the reuptake of traffic incidents. Like we already suggested from the above data concerning traffic (Table 5.3), the high proportion of cyclists in the city of Münster also accounts for a great deal of traffic incidents that emergency patrol deal with. As table 5.6 reveals, Münster scores rather low with regard to the numbers of serious crimes, indicating that in only 1.9 percent EP deal with serious crimes on their own initiative, compared to an average of 8.0 percent of the total PSE observations.

As was noticed earlier, the community beat patrol in Bochum differs from the average and the numbers further vary concerning the initiation of incidents. With regard to both traffic and non-traffic incidents, the pro-active activities in Bochum are significantly lower than in the total PSE and the Münster data (which roughly matches the total PSE). However, this does not mean that community policing officers in Bochum also deal with fewer incidents: Considering the numbers of incidents, Bochum even scored higher (with 196 incidents) in comparison to both Münster (162) and the average PSE (175). Therefore, there seems to be a 'demand' of community police work among the citizens and a rather positive reaction from the public to this kind of police work. Further analyses reveal that the incidents that were initiated by citizens comprised 78.8% questions and other aspects of networking with the public. Incidents that were initiated by the officer comprise of 33.3 percent traffic, 7.2 percent social order and again aspects of networking (44.1%). All but one were carried out face to face and the qualitative data suggests that the reactions of the public to pro-active police actions were generally positive.

*“The officer notices an older man who grips to a bin. He approaches and addresses him. The man appears a bit confused. The officer asks for his ID. The man does not carry any. The officer asks for his name and date of birth and carries out a check via radio (DST and EMA). It turns out that an old peoples' home had posted him as missing. The officer orders a patrol car in order to get the man back. When the car arrived, the officers quickly consult each other, and then the old man is carried back.”*

Incident on August 30, 2006, code 200608301103

Table 5.7: proportion of incidents on the initiative of the police

	Emergency Patrol
--	------------------

	Traffic		Non-traffic		All incidents	
Bochum	96	66.7	71	28.2	167	50.3
Münster	66	65.2	63	* 14.3	129	40.3
<i>Total PSE</i>	868	77.9	1.221	32.6	2.089	51.4
<i>Community Beat Patrol</i>						
Bochum	48	81.3	148	48.6	196	** 56.6
Münster	50	94.0	112	58.9	162	69.8
	51		124		175	
<i>Total PSE</i>	611	92.8	1.483	58.6	2.094	68.6

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

## 5.5 Knowledge of the People in the Neighbourhood

In Bochum, both emergency patrol and community police officers meet significantly less persons they know during patrol work. For EP this accounts for the incidents in general, while the low numbers for community police only account for other than traffic and social problems. As the above analysis shows, the main contacts of CBP in Bochum referred to traffic and social problems and people asking for the way. This result is therefore explainable; however, the low numbers of EP are surprising. Regarding the area that is covered by EP it turns out that the officers in Bochum cover a rather low area, with 32 km<sup>2</sup> compared to an average of 137.2. Equally, the ratio of inhabitants per officer comprises only a third of the Münster numbers (450 in Bochum, compared to 1470 citizens per officer in Münster; see also Table 5.x). However, the numbers can be explained by the fact that EP work is often carried out from the police car, thereby not allowing to make any further contacts, additionally, EP officers do mostly deal with traffic – and here this mainly refers to car incidents – which may also involve a number of people who only pass by the highly frequented area.

*“Two women address the officer. They say a man insulted and threatened them. The description sounds familiar to the officer. He promises to care for it. He explains to me that the person is a well known psycho, who looks like Elvis and everybody would therefore call him Elvis. The officer asks a man if he saw Elvis. He explains to him that Elvis had been walking into a passage. The officer goes along there and finds Elvis short time later in a shop. He addresses him and asks what had happened. The officer also calls him Elvis, which seems to be absolutely okay for the man. The officer asks him to leave the people alone, otherwise he would get arrested.”*

Incident on August 31, 2006, Code 200808311340

Table 5.8: proportion of incidents in which the officers meet an acquaintance: EP

	Traffic		Social problems		Other		All incidents	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>								
Bochum	96	1.0	18	22.2	53	7.5	167	* 5.4
Münster	66	1.5	20	15.0	43	9.3	129	6.2
<i>Total PSE</i>	868	2.8	294	35.7	927	14.5	2.089	12.6
<i>Community Beat Patrol</i>								
Bochum	48	0.0	27	74.1	121	* 24.0	196	25.0
Münster	50	16.0	10	80.0	102	36.3	162	32.7
<i>Total PSE</i>	611	7.5	168	57.7	1.315	38.3	2.094	30.9

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

## 5.6 Marginal persons

Incidents involving marginal persons, like alcoholics, drug addicts or homeless people rather – and obviously – occur in non-traffic situations. Of these, most incidents are dealt with by the officers working on community beat patrols. Here, Bochum district police again scores very high with a highly significant number that more than doubles the average PSE results, while Münster data exactly matches the average PSE numbers of 4.3 versus 11.7 in Bochum. The qualitative data suggest a relation of these high numbers and a specific style of policing. The district officer seemed to have a very good knowledge of the marginalised persons in his district. When patrolling, he pro-actively approached and talked to marginal groups or individuals. The encounters were always friendly, even when the officer had to ask them to leave a certain place. He knew the people by name and was known to them and accepted, as his orders were generally complied with.

*“The drug counselling centre is a well known meeting point of the Bochum Junky scene. The officer greets the group of about 20 persons, who assembled in front of the building, he asks if things are all right and if they can keep the pavement clear. Friendly encounter. The group complies with his request and gets out of the way “*

Incident on August 28; 2006, code 200608280958

On several occasions the observer noted that the CBP officer went up to persons he did not know, introduced himself and his job and asked for the person’s name. Nearly all incidents that involve marginal persons were initiated by the officer (84%; or 20 incidents respectively). Twice a person addressed the officer, once somebody hinted to a drunken person on a bench. In all cases, those self-initiated and when he was addressed, the officer reacted friendly and calm.

*“The officer is addressed by an older man. His looks are odd and rough, he wears leather gear, carries a radio on his belt and headphones. On his chest, a sticker he attached, saying “POLICE”. Later the officer told me that the man is a well-known psycho, who sees himself as a special police agent. The Bochum police call the man “Herrminator”, because his first name is Herrmann. Each day he cycles around the city and plays police. The citizens got used to him, there is hardly any trouble, the officer explained. The officer is friendly with “Herrminator”. He tells him about reconstructions at the central station and that he could keep an eye on that. He does not make fun of the man but tries to involve him, as far as that is possible. “Herrminator” patrols with us for a while and then says good-bye again.”*

Incident on September 05, 2006, code 200609051058

Table 5.9: proportions of incidents with marginal persons

	Traffic		Non-traffic		All incidents	
	PSE – EP					
Bochum	96		71		167	6.6
Münster	66		63		129	4.7
Total PSE	868		1.221		2.089	5.8

	<i>PSE – CBP</i>					
Bochum	48		148		196	** 11.7
Münster	50		112		162	4.3
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>611</i>		<i>1.483</i>		<i>2.094</i>	<i>4.3</i>

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

## 5.7 The Outcome of Incidents

The outcomes of incidents are measured in terms of repressive measures taken by the officers, divided into warnings, summons or tickets issued to citizens and arrests. Considering the overall numbers, German emergency policing looks rather repressive, as lot summons are issued, where the numbers in both cities double the average PSE (table 5.10a). On the other hand, the Münster district police scores significantly low with regard to warnings that they take out to citizens, and also summons and arrests in Münster are below the PSE average, though not significant.

*Table 5.10a: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – all incidents*

	N	Warning	Summons	Arrest	One of these
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>					
Bochum	167	21.6	** 22.8	4.8	** 49.1
Münster	129	22.5	** 20.9	3.1	46.5
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>20.1</i>	<i>10.4</i>	<i>5.0</i>	<i>35.4</i>
<i>Community Beat Patrol</i>					
Bochum	196	18.4	1.5	1.0	20.9
Münster	162	** 6.2	1.9	0.6	** 8.6
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>20.0</i>	<i>3.1</i>	<i>1.3</i>	<i>24.4</i>

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Dividing the incidents into traffic and non-traffic observations, a clear distinction must be drawn between the two cities, as the high numbers of summons in Münster that are issued by emergency patrol officers relate to traffic incidents (table 5.10b), while in Bochum a significantly high number of summons are issued in non-traffic incidents (table 5.10c). The numbers here are nearly four times as high (9.9) as in the average PSE observations (2.5).

*Table 5.10b: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – in the sphere of traffic*

	N	Warning	Summons	Arrest	One of these
<i>PSE</i>					
Bochum	96	30.2	32.3	0.0	62.5
Münster	66	30.3	** 39.4	1.5	71.2
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>868</i>	<i>35.7</i>	<i>21.4</i>	<i>1.2</i>	<i>58.3</i>
<i>PSE</i>					
Bochum	48	54.2	4.2	0.0	58.3
Münster	50	** 20.0	2.0	0.0	** 22.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>611</i>	<i>59.9</i>	<i>8.2</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>68.1</i>

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

The huge differences, however, become more obvious by looking into the qualitative descriptions: In Münster, EP officers carried out a speed control during observation time. The summonses that were issued for the period of this control (that only lasted one hour), account for nearly 30% of the Münster EP summons in traffic situations. About half of the remaining cases related to misdemeanours (no seat belt fastened, cycling in the wrong direction), the officers detected while they were out on patrol. This can be related to the awareness of the officers and the focus they have while on patrol and the principle of the mandatory prosecution of offences (section 5.1). Further, the local circumstances of Münster as a ‘cycling city’ is mirrored in these results: Three of the summons (26 in total) involved cyclists both as offender and as a casualty, involved in an accident.

Big differences are found with regard to the kind or style of policing. Münster CBP carries out more roadside stops than any other police (table A.13). However, none of the checks resulted in a summon and only few warnings were taken out. The warnings concerned: speed, use of seat belts, cyclists disregarding traffic lights or one-way street. On two occasions, the officers allowed motorists to hand in their driving licence at a later occasion and refrained from an official summon. At both occasions, the respective citizens complied with this offer. Compared to the work of emergency patrol officers, CBP more often issue warnings instead of summons, though often dealing with the same offences. Two examples of how community beat patrol and emergency patrol deal with the same incident, are given below:

Community beat patrol, Münster

*Being on patrol, the officers notice a motorist without a fastened seat belt. The officer turns and stops the man. In the meantime, the man has his belt fastened. The officer explains the law and that he was actually due a fine of 30€. He only issues a warning because the man showed some insight in his behaviour. Having checked the papers, the officer said goodbye, again referring to the seatbelt law. Incident on May 15, 2006, code 200605151750*

Emergency patrol, Münster

*During patrol, the officers stop a man driving without seat belt fastened. They inform him about this. Then they carry out a check on the driving licence and the vehicle registration certificate. Both results are negative. Then one officer issues a fine of 30 €. This was payable within a week also the man should have his belt fastened in future occasions. He said goodbye and the officers proceed their patrol.*

*Incident on September 26, 2006, code 200609261847*

*Table 5.10c: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – outside the sphere of traffic*

	N	Warning	Summons	Arrest	One of these
	<i>PSE</i>				
Bochum	71	9.9	** 9.9	11.3	31.0
Münster	63	14.3	1.6	4.8	20.6
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.221</i>	<i>8.9</i>	<i>2.5</i>	<i>7.7</i>	<i>19.2</i>
	<i>PSE</i>				



Bochum	148	6.8	0.7	1.4	8.8
Münster	112	0.0	1.8	0.9	2.7
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.483</i>	<i>3.5</i>	<i>1.0</i>	<i>1.8</i>	<i>6.3</i>

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Emergency patrol police in Bochum issues summons in non-traffic incident four times more often than the average PSE. The summonses refer to situations of assault, theft and fare dodging. These numbers also go along with the incidents police deal with in general. Bochum EP is more than any other force dealing with cases of assault, with 5.4, compared to a PSE average of 1.3. Local circumstances related to the city's high grade of urbanisation and population density may account for this, though even large cities like Oslo or Brussels not even come close to these numbers (0 cases in Oslo and 2.5 in Brussels). However, according to statistics of criminality 2006 of NRW that were issued by NRW police, Bochum was among the three cities with the highest frequency of crime. This is related to the fact that in 2005 and 2006 several large cases of fraud had been completed in Bochum (Landeskriminalamt NRW, 2007, p. 16).

## 5.8 Use of Information Sources

The use of information sources refers to the officers consulting additional sources in order to proceed with incidents and to check on persons. A source from a citizen can be a personal ID, a driving licence, the vehicle registration certificate or other documents, but also other information provided. Though citizens in Germany generally prove their identity by the personal ID, the Personalausweis, it is not mandatory to carry it. Motorists, on the other hand, are obliged to have their driving licence and the registration certificate of the vehicle they are using, at hand. Sources from a citizen in Germany are therefore, generally manual.

Checking on persons' identities, places of residence, car ownerships and so on, police however refer to digital sources, stored in various databases. A check is generally carried out via the general operational centre, which then inform the officers on the street. Being at the station, the officers can also carry out the search themselves (see also section 5.2 above). These outer circumstances and procedures are reflected in the results of our observations: Hardly any sources from citizens are digital and reversely, the police hardly draws on any manual sources. An exception is found however in Münster, where the CBP made highly significantly more use of manual sources 11.1% versus a European average of 3.4%, table 5.11a). Bochum EP on the other hand draws highly significantly more on manual information sources from citizens and digital information from the police than the PSE average (50.9 versus 28.8 and 41.3 versus 22.6%, respectively, see table 5.11a). A deeper analysis of the data will account for these differences:

*Table 5.11a: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – all incidents*

	N	Source from a citizen		Source from the police		One or more of these
		Manual	Digital	Manual	Digital	
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>						
Bochum	167	** 50.9	0.6	0.6	** 41.3	** 60.5
Münster	129	30.2	0.8	3.1	29.5	41.9
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>28.8</i>	<i>0.7</i>	<i>2.7</i>	<i>22.6</i>	<i>39.9</i>
<i>Community Beat Policing</i>						

Bochum	196	13.3	0.0	0.5	5.1	14.3
Münster	162	13.6	1.2	** 11.1	6.2	* 27.8
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.094</i>	<i>14.0</i>	<i>0.4</i>	<i>3.4</i>	<i>6.0</i>	<i>18.9</i>

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

### *Traffic incidents*

In traffic incidents, Bochum emergency police uses information sources (manual from citizens and digital police information sources) significantly more often than the average PSE (see table 5.11b). In traffic incidents, the Bochum emergency patrol refer to their own observations, contributions from the persons involved and on information from a computer file, they had consulted. The sources were used for dealing with accidents with and without casualties, traffic stops and traffic violation.

*Tabel 5.11b: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – in the sphere of traffic*

	N	Source from a citizen		Source from the police		One or more of these
		Manual	Digital	Manual	Digital	
		<i>PSE</i>				
Bochum	96	** 65.6	0.0	1.0	* 47.9	** 75.0
Münster	66	48.5	0.0	6.1	43.9	60.6
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>868</i>	<i>46.9</i>	<i>0.2</i>	<i>3.6</i>	<i>32.1</i>	<i>57.1</i>
		<i>PSE</i>				
Bochum	48	31.3	0.0	2.1	6.3	31.3
Münster	50	38.0	0.0	0.0	8.0	38.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>611</i>	<i>23.0</i>	<i>0.0</i>	<i>2.1</i>	<i>11.8</i>	<i>25.5</i>

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

### *Non-traffic incidents*

The consultancy of manual sources from citizens and digital police sources are both significantly more often carried out by the Bochum EP service than the PSE average, with 31.0 versus 15.9 for manual sources from citizens and 32.4 versus 15.9. for digital sources from the police. The information from manual sources from citizens was used in cases of shoplifting, assault, in suspicious situations and when dealing with cases of public or social order. The use of digital police sources was carried out in connection with the same kind of incidents, thereby corresponding with the citizens' sources.

Only Münster police often consults a specific manual information source (see table 5.11c). The community beat patrol here score more than four times as high with a number of 16.1 versus 3.1 in the average PSE observations. The explanation for these differences however is simple: The officers carry a map with them, which they use whenever asked for direction. It is a city map, issued by the tourist information, that then can even leave with the citizens if necessary. Most of the other incidents where the officers consulted manual information sources related to the search of persons in connection with arrest warrants. Carrying out arrest warrants is a basic component of Münster district policing. Here, the officers gained information from the persons involved themselves or from third parties. Also their own experience played a role and documents they had been issued at the station or from another institution, for example the documents used for an arrest warrant. In contrast, the manual sources from citizens are hardly playing a role for Münster CBP. The number of 2.7 is significantly low compared to the average of 10.3 in the overall PSE observations.

Table 5.11c: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – outside the sphere of traffic

	N	Source from a citizen		Source from the police		One or more of these
		Manual	Digital	Manual	Digital	
<i>PSE – EP</i>						
Bochum	71	** 31.0	1.4	0.0	** 32.4	40.8
Münster	63	11.1	1.6	0.0	14.3	22.2
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.221</i>	<i>15.9</i>	<i>1.0</i>	<i>2.1</i>	<i>15.9</i>	<i>27.7</i>
<i>PSE – CBP</i>						
Bochum	148	7.4	0.0	0.0	4.7	8.8
Münster	112	* 2.7	1.8	** 16.1	5.4	23.2
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.483</i>	<i>10.3</i>	<i>0.5</i>	<i>3.9</i>	<i>3.6</i>	<i>16.2</i>

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

## 5.9 What determines what is involved in Police Patrol Work?


Before turning to the determinants of police patrol work we summarise the above analysis and present an overview of what is involved in the work of the emergency patrol and the community beat patrols in Bochum and in Münster. In doing so we draw on the main categories of 1) traffic, 2) maintaining the law, 3) order and assistance and 4) networking, internal jobs and other issues. (The numbers are drawn from table 5.5 and A.5 respectively).

Table 5.12: patrol work subdivided into the main subjects (percentages)

	Traffic	Maintaining the law	Order/ Assistance	Networking / Internal job/ other
<i>PSE – EP</i>				
Bochum	57,5	18,0	18	6,6
Münster	51,9	13,2	27,2	8,6
PSE	41,5	20,9	26,5	11
<i>PSE – CBP</i>				
Bochum	24,5	1,5	38,3	35,7
Münster	30,8	6,8	26	36,4
PSE	29,2	10	24	36,7


Summarising the above analysis, the majority of emergency police patrol work in the two German cities is concerned with traffic issues (57% in Bochum and 52 % in Münster, while the average PSE amounts only to 41, 5%). Accordingly, most of the other tasks are below the PSE average. While issues of ‘order and assistance’ in Münster slightly exceed the PSE average (27,2% versus 26,5%) , the two forces do not so much deal with ‘maintaining the law’ which would actually be seen more as a task of emergency patrol.

Figure 5.1: Main subjects involved in Emergency patrol work in Bochum and Münster (percentages).



Looking at the work distribution of the community beat patrols, the differences in the profile of the two approaches becomes obvious. Networking plays a more subordinate role for EP, CBP officers do little deal with maintaining the law while their other tasks seem to be more balanced with similar shares in dealing with traffic, order and assistance and networking.

Figure 5.2: Main subjects involved in community beat patrol work in Bochum and Münster (percentages).



In a second step we now to turn to the determinants of such differences and refer to the conceptual model of police patrol work that was presented on page 14, earlier in this book. The model considers that police patrol work is determined by basic assignment, basic strategy, management control and police leadership, exceptional local circumstances, local urbanization and national features. In this section we will now describe how the police work that was observed in the two German cities is informed by these different factors. In order to do so we will go through the results looking how the respective factors do account for what and how police patrol work is carried out in Bochum and in Münster.

The high numbers of traffic incidents that the German police, in particular the EP officers deal with may be ascribed to specific **national features**. Of all countries that have been observed in this study, Germany has a very dense traffic infrastructure (here especially in Bochum) and it has the highest proportion of cars per 1000 inhabitants: with 573, compared to for example 458 for the Netherlands in 2006 (welt in zahlen, 2009). This may also go along with the rather high numbers of summons that are issued by the EP officers in Germany, because as a result of an accident people are often summoned to give testimony. The results also revealed that about half of the traffic incidents in Bochum are initiated by citizens who called or reported about their own or witnessed incidents. In cases of accidents officers are then legally obliged to fine the person responsible for the accident. Although this is known to most motorists, even at minor crashes without casualties, people tend to rather call the police than to deal with the

accident privately. So this may also be an issue of national culture and it is not unknown of that the car is said to be the ‘the Germans’ dearest child’.

The high numbers of citizens’ calls in Bochum contradicts the assumption that a high degree of urbanisation goes along with fewer calls. On the other hand, it may particularly be the higher degree of anonymisation that may encourage people to call the police and to report an accident to an official body – while one may otherwise have dealt with things in private. Local urbanisation may also be responsible for the rather low numbers of serious crimes that Münster police deals with in the more provincial ‘Münsterland’.

In Bochum, on the other hand EP issued summons at non-traffic four times more often than the average PSE and they are more than any other force dealing with cases of assault. While this at a first glance may be determined by urbanisation, there must also be **exceptional local circumstances** that explain these differences because other large cities like Oslo or Brussels not even come close to these numbers (0 cases in Oslo and 2.5 in Brussels). As it was mentioned elsewhere, reasons for this may lie in the fact that several large cases of fraud had been completed in Bochum in 2005 and 2006 (Landeskriminalamt NRW, 2007, p. 16).

Another feature of the Münster observations relates to the high numbers of cyclists in this city. Rather than speaking of ‘exceptional local circumstances’ one may refer to **specific local circumstances**. So it was shown that the high proportion of cyclists accounted for a great deal of traffic incidents that EP officers deal with, so that the character of the city is reflected in the style of policing.

**Management control and police leadership** was also found to have an impact on what is involved in police patrol work, again relating to the sphere of traffic: It turned out that 30 percent of the incidents in Münster were noted during a one-hour long traffic check that was ordered by the Northrhine-Westphalian home office. The ‘management by objectives’, for example to require a patrol team to fine a specific number of motorists for no seat belts fastened or phoning while driving has more and more become part of police management in NRW.

The impact of the **basic policing strategy** and ‘the way we do things around here’ is reflected at several points in this study, especially with regard to the CBP work. In contrast to their EP colleagues the officers seem to have more freedom to frame their work and to incorporate aspects of their personality and interests. The analysis revealed that in particular the CBP in Bochum differs in a number of ways from the way this work is carried out by other forces. Surprisingly however, it was found that Bochum CBP initiates significantly fewer incidents. On the other hand the qualitative descriptions revealed that the officer was openly present in the city centre. He seemed to be well known and to have a distinct knowledge of the area and the people around him. In this respect he was not directly initiating incidents but his apparent open attitude welcomed people to approach him. A great deal of this work relates to ‘giving assistance’ after the citizens’ demand. This suggests that there is indeed a need for assistance among citizens and a ‘willingness’ to approach the police which only became evident because the officer was available and easy approachable.

Handling marginal persons is a further issue that is nearly solely dealt with by CBP and again, in particular by the police of Bochum. As the qualitative data suggest, the district officer seemed to have a very good knowledge of the marginalised persons in his district. When patrolling, he pro-actively approached and talked to marginal groups or individuals and in



contrast to the overall numbers of initiation, 80 percent of all incidents involving marginal persons were initiated by the CBP officer in Bochum.

In this respect, however, it should be noted that there may also be an **effect of the study** itself: The decision of Bochum police that our observer should accompany this specific officer during the research phase may not have been accidental. The district officer for the city centre is very engaged and enthusiastic in his work and experienced in dealing with people and media. He regularly appears as the local radio operator at the German reality TV Series ‚Toto und Harry‘, in which two officers of the Bochum emergency patrol service are accompanied by a TV production team (see also Spiegel, 2009). On the other hand, such enthusiasm can also be seen as something desirable.

**Information sources** play a determining role for police patrol work when they are used as a basis of the situational picture after which then tasks are assigned to the different units. Information sources are a channel to communicate citizen’s calls to the units. In most of the patrol work, however, they are being used as a tool for dealing with current issues.

## References

- Amnesty International (2004): Back in the Spotlight - Allegations of police ill-treatment and excessive use of force in Germany. Available at <http://web.amnesty.org>
- BPol (2008). <http://www.bundespolizei.de/> [October 2008].
- Das, Dilip K. (1993): Policing in six countries around the world: organizational perspectives; [Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, India, New Zealand] Chicago, OICJ, The Univ. of Illinois.
- Deutsche Bundesregierung (Homepage): <http://www.bundesregierung.de/en>
- Ewald, Uwe; Feltes, Thomas (2003): Policing a Multicultural Society – Germany. In: Policing and Society 7, pp. 165-196.
- Feltes, Thomas (1993): The Function and the Role of the Police in the Federal Republic of Germany. In: Social Changes, Crime and Police, J. Vigh and G. Katona (eds.), Budapest, pp.331-340.
- Feltes, Thomas (1995): Policing in Germany. In: Comparisons in Policing: An International Perspective, ed. By Jean-Paul Brodeur, Aldershot/Brookfield/Hong Kong/ Singapore/ Sydney, pp.184-190.
- Feltes, Thomas (2002): Community Oriented Policing in Germany – Training and Education. In: Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategy and Management, 25, 1, pp. 48-59.
- First Periodical Report on Crime and Crime Control in Germany (Erster Periodischer Sicherheitsbericht) (2001), Berlin; available on the internet at [www.bka.de](http://www.bka.de) and [www.bmi.bund.de](http://www.bmi.bund.de).
- Focus online (2006). Dutzende Jugendliche bedrängen Polizisten. Retrieved from [http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/kreuzberg\\_aid\\_119336.html](http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/kreuzberg_aid_119336.html)
- Gramckow, Heike P. (1995): The influences of history and the rule of law on the development of community policing in Germany. In: Police Studies, 18, 2, 1995, pp. 17 – 32.
- Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen (2007). Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 2006. Retrieved from <http://www.polizei-nrw.de/lka/stepone/data/downloads/e1/00/00/pks-jahrbuch-2006.pdf>
- Lange, H.J. (1999). Innere Sicherheit im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.
- Posiege, P. & Steinschulte-Leidig, B. (1999). Bürgernahe Polizeiarbeit in Deutschland. BKA-Forschung. Bundeskriminalamt: Wiesbaden
- Polizei NRW (2006). Organigramm. Available from: <http://www1.polizei-nrw.de/muenster/Organisation/> [14.01.2007].

Shell [http://www-static.shell.com/static/deu/downloads/aboutshell/our\\_strategy/mobility\\_scenarios/shell\\_mobility\\_scenarios\\_charts.pdf](http://www-static.shell.com/static/deu/downloads/aboutshell/our_strategy/mobility_scenarios/shell_mobility_scenarios_charts.pdf)

Spiegel (2010). Drinnen Vorlesung mit Toto & Harry - draußen wird ihr Streifenwagen zertrümmert. Available from: <http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/wunderbar/0,1518,672173,00.html>

Welt-in-Zahlen (2006). Ländervergleich. Available from: <http://www.welt-in-zahlen.de/laendervergleich.phtml?indicator=126>

## CHAPTER 6

**6. Policing the Streets in Belgium**

*Van Altert Katrien*<sup>51</sup>, *Els Enhus*<sup>52</sup>

**The Belgian Police**

A range of scandals in the police forces in Belgium that started in the 1980s and were the object of parliamentary research commissions (Enhus 1998) resulted in 1996 in a political consensus (Ponsaers and De Kimpe 2001) that only a radical change in the Belgian police system would give it back its lost legitimacy (Enhus and Ponsaers 2005). Decided in 1998 and implemented in 2001 the *gendarmerie*<sup>53</sup>, the judicial police<sup>54</sup> and the ‘local police’<sup>55</sup> were reformed to an integrated police service structured on two levels (a federal level and a local level). Both levels have the same core tasks -the maintenance of order (including traffic) and crime investigation- but are subsidiary to each other. The law<sup>56</sup> stipulates that both levels have no hierarchical bounds, they are autonomous. However, in order to realise an integrated police both levels have functional bounds.

The local level consists of 192 ‘zones’<sup>57</sup> of police. Each ‘zone’ is autonomous but has the obligation to deliver ‘basispolitiezorg’ or ‘basic police care’ to the citizens on their territory, which requires them to fulfill 6 functions: intervention, reception, crime investigation, care of victims, order maintenance and community beat patrol (KB, 2001; Vandevoorde, Vaerewyck et al. 2003). Besides this basic police care, the local police is obliged to fulfil a series of tasks for the federal level. The local level is the operational level, approximately 25.000 of the 45.000 police officers work at this level.

The subsidiary principle of the federal level dictates that police problems that are not linked to or transgress the boundaries of a zone are dealt by the federal level. It also means that problems that need a specialised knowledge and/or equipment are handled by the federal

---

<sup>51</sup> Assistant department Criminology, Interuniversity research group Social Security Analysis (SVA), Vrije Universiteit Brussel

<sup>52</sup> Professor department Criminology, Interuniversity research group Social Security Analysis (SVA), Vrije Universiteit Brussel

<sup>53</sup> The ‘Gendarmerie’ or ‘Rijkswacht’ was until 1992 the state police service, a military force with as there core tasks maintaining order and criminal investigation.

<sup>54</sup> The ‘Gerechtelijke politie bij de parketten’ or ‘Police Judiciaire des Parquets’ was a small specialised force with an exclusive judicial task.

<sup>55</sup> In Belgium there existed 598 forces of ‘Gemeentepolitie’ or ‘Police Communal’ at the time of the police reform. They had the same core tasks as the ‘gendarmerie’: maintaining order and criminal investigation at the local level.

<sup>56</sup> Wet 7 december 1998 tot organisatie van een geïntegreerde politiedienst, gestructureerd op twee niveaus, B.S., 5 januari 1999.

<sup>57</sup> A ‘zone’ can consist of one big city or of more municipalities. Because of the principle of the municipal autonomy the federal level was not allowed to propose any territorial restructuring of the police forces. The ‘zones’ were created on the personal initiative of the mayors who negotiated for a certain area a voluntary cooperation. As a result the creation of the ‘zones’ was purely motivated by political aims and not by policing needs. 598 municipalities were reformed to 196 zones. 50 police zones coincide with the territory of one city or town (one-city-zone) and 146 coincide with more than one city and / or town (multiple municipal zone). By creating the ‘zone’ a new administrative level was put into place. In the case of a multiple municipal zone the conduct of a police ‘zone’ is in the hands of the college of mayors. They appoint a president who is responsible for the daily conduct and contacts with the police chief. The college is accountable to the police Council that is composed of several municipality Council members from the municipalities concerned.

police. The federal level is obliged to give support to the local level. A local police force can ask for personnel and means<sup>58</sup> in certain cases.

So although both levels are autonomous, there are functional bounds that enable integrated and complementary work. Two important principles<sup>59</sup> make this integration possible: the functioning of the federal police is consolidated in the national security plan. This plan contains an outline of future functioning and priorities of the federal police. The functioning of the local police on the other hand needs to be stipulated in a police plan for the 'zone'. This zonal plan has to take into account the priorities and plans of action defined on the federal level. Only when a certain problem is absent in the particular zone, the choice of own priorities is allowed. A second important principle is the obligation of the local level to send its information to a centralized information system (the national data warehouse). To enable this way of working, each local force works with the same software (ISLP) and is automatically linked to the central system. Daily the local information is automatically downloaded to this central system. As compensation the local level can receive information gathered on the federal level or in other zones. In order to develop functional information crossroads, a service (AIK) has been created at judicial district level to function as the link between the federal and local levels for operational, control and policy information.

After the implementation of the new police structure the minister of interior introduced the principle of community oriented policing in 2003 (CP1 en CP2). These guidelines instruct the Belgian police to develop COP by working on five important principles. They have to work (1) community oriented, (2) in partnership with other actors involved in certain security problems (3) problem oriented (4) while increasing the empowerment of both the public and the policemen (5) and be accountable for the followed police policy. Both the local and federal level should implement this philosophy. On the federal level the police chiefs were not convinced that this view would be applicable and some of the guidelines were translated into 'intelligence led policing'. In reality the degree in which COP has been implemented in the Belgian local forces is highly diverse. Nearly every force do efforts to invest more in the community beat policemen. However, only in a small amount of them there are attempts to implement the philosophy throughout the whole force. (Vandevoorde, Vaerewyck et al. 2003) Due to resistance on the work floor (and even from the police chiefs themselves), the implementation of community oriented policing is generally evaluated as not really successful (Easton, Ponsaers et al. 2008)

### **Organisation of emergency intervention and community beat patrol in Belgium**

Only the local level is responsible for the organisation of emergency intervention and community beat patrol. In order to guarantee every Belgian citizen the same level of basic police care, the six functions, that have to be delivered by each local level (KB, 2001), are described by law and norms are imposed (PLP10).

In the KB 2001 article 2 the function '**community beat patrol**' is defined as: 'delivering a visible, approachable and contactable police service that is maximally oriented to the needs and expectations of the setting'. The ministerial circular (PLP10) describes the function

---

<sup>58</sup> For example in case of public disorder problems a police force can get support from other police zones or/and from the general federal reserve and can ask for the Special Intervention Units (SWAT), the Dogs Division, the Air Support Division, the management of operational documentation or the documentation needed by the police services in the field in order to complete their missions, data processing, telephone and radio-communication and the international and operational police co-operation.

<sup>59</sup> Other principles are: a common selection and recruitment procedure has been developed and training has been harmonized, all police officers have the same status; a code of ethics is applied to all members of all police services.



‘community beat patrol’ as the cornerstone of a community oriented police. Therefore their tasks are much more diverse than the administrative tasks they traditionally execute. The traditional role of the community beat patrol can mainly be categorized under what is defined in this research as ‘internal affairs’. This category refers to a variety of administrative tasks such as checking newcomers, dispatching fines and convocations for the tribunal, getting declarations from people in running judicial cases, intervening in cold cases and conflicts, and so on... In important part of these administrative tasks can be categorized under the term of so called ‘kantschriften’. In Belgium police officers are obliged to report each criminal act to the public prosecutor. From that moment onwards the prosecutor has the leading role in deciding which steps are to be taken in the criminal investigation<sup>60</sup>. By means of ‘kantschriften’, notes in the margins of the report, missions (often the hearing of suspects, neighbours, checking of alibis, decisions of the prosecutor ...) are ordered to the police. After a mission has been fulfilled by the police, the results are sent to the prosecutor. After studying the new information a new mission is given and so on. In the Belgian police lots there is a lot of criticism on this cumbersome and slow way of working. In every day work these missions are usually dispatched to the community beat officers. Because of the huge amount of paper work involved with these ‘kantschriften’, community beat officers are often called the ‘postman’ of the public prosecutor.

The ministerial circular clearly wants to change this traditional role of the community beat patrol. Following the new guidelines, community beat officers have to concentrate on enhancing their contacts with the public by executing new tasks that can consist of: collecting and giving information to citizens, communicating expectations of citizens to civil services, performing preventive controls and patrols to enhance the feelings of safety, listening to complaints and trying to find solutions for problems, detecting and trying to solve small conflicts (restorative approach), detecting sources of safety problems and crime, intervention in cold cases (instead of emergency patrols) where the specialised knowledge of the beat officer is needed, control and follow-up of persons under parole. The former administrative tasks are only to be exercised in a restricted manner: only when specialised knowledge is needed or former personal contact with the concerned citizen has taken place.

When organising this function the zone should take into account specific local circumstances and the density of the population to create beats with a geographical even dispersion. The compulsory norm is minimal 1 beat officer/4000 citizens. Later on the ministry of home affairs proposed a not compulsory adaption of this norm: in rural zones 1/4000 citizens, in towns 1/3000 and in big cities 1/2000. The average figures for Belgium are indicated in next table.

	<b>Wallonië</b>	<b>Brussel</b>	<b>Vlaanderen</b>	<b>België</b>
<b>ZVP 2003-04</b>	1.898	2.067	3.169	2.567
<b>ZVP 2005 – 08</b>	1.851	2.245	3.171	2.497

<sup>60</sup> With exception of minor facts where the police is allowed to dress a limited report (VPV) and no further actions are taken. In certain minor cases with unknown suspects, defined on a list, the police dresses an APO (Autonomic police inquiry) that is send to the prosecutor and gets 3 months to start an inquiry.

The goal of the function of ‘**emergency patrol**’ is to respond to every call that requires a police intervention in a reasonable time (KB, 2001, art.4). Urgent calls have priority, non urgent tasks can be performed when there is time left over (PLP10). In quiet moments these tasks can be extended by tasks that can immediately be stopped in case of emergency, such as directed patrol work, tasks with a federal character (f.e. surveying money transports ..), certain prescribed controls ( f.e. traffic controls, surveillance of places..), inquiries of limited scope (hearing a suspect..).

The emergency patrol has to be organised on a 24 hour base in each police zone. The frequency and nature of the calls in the zone have to be taken into account when determining the amount of shifts. The minimal norm is one intervention team during the 24 hours and one supplementary team 84h/week. At all times a chief officer has to be permanently reachable. Opposed to the community beat patrol, the ministerial circular doesn’t translate the working of the emergency patrol in terms of community policing.

### **Police in Brussels, Dendermonde and Aarschot**

#### *Socio-demographic characteristics of the cities*

The multiple municipal police zone Brussels (capital)<sup>61</sup> - Elsenne consists of three districts: Brussels-capital, Laken and Elsenne. In each district there are several police offices: five in Brussels-capital, six in Laken and four in Elsenne. Observations were made in the fourth police office of the district Brussels-capital. This area consists of two neighbourhoods: ‘Oude Markt’ and ‘Anneessens’. The neighbourhood around the ‘Oude Markt’ is known as the ‘Marollen’, one of the oldest parts of Brussels and a very typical and populist block. 47,30% of the population are workmen and 30,80% clerks. Quite a large proportion of these people are unemployed: 50% lives of a replacement income. The former industry has vanished and has been replaced by a growing tertiary sector that doesn’t recruit within the area itself, but outside the Marollen. Because of the low housing prices the Marollen have a growing attraction on young alternative people and the gentrification process is in full development. As a consequence it has recently become a bustling area. There are always many people wandering the streets, not so much the real locals, but especially visitors who stop by the many shops that are located there or the popular flea market on the ‘Vossenplein’. The area has a double-sided image: on the one hand there is a lot of poverty and many homeless people can be seen sleeping in small alleys or wandering the streets. On the other hand trendy bars and restaurants as well as higher-class people are settling themselves in this neighbourhood, by which its standard is changing to that of a trendy neighbourhood, including higher renting prices and renovations of degenerated buildings. The whole area is characterised by a very multicultural population. Several local circumstances influence the activity of the police. There are about 10 schools that require some degree of surveillance, there’s a community welfare centre that enquires the assistance of the police, there’s a university hospital and there are many shops and the coming and going of about 250 market traders. On top of that, there’s an intensive night life, mainly due to the presence of several popular night clubs such as The Fuse, Le Bazaar etc... There are also seven blocks of social apartments that inhabit about 4000 people, many of them of a foreign origin. The crime level is relatively high with a concentration of thievery of all sorts.

---

<sup>61</sup> Brussels consists in 19 municipalities which were grouped to 4 police force zones. The zone where the research took place is formed by the municipality Brussels capital and the municipality Elsenne. Together they form the zone Brussel-Elsene.

**Dendermonde** is a city located in the East of Flanders and is being surrounded by three main cities: Ghent, Antwerp and Brussels. The city consists of eight sub communities: Appels, Dendermonde, Sint-Gillis-bij-Dendermonde, Baasrode, Grembergen, Mespelare, Oudegem and Schoonaarde. Dendermonde has a centre function in the area. There are 11 schools, there's the hospital St Blavius and the city is economically very active: it is the fourth most important trade centre in the East of Flanders. There's a relatively large industrial zone, several trade zones and a large number of companies are spread over the city and sub communities. There's a lot of agricultural land and quite some nature and forestry. Dendermonde is appealing to a lot of tourists: especially the old city centre and borders of the Schelde are popular districts. The nightlife takes place in the city centre and around the station. There are no night clubs. The crime rate in Dendermonde is relatively low compared to the surrounding cities. The police zone coincides with the borders of the city (one-city zone).

**Aarschot** is situated on the transition of the Kempen and the Hageland and is typified by a beautiful and diversified landscape. Aarschot can be characterised as a cosy and lively community. The only multinational in Aarschot is Duracell, all other companies are small and medium-sized enterprises. The current capacity of the industrial zone is slowing down the further growth of present companies and is preventing new companies to establish themselves in Aarschot. The nightlife in Aarschot is on the downfall. The two remaining night clubs that were left there have closed their doors and the night scene now evolves completely around the city centre. Several pubs are trying to increase their popularity by special actions. Some of them cause minor nuisances such as noise pollution and social nuisance. The centre of Aarschot is easily accessible, which comes in favour of a flourishing commercial life. The shopping centre attracts many visitors from out of town. Aarschot has a centre function and to meet the demands of such a function, there is a well-developed public transport network. The number of people travelling way and from Aarschot for business purposes is high and still rising. As in Dendermonde, the police zone coincides with the borders of the city (one-city zone).

#### *General characteristics of the emergency and beat patrol in the three cities*

With a very limited area, a very high population density and the highest police employee/inhabitants ratio<sup>62</sup> the situation of Brussels is very different than the two other cities under observation. The high employee/inhabitants ratio can be expected in view of the particular characteristics of and problems in the area as described higher.

*Table 6.1: strength of the Belgian police teams under observation, police-inhabitant ratio and population density*

	Strength (number of employees) *	Area covered by EP (km <sup>2</sup> )	Inhabitants in this area #	Inhabitants per employee	Population density (inh./km <sup>2</sup> )
Brussel	86	0,9	20.000	230	22.200

<sup>62</sup> This is surprising because all Brussels police zones are confronted by a chronic shortage of police officers. This is partly due to the high standards of the (bilingual) language exams but also because the forces have problems to recruit out of Brussels inhabitants. To solve this problem police officers from outside the city are obliged after their initial training to work in Brussels. But most of them ask to get a mutation to more 'calm' forces with less problems after the legal 3 years of duty have been fulfilled. This results in a high turn-over and consequently a disproportionally high proportion of very young officers.

Dendermonde	117	55,7	43.400	370	780
Aarschot	57	62,5	27.900	490	450
<i>TOTAL PSE</i>	<i>1.741</i>	<i>1.646,9</i>	<i>837,420</i>	<i>480</i>	<i>510</i>

\* : including all employees: law enforcement officers as well as administrative staff.

#: number of inhabitants in the area covered by Emergency Patrol (EP) – the area under observation.

In **Brussels** the head chief is assisted by two sub chiefs each of whom is responsible for one part of the district (Anneessens and Oude Markt). The community beat patrol unit consists of seven community beat inspectors who exclusively commit themselves to community work: they don't take care of reception work and they never do emergency patrol work. They patrol in their part of the district, they receive people whom they have summoned in the police office and they take care of administrative tasks. The number of inhabitants per community beat inspector is 2857<sup>63</sup>. This is more than the average observed in the different zones in the region of Brussels (2242)<sup>64</sup>.

The emergency patrol unit consists of seven teams, each of them led by a chief inspector (three teams for Anneessens and four for Oude Markt). Each team has six to seven inspectors who take care of the patrol work and the reception. Under ideal circumstances, thus when the team is complete, there are two inspectors who are designated to do the reception, two take care of the patrol work on foot and two patrol by car. In the middle of each shift there is a switch: the two inspectors who are taking care of the reception go on patrol, and the ones taking care of the patrol work, take over the reception.

Priorities on the level of the zone were<sup>65</sup>: violent thefts, thefts in vehicles, burglaries, gang violence (as related to drug traffic, sexual offences, violent thefts, injuries and homicide), nuisance and incivilities (public tidiness, graffiti, vandalism, noise pollution) and traffic (drunk driving, speeding, dangerous parking and traffic aggression). Besides these priorities, special attention is being given to youth delinquency and crime on public transport.

The police plan of 2005 (of the zone Brussel – Elsene) didn't mention the implementation of community policing although the police chief of this area strongly supports COP in his district.

There is a connection between the emergency patrols and the community beat patrols: the seven community inspectors are linked to one of the seven emergency patrols.

In **Dendermonde** the community beat patrol unit consists of 12 community beat inspectors. The number of inhabitants per inspector is 3617. This is more than the average number observed in the whole region of Flanders (3171). Each inspector takes care of the reception a few hours a week and weekly has a nightshift. They use motorbikes and bicycles for transportation to enhance visibility and approachability. Complex problems are handled in cooperation with the project manager specialised in that specific domain. There's a unit 'project work' that is responsible for the different priorities of the area. The priorities as

<sup>63</sup> We recalculated the number of inhabitants as related to community beat policing (instead of to the strength of the entire police force as indicated in the table above) to compare these figures to the national average

<sup>64</sup> See table on page 3

<sup>65</sup> As defined in the police plan of the zone of 2005

defined in the police plan of the 'zone' in 2005 were: traffic (accidents with injuries / death), drugs, thefts, social problems and nuisance and environment. Special attention was to be given to shoplifting / pickpockets, theft of (motor)bikes and traffic accidents with material damage.

The plan stipulates internal reorganisations and priorities with the aim to enhance the functioning of the police force by integrating work processes, less administrative tasks and workload. These projects are meant to allow cultural changes to take place in the police force, enabling as such the introduction of community oriented policing. Five project-coordinators are responsible for these themes. If complex and persistent problems occur that go beyond the capabilities of emergency and community patrol work, the unit 'project work' is being set to work. After screening and elaborate analysis they set up action plans.

The tasks of the emergency patrol unit go beyond first line aid after a call. They also take care of the reception, do research, perform surveillances, etc... Each shift consists of two emergency teams. Apart from the traditional emergency patrols, there are also, since October 2004, special surveillance teams to watch over different forms of nuisance and crime. During the week two surveillance teams are active. At night and during weekends the second emergency patrol unit is mobilised as an extra surveillance team. Usually they are on foot or by bike in order to be on the spot faster. An additional advantage is that they can hear and observe more when they are on foot / by bike.

The emergency and community beat patrol units are interconnected through the project work. The project coordinator makes up a list with assignments for the surveillance teams. The community beat patrol units are an important source of information to make up this list: when they notice problems that require additional surveillance, they report this to the surveillance units. Surveillance units on their turn report relevant information to the community patrol units.

In **Aarschot** the community beat patrol unit is expected to be the cornerstone of a community oriented police organisation. However, the current community beat patrol unit still has a long way to go before reaching the ideal standards of community oriented policing. Their main task now still consists of assignments from public prosecution, thus preserving the traditional role of community beat officers. With the limited sources the police force has, the community beat officers try to implement community oriented policing in a rather limited way. Currently there are seven community inspectors, which means that the number of inhabitants per community beat inspector is 3986 (3171). Again this is more than the average observed in the region of Flanders.

The emergency patrol unit consists of 32 police agents. They are responsible for urgent intervention jobs. Calls that are not really urgent are being handled by the community beat patrol unit. Except for urgent administration, this team is constantly on the road. In case of heavy work load the emergency patrol unit is assisted by a special urgency team.

Priorities as defined in the zonal police plan of 2005 were: traffic, burglary, drugs and youth delinquency. The local environment, social and family problems and nuisances are points of attention.

*Work load of the police in the three cities*

*Table 6.2: work load*

	<i>Observed incidents</i>	<i>... of which are calls *</i>	<i>Inc./hour</i>	<i>Calls/hour</i>
	<i>Emergency Patrol</i>			
Brussel	191	89	1,6	0,7
Dendermonde	109	66	1,4	0,8
Aarschot	152	76	1,9	* 1,0
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>913</i>	<i>1,8</i>	<i>0,8</i>
	<i>Community beat patrol</i>			
Brussel	175	19	** 4,2	0,5
Dendermonde	489	71	** 4,9	* 0,7
Aarschot	78	8	** 1,3	0,1
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.094</i>	<i>323</i>	<i>2,6</i>	<i>0,4</i>

\*: calls are all incidents to which a citizen took the first step, excluding ‘answering a question from the public’ (var06=65) and ‘chatting with the public’ (var06=84).

When we study the work load of the emergency patrol in the three cases, the police force of Aarschot seems to have the highest work load (1,9 incidents/hour and 1,0 calls of citizens/hour) As we discussed before: Aarschot has a low population density but the highest police/civilian rate of the three cities. In Brussels and Dendermonde the emergency patrol units treat less incidents/hour (1,6 and 1,4).

The community beat patrol of Aarschot on the contrary treat only 1,3 incidents/hour while in Brussels and Dendermonde this is nearly four times more. In the already cited police plan the Aarschot force management signal problems to build a community oriented beat patrol. The lack of officers to perform this function is one of the main explanations for the observed low work load: as they are clearly understaffed, they limit the scope of their activities, which can be observed in the following table. The community beat units only got two clear directives from the force management: they have to attend every morning and evening the schools in the city to regulate traffic and they are obliged to re-visit victims of burglaries in order to give them preventive advice.



	emergency patrol			community beat patrol		
	% Aarschot	% Brussel	% Dendermonde	% Aarschot	% Brussel	% Dendermonde
Accident with casualties (with vehicle)				1,3		1,0
Accident without casualties (with vehicle)	4,6	1,6	3,7			1,5
Drunk driving / Driving ban	3,3					0,5
Directing traffic		1,0		1,3		1,5
Defective street furniture / infrastructure	3,3	0,5	3,7			
Traffic stop (officers on the move)	1,3		2,8			5,5
Traffic violation	23,0	23,6	16,5	6,4	2,3	26,6
Roadside stop (officers standing along the road)	4,6					
Other traffic	1,3	3,7	3,7	1,3	1,1	1,0
Break-in at a house/ business/hotel room/school	2,6	6,3	4,6			2,5
Car break-in		3,7	0,9			1,0
Theft of a motor vehicle					0,6	0,5
Theft of a moped or bicycle						
Picking up shop-lifter / shoplifting	0,7	2,1	1,8			4,5
Robbery - person / pick pocketing	1,3	2,6	0,9		1,1	2,0
Hold-up of a bank / post office / shop / business			0,9			0,5
Narcotics	0,7					0,5
Weapons and firearms					0,6	
Assault (bodily harm)	0,7	0,5			0,6	2,5
Vandalism / Mischief	4,6	2,6	1,8			1,5
Fraudulent practices, Swindle, Fraud						1,0
Sex offences						0,5
Cafés and restaurants - check					0,6	
Standing Guard / looking at suspicious situations	7,9	3,7	3,7			0,5
Wanted person / stolen good		0,5	0,9			
False name						1,0
False report						
Immigration law				2,6	2,9	
Other (e.g. bomb alert, public drunkenness)	0,7	0,5	2,8		1,1	0,5
Twist / quarrel / argument, problems between people (no relationship problems)	4,6	11,5	5,5	2,6	2,9	3,0
Relationship problems	2,6	1,0	11,9	2,6	0,6	
Noise nuisance from a house	0,7		3,7			
Noise nuisance from a hotel / restaurant /café / or other business	2,0	1,0	1,8			
Environment (not noise nuisance) (but e.g. dog dirt)	4,6	0,5	2,8	3,8	0,6	
Disturbed/demented people; 'social'/pitiful cases						
Dangerous situations (not traffic/weapons)	3,9	2,6				0,5
Missing persons		0,5				
manifestations	1,3		2,8			2,5
Assistance / mediation / caretaking / unwell person	3,3	2,1	0,9			5,0
Public order	0,7	2,1	0,9	1,3	1,1	8,0
Fire	0,7	0,5				
Lost and found articles (also bicycles)		1,0	1,8			1,0
Answering questions from the public	2,0	11,0	1,8	10,3	10,9	9,5
Nuisance from young people	0,7	3,1	1,8			
Other (e.g. finding a body, underground transport regulations, fare dodging)		0,5			0,6	0,5
False alarm (break-in, fire, hold-up)	1,3	1,0	2,8			3,0
Internal job / message (e.g. transport of prisoners, delivering a postal item)	2,6	2,1	7,3	28,2	36,6	2,0
Questioning a suspect.	0,7	0,5	1,8	26,9	4,6	0,5
Helping colleague / support	2,6	1,6			0,6	
Chatting with the public / networking	5,3	3,7	3,7	7,7	22,3	6,0
Chatting or conferring with an official / networking				1,3		0,5
research in neighbourhood				1,3		
prevention					0,6	
Other		0,5		1,3	8,0	1,0
N	152	191	109	78	175	489

The analysis of the tasks that are dealt with by the emergency patrol units, reveals a very similar pattern of activities: there are no major differences in the proportions of the fulfilled tasks. The main part of their activities concerns traffic violations (about 23% of all incidents). These findings confirm prior Belgian research on activities of emergency patrols. The high volume of traffic interventions is the result of ‘filling up’ time in between emergency calls (Eliaerts, Enhus, 1992, 80) It is also conform with the instructions on the functioning of emergency patrol units in the new Belgian police structure (see 6.2)

The activities of emergency patrol units that are not traffic related contain more than 50 domains of activity, each of them taking low to very low percentages. In general this indicates a great dispersion and a very broad police task. Between the three cities we find no major differences. In Aarschot ‘standing guard’ / looking at suspicious situations’ is the second most important activity (7,9%), the third is chatting with people/networking (5,3%). In Brussels the second and third most important activities were ‘twist / quarrel / argument, problems between people’ (11,5%) and ‘answering questions from the public’ (11%). In Dendermonde the traffic violations form the largest category, yet represent only 16,5 of all activities. The second important task is dealing with conflicts (11,9%), the third is ‘internal job / message’ (7,9%). This proportion is higher than in Aarschot or Brussels. Looking at the tasks of the community beat patrol units leads to the conclusion that both forms of patrol work – for not urgent interventions – act as communicating vessels.

While the similarity between the studied units of emergency patrol work is striking, we find a much larger diversity between the community beat patrols. First of all the dispersion in the tasks is different: in Brussels 70% of all activities consists of ‘internal jobs / messages’ (36,6%), ‘chatting with the public / networking’ (22,3%) and ‘answering questions from the public’ (10,9%). In Aarschot 65% consists of ‘internal jobs / messages’ (28,2%), ‘questioning a suspect’ (27%) and ‘answering questions from the public’ (10,3%). In Dendermonde the activities are the most divers of all three with as most important tasks: traffic violations (27%)<sup>66</sup>, ‘answering questions from the public’ (9,5%), public order (8%) and ‘chatting with the public / networking’ (6%). Due to the clear orientation toward community oriented policing in Dendermonde, the community beat officers are released from a lot of administrative work and walk around their beat more frequently. This decision seems to have an important impact on the work of the emergency patrol: as indicated before, they are more involved in handling ‘internal jobs / messages’ than the other observed forces. The community beat patrol officers have informal chats with the inhabitants, intervene in conflicts and inform people. They frequently organize internal meetings were they discuss common problems and decide on actions. For instance, in the observed period the beat officers decided to organize an action to prevent the stealing of bikes (graving a unique number in the frame) and to tackle problems of cyclists crossing the central place during the big weekly market as an answer to complaints of the merchants. At the time of the observations only warnings were given. After running the project during one month fines would be given. These two actions explain the high amount of traffic related activities by the community beat patrol in Dendermonde. 36 people presented their cycle for engraving; 89 got a warning that it was not allowed to cycle while the market was going on. The officers in this force got the instructions to be present at school entrances every morning and look for traffic problems. This task also resulted in a high amount of warnings to students and parents about their traffic behaviour. The observations started at the beginning of the Belgian school year (the first of September). This new start influenced the attitude of the community beat officers who wanted to remind or state the rules of good traffic behaviour.

---

<sup>66</sup> See also table 6.3

More broadly speaking, it is clear that the implementation of community policing in Dendermonde resulted in broader job responsibilities for the community beat patrols. The officers have more space to implement their own priorities in their beat. The choice of traffic as highest priority could be due to the lack of other big problems in this city. Of all three cities Dendermonde seems to be the safest. Besides that, our findings could possibly be influenced by the time of the observations. Observations started on the first of September, in Belgium a date where the rhythm of work starts anew and schools restart after two months of summer holidays. Traffic congestions and problems re-enter society after a relatively quiet summer period and thus requires some guidance by the police. It could be that the priority for traffic was only temporal.

The strong focus on traffic problems by community beat officers in Dendermonde results in a lower level of traffic related activities by the emergency patrol units.

The observation of tasks in Aarschot and Brussels reveals that the community beat patrols still work in a more traditional way. Before the introduction of COP the community beat patrol inspectors fulfilled most of the administrative tasks in the police force. They had to control newcomers, dispatch fines and convocations for the tribunal, get declarations of people in running judicial cases, intervene in cold cases and conflicts, and so on. In both cities we find a high proportion of time spent on 'internal jobs / messages' (36,6 and 28,2%).

### Sort of Incidents Involved in Patrol Work

#### Traffic

Table 6.3: proportion of traffic

	Incidents on the initiative of the police		Incidents on the initiative of a citizen		All incidents	
	<i>Emergency Patrol</i>					
Brussel	79	65,8	112	** 5,4	191	* 30,4
Dendermonde	41	48,8	68	19,1	109	* 30,3
Aarschot	70	64,3	82	22,0	152	41,4
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.074</i>	<i>62,9</i>	<i>1.015</i>	<i>18,9</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>41,6</i>
	<i>Community beat patrol</i>					
Brussel	136	** 4,4	39	0,0	175	** 3,4
Dendermonde	343	** 57,4	146	4,1	489	** 41,5
Aarschot	61	** 9,8	17	11,8	78	** 10,3
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>567</i>	<i>39,5</i>	<i>658</i>	<i>6,7</i>	<i>2.094</i>	<i>29,2</i>

\*  $p < 0,01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0,001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

In general, emergency patrols seem to be confronted more with traffic incidents (41,6%) than community beat patrols (29,2%).

The proportion of traffic incidents in the total amount of emergency patrol incidents is in Brussels and Dendermonde about 30%, whereas it is 41,4% in Aarschot. Brussels and Dendermonde thus score significantly lower than the total proportion of traffic in all emergency patrol incidents (total PSE 41,6%).

Although these figures seem to suggest that a considerable amount of police-time is spent on traffic incidents, it might be interesting to look at the amount of time that is spent on each

type of incident. The average duration of traffic incidents in Belgium was eight minutes<sup>67</sup>, whereas the average time spent on for instance serious crime was 27 minutes<sup>68</sup>. For Brussels this implies that about 116 minutes in total were spent on traffic and about 595 minutes were spent on serious crime<sup>69</sup>. In Dendermonde about 198 minutes in total were spent on traffic and 322 minutes on serious crime. In Aarschot 378 minutes were spent on traffic and 880 minutes on serious crime. These figures do put another perspective on the matter.

Within emergency patrol work traffic incidents mostly occur on the initiative of the police (in general 62.9% of total PSE), there are no significant differences between the proportions of the three Belgian cities and the total proportion. We do see differences within the incidents on the initiative of citizens: emergency patrol work in Brussels contains considerably less traffic incidents on the initiative of citizens (5,4% of all incidents on behalf of a citizen compared to the total proportion of 18,9%).

The proportions of traffic incidents within all incidents community beat policing officers were involved in, show significant differences between the three Belgian cities and the total proportion: whereas the proportion is smaller in Brussels and Aarschot, it is bigger in Dendermonde. As we already pointed out before, the community beat officers in Dendermonde spend more efforts on traffic incidents than in Brussels and Aarschot, and compared to the overall proportion. In Dendermonde the proportion of traffic incidents on behalf of the police is even bigger in community beat patrol work than in emergency patrols<sup>70</sup>. In Aarschot and Brussels on the other hand the proportion of traffic incidents on behalf of the community beat police is a lot smaller than the overall proportion. The observed difference can not be explained by a difference in priorities, as traffic is defined as one of the top priorities in all three areas. The higher attention to traffic could be due to the relatively low crime level in this city.

The incidents involved are in large amounts small incidents with bicycles, e.g. when riding on pavements, crossovers or streets that are not allowed for bikes. Although we can conclude that traffic incidents get a relatively high level of attention from police officers, we will see later on that these cases are rarely handled in a punitive way. As we explained earlier in point 6.2, in Dendermonde the officers' reaction never went beyond giving a warning.

*“The police officer is trying to stop traffic that is taking the wrong turn in a one-way street. Two girls on a bicycle ignore him and try to continue their track. The officer stops them and gives them a warning.” (Dendermonde CBP)*

In table 6.5 we can see that the traffic incidents in Dendermonde mainly consist of traffic violations. However, whereas the proportion of traffic violations in community beat patrol work is bigger than the general proportion, it is smaller in emergency patrol work. Earlier in the text we already suggested that both forms of patrol act like communicating vessels when dealing with non-urgent problems. It seems that the smaller proportion that is spent on traffic violations by the emergency patrols is compensated by a more intense approach by community patrol work. The fact that emergency patrols are dealing with a lot of social

<sup>67</sup> Dendermonde: 6 minutes, Aarschot: 16 minutes, Brussels: 2 minutes

<sup>68</sup> Averages: Dendermonde: 23 minutes, Aarschot: 40 minutes, Brussels: 17 minutes

<sup>69</sup> During the observations not the exact figures on incident duration were reported, duration was reported using time intervals on which we calculated the duration by closing the last interval with the highest duration measured in the field reports.

<sup>70</sup> This is due to two projects on traffic (see 6.2)

problems could be an explanation for the smaller proportion of traffic violations and checks. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the average amount of time spent on social problems is bigger than the time spent on traffic incidents<sup>71</sup>. **Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden.**

In Brussels and Aarschot on the other hand, community beat patrol work consists less of traffic incidents than the overall percentage. This is mainly due to a smaller proportion of traffic incidents on the initiative of the police (4,4% in Brussels and 9,8% in Aarschot, opposed to a general proportion of 39,5%).

Table 6.5 gives us more detailed information on the traffic incidents observed during patrol work: the emergency patrols in Brussels didn't do any traffic checks (0%), whereas the overall proportion for this type of incident is 10,1%. What is more, in Brussels there were no traffic checks at all, as the proportion in community patrol work is 0% as well. It is known that in highly urbanized areas traffic violations are taken less seriously than in the country. However, the proportions of traffic checks are low for all three cities and in emergency patrol work as well as in community patrol work. There are several explanations for these findings. In Aarschot the car speed is measured almost exclusively by unguarded cameras, in Brussels the main traffic problems are not speed but parking problems. To respond to this specific need, and because of the lack of police officers, a new kind of unarmed assistant police officer was created. They have limited police responsibilities and their task is controlling parking contributions and regulations. Alongside with this development, most Belgian cities installed administrative regulations for the payment of parking places. The contributions and fines in case of foul are checked and collected by private firms. The creation of this new police function and the involvement of private firms in the treatment of parking fees has reduced the activities of the community beat officer in this domain.

#### *Maintaining the law and other main themes in policing*

In the next table the nature of the incidents was divided into six main categories: maintaining the law, maintaining public order, giving assistance, networking, internal jobs and a leftover category 'else'.

*Table 6.4: patrol work subdivided into main categories (percentages)*

	<i>N</i>	<i>Maintain- ing the law</i>	<i>Maintain- ing public order</i>	<i>Giving assistance</i>	<i>Networking</i>	<i>Internal job</i>	<i>Else</i>
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>							
Brussel	191	51,3	6,8	29,8	3,7	2,1	6,3
Dendermonde	109	46,8	7,3	31,2	3,7	7,3	3,7
Aarschot	152	59,6	9,9	19,7	5,3	2,6	3,9
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>56,8</i>	<i>8,1</i>	<i>23,0</i>	<i>4,9</i>	<i>3,3</i>	<i>4,0</i>
<i>Community Beat Patrol</i>							
Brussel	175	** 14,9	* 1,1	14,3	22,3	** 36,6	* 10,9
Dendermonde	489	39,3	7,6	15,3	19,2	8,8	* 9,8
Aarschot	78	41,0	2,6	16,7	* 9,0	** 28,2	2,6

<sup>71</sup> In Dendermonde the average amount of time spent on traffic incidents was 6 minutes, whereas the average amount of time spent on social problems was 23 minutes.

<i>Total PSE</i>	2.094	37,1	5,8	18,4	21,4	11,6	5,8
------------------	-------	------	-----	------	------	------	-----

\*  $p < 0,01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0,001$  (with respect to 'Total PSE').

Within emergency patrol work the different categories show no significant differences between the three Belgian cities and the overall proportions: maintaining the law is the largest category and takes up about half of the total amount of incidents. Giving assistance is the second largest category, followed by maintaining public order. Networking and internal jobs are the smallest categories in emergency patrol work. In Brussels and Aarschot the proportion of internal jobs in emergency patrol work is similar to the average, whereas it is significantly higher in community patrol work (36,6% in Brussels and 28,2% in Aarschot, as opposed to an average of 11,6%).

“Maintaining the law” does not refer exclusively to “criminal law maintenance”. It involves all sorts of law maintenance, including traffic offences. Almost 50% of all law maintaining incidents observed during emergency patrol work in the three Belgian cities are traffic related. These findings confirm the observations we made in the preceding section.



**Maintaining the law: emergency patrol1**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Drunk driving / Driving ban	5	2,1	2,1	2,1
Traffic stop (officers on the move)	5	2,1	2,1	4,2
Traffic violation	98	41,2	41,2	45,4
Roadside stop (officers standing along the road)	7	2,9	2,9	48,3
Break-in at a house/ business/hotel room/school	21	8,8	8,8	57,1
Car break-in	8	3,4	3,4	60,5
Picking up shop-lifter / shoplifting	7	2,9	2,9	63,4
Robbery - person / pick pocketing	8	3,4	3,4	66,8
Narcotics	1	0,4	0,4	67,2
Weapons and firearms	1	0,4	0,4	67,6
Assault (bodily harm)	2	0,8	0,8	68,5
Vandalism / Mischief / Graffiti	14	5,9	5,9	74,4
'Standing Guard' / looking at suspicious situations	23	9,7	9,7	84,0
Wanted person / stolen good	2	0,8	0,8	84,9
Other penal law (e.g. bomb alert)	5	2,1	2,1	87,0
Environment (not noise nuisance) (but e.g. dog dirt)	11	4,6	4,6	91,6
Nuisance from young people	9	3,8	3,8	95,4
False alarm (break-in, fire, hold-up)	7	2,9	2,9	98,3
Questioning a suspect / victim / witness.	4	1,7	1,7	100,0
Total	238	100,0	100,0	

---

**1 Joint figures on incidents involving maintaining the law observed during emergency patrol work in Brussels, Dendermonde and Aarschot**

Besides traffic incidents, in emergency patrol work ‘maintaining the law’ mainly consists of theft-related incidents, suspicious situations and nuisances such as vandalism and nuisances from youngsters.

*“Dispatching informs the officers about a theft in the atelier of a cleaning firm. Arriving at the scene they establish obvious signs of burglary: several doors and locks have been forced. Several tools have been stolen and the empty boxes have been left behind. The officers take note of the serial numbers as indicated on the boxes and leave.” (Brussels EP)*

Besides maintaining the law, emergency patrols also spend quite some energy (23% total PSE) on incidents that involve giving assistance. These incidents often consist of social problems as described later on in this text.

As table 6.5 later in the text indicates, emergency patrol work in Dendermonde involves significantly more social problems (22.9% opposed to a general proportion of 8,6%). Social problems mainly consist of relationship problems, conflicts between neighbours and problems related to alcohol and drugs. Often these incidents have a relatively low ‘danger-level’ yet do seem to require the assistance of a neutral go-between. In situations as such police officers often perform the role of social negotiators: when citizens are unable to resolve a conflict on their own, they turn to the police for assistance. In Dendermonde there are more social problems due to its demographic composition.

*“The police officers are asked to intervene in a family conflict: the daughter –who isn’t living with their parents anymore- refuses to leave the house upon her parents’ request. As the situation seems to be getting out of control, the parents call the police. (...) The officers advise the daughter to leave the house; eventually she agrees.” (Dendermonde – CBP)*

*“The officers receive a call from a woman who’s having problems with an ex-boyfriend. Arriving at the scene the man tries to escape by taking the bicycle of the woman’s son, yet the officers manage to stop him. The man appears to be drunk and isn’t able to show his ID. However, the officers know who the man is, as he had been arrested about a week ago. (...) Ever since the relationship between the couple has ended, the man continues to harass the woman. This time he was trying to convince her to talk to him again, but she didn’t want to. The man kept on knocking on her door and refused to leave, upon which the woman called for police assistance. The police officers ask the man to leave the woman alone, take back the bike and return to the woman’s house. (...) The officers advise her to call them whenever the man is causing problems again.” (Dendermonde EP)*

Besides social problems, giving assistance also consists of questions from the public.

In table 6.5 we can see that there are more questions from the public during emergency patrol work in Brussels (11% as opposed to an 3,8% average). Often these questions are of a very practical matter, such as road descriptions. As we described higher this area in Brussels is not only highly attractive to tourists, it also groups a lot of functions such as a community welfare centre and a big university hospital.

*“A man driving a car is signalling the police officers. He wants to know how to get to the hospital. The officers explain him the fastest way to go, wish him a nice day and continue their patrol.” (Brussels EP)*

Whereas emergency patrol work in the three Belgian cities hardly reveals any differences in types of incidents, community patrol work does seem to reveal several differences with the overall proportions. Like in emergency patrol work the largest proportion of incidents can be categorized under maintaining the law: 37,1% of all cases. In Brussels there is considerably less maintaining the law (and maintaining public order) than in general, only 14,9% of all incidents involves law maintenance. This is mainly due to a much less intense activity in traffic related incidents compared to the other observed cities.

Even stronger than in emergency patrol work, the incidents that involve maintaining the law observed during community patrol work are highly traffic related: about 70% consists of traffic incidents. Besides traffic, a large proportion of incidents involving law maintenance is occupied by questioning witnesses or suspects (16%). Far less than in emergency patrol work, community patrols are confronted with theft-related incidents or even criminal offences in general. This indicates that community patrols often act in the follow-up of criminal offences handled by emergency patrol units.

#### Maintaining the law: community beat patrol

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Traffic stop (officers on the move)	1	0,4	0,4	0,4
Traffic violation	176	70,4	70,4	70,8
Break-in at a house/business/hotel room/school	1	0,4	0,4	71,2
Theft of a motor vehicle	1	0,4	0,4	71,6
Robbery - person / pickpocketing.	3	1,2	1,2	72,8
Weapons and firearms	1	0,4	0,4	73,2
Assault (bodily harm)	1	0,4	0,4	73,6
Cafés and restaurants - check	1	0,4	0,4	74,0
Immigration law	9	3,6	3,6	77,6
Other (e.g. bomb alert)	3	1,2	1,2	78,8
Environment (not noise nuisance) (but e.g. dog dirt)	9	3,6	3,6	82,4
Nuisance from young people	3	1,2	1,2	83,6
Questioning a suspect / victim / witness.	40	16,0	16,0	99,6
Interviewing a local resident after a crime	1	0,4	0,4	100,0
Total	250	100,0	100,0	

*In pursuance of an intervention by the emergency patrol unit, the community beat patrol officer has to question a man whose garden had been damaged due to a fight on the public road. At the time of the incident, the man was not at home, so the emergency unit did not have the opportunity to take note of his declaration. This time he is at home, so his declaration can be written down. (Aarschot CBP)*

The second largest category in community beat patrol work is -unlike emergency patrol work-networking.

In general 21,4% of all incidents handled by community beat officers involves networking. In Aarschot the amount of networking incidents is significantly lower, only 9% of all cases are networking-related. Networking incidents consist of conversations with citizens in order to find out about possibly relevant information, to inform citizens about new developments in cases they are related to or just to improve the relationship with the public. It is widely acknowledged that good police/public relationships are vital for successful policing (Bowling, Foster, 2002). The lower proportion of networking in Aarschot confirms the internal evaluation of the functioning of the community beat patrol in Aarschot, as diagnosed in the zonal police plan, where it was concluded that community oriented working had not yet been implemented as it should.

*“We stop by a shop to buy some cigarettes. The shopkeeper and the police officer seem to know each other and they have a small conversation. The officer asks him if something has happened that is or could be important for him to know. The shopkeeper doesn’t have anything in particular to mention, so we continue our road.” (Aarschot CBP)*

*“The officer stops by a shop to inform the shopkeeper about a case of stalking in which she was the victim. He gives her an update of the current state of the case, as he just found out that the offender has been convicted to a conditional prison sentence of five years. (...) The woman thanks the officer for keeping her informed. The officer asks her to call whenever it should happen again.” (Brussels CBP)*

*“We stop by a bar to find information about someone who’s supposed to be member of the sports club attached to the bar. He asks the owner of the bar if he’s acquainted with X. (...) The owner takes his list of members and confirms the man’s membership. The officer takes note of the information and says they will contact him. They finish by having some small talk on sports, after which we leave again.*

As described earlier, community beat patrol work seems to involve more internal jobs (11.6%) than emergency patrol work (3.3%). These internal jobs consist mainly of administrative tasks. Community beat inspectors are (over)loaded with administration. (Van Nuffel, 2006, 49) Especially in Brussels and Aarschot community beat officers spend significantly more time on internal jobs than average. These internal jobs consist in large amounts of checking addresses and doing missions for the public prosecutor. As mentioned earlier, the lower level of administrative tasks in Dendermonde can be explained by a more thorough adaptation of community oriented policing. In Aarschot and Dendermonde on the other hand, the high administrative burden is an obstacle to the development of the philosophy of community oriented policing. Although most people agree that the administrative workload of community beat officers should be decreased, it is sometimes

claimed that these administrative missions can be used as an opportunity to get in touch with the public (Van Nuffel, 2007).

*The community officer stops by an apartment. When the woman who's living in the apartment opens the door, he explains what the reason is for his visit: he wants to check if she is really living at this address and if there are any other tenants living over there. The woman tells him that she is living in the apartment together with her daughter. The officer asks her about her professional occupation and what price she is paying for this apartment. She explains that she doesn't have a job yet but that she is looking for one and informs him about the price she pays for renting the apartment. The officer takes note of this information, thanks her and continues his patrol. (Brussels CBP)*

The leftover category “else” is beyond average (3,8%) in the community patrol work of Brussels (9,1%) and Dendermonde (8,6%). In Dendermonde this category includes a large proportion of engravings of bicycles (before we also noticed that traffic incidents in Dendermonde often involve bicycles, which could indicate an intensive use of bikes in Dendermonde<sup>72</sup>). In Brussels this category includes a considerable amount of incidents involving the guiding of ushers.

Table 6.5: patrol work subdivided into subjects (percentages)

	Traffic				Law		Order/ Assistance					Other		
	Coll.	Viol.	Check	Other	Serious crime	Other	Social problem	Quest. from public	Trouble -some youth	Public order	Other	Net-working	Int. job.	Else
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>														
06 Bruss	*1,6	23,6	** 0,0	5,2	18,3	4,7	13,6	**11,0	3,1	2,1	7,9	3,7	2,1	3,1
06 Dend	3,7	*16,5	** 2,8	7,3	12,8	7,3	** 22,9	1,8	1,8	3,7	5,5	3,7	7,3	2,8
06 Aars	4,6	23,0	5,9	7,9	11,2	8,6	9,9	2,0	0,7	2,0	12,5	5,3	2,6	3,9
Tot PSE	6,1	21,9	10,1	3,4	15,5	5,4	8,6	3,8	1,2	5,3	7,6	4,9	3,3	2,8
<i>Community Beat Policing</i>														
06 Bruss	0,0	** 2,3	*0,0	1,1	7,4	4,6	3,4	10,9	0,0	1,1	1,1	22,3	** 36,6	** 9,1
06 Dend	0,0	* 34,2	** 0,2	* 7,2	** 2,7	0,6	2,2	11,9	0,6	* 1,0	2,9	19,2	8,8	** 8,6
06 Aars	1,3	* 6,4	0,0	2,6	** 28,2	2,6	5,1	10,3	0,0	1,3	3,8	* 9,0	** 28,2	1,3
Tot PSE	0,7	21,5	3,2	3,8	7,4	2,6	3,7	11,4	1,3	3,3	4,3	21,3	11,6	3,8

\* p<0,01; \*\* p<0,001 (with respect to Total PSE).

The figures as presented in the above tables suggest different roles for emergency patrols and community patrols: where emergency patrols intervene more directly in different kinds of conflicts, community patrols act predominantly on a second level: they do the follow up of incidents in which the emergency units took the first steps and try to keep a close contact with the public.

### *Serious crimes*

Some controversy seems to exist concerning the extent of crime-related work in police tasks, in part because it is so dependent of the definition of crime (Mawby, 2000; Lanier & Henry, 2004). In the following section we will look at the amount of what we consider to be more or less serious forms of crime<sup>73</sup>.

<sup>72</sup> Because of a lack of adequate national statistics we were not able to answer this question.

<sup>73</sup> Following incidents were labeled as serious crime: break-in at a house/ business/hotel room/school, car break-in, theft of a motor vehicle, theft of a moped or bicycle, picking up shop-lifter / shoplifting, robbery - person / pick pocketing, hold-up of a bank / post office / shop / business, narcotics, weapons and firearms, assault

Table 6.6: proportion of serious crimes

	Incidents on the initiative of the police		Incidents on the initiative of a citizen		All incidents	
	<i>Emergency Patrol</i>					
Brussel	79	2,5	112	29,5	191	18,3
Dendermonde	41	4,9	68	17,6	109	12,8
Aarschot	70	8,6	82	19,5	152	14,5
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.074</i>	<i>8,0</i>	<i>1.015</i>	<i>24,6</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>16,1</i>
	<i>Community Beat Policing</i>					
Brussel	136	7,4	39	7,7	175	7,4
Dendermonde	343	* 3,2	146	* 1,4	489	** 2,7
Aarschot	61	** 36,1	17	0,0	78	** 28,2
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.436</i>	<i>7,4</i>	<i>658</i>	<i>7,8</i>	<i>2.094</i>	<i>7,5</i>

\*  $p < 0,01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0,001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

In general emergency patrol work (16,1%) involves more incidents with serious crime than community beat patrol work (7,5%).

The incidents the emergency patrols are involved in, are mainly crime facts that are reported by citizens (24,6%), whereas only 8% of these facts are found on the initiative of the police. In community patrol work the proportion of incidents on the initiative of citizens (7,8%) is not so different from the proportion of incidents on the initiative of the police (7,4%).

Emergency patrol work in the three Belgian cities does not show significant differences in serious crime with the general proportion. In general (only) 16.1% of all cases involve serious crime. A large amount of these incidents are theft-related<sup>74</sup>.

*There has been a burglary in an office. An employee reported this incident and is waiting for the police to come, as she is afraid the thieves are still inside the building. When arriving at the scene, another unit has already checked the building on the possible presence of burglars. The woman shows the damage to the officers and reports what has been stolen. The officers take note of all relevant information, check for traces the burglars might have left behind and eventually continue their patrol. (Brussels EP)*

In community patrol work the average proportion of incidents that involve serious crime is 7,5%. As mentioned earlier in the text, the community beat patrols in Aarschot seem to deal with a bigger proportion of incidents that involve serious crime (28,2%). What is more, all of these incidents occurred on the initiative of the police. As explained in point 6.2, as soon as a criminal fact is being handled by the public prosecution, research missions are given to the police. These missions mainly consist of the hearing of suspects or victims. In Aarschot the police plan diagnoses a heavy burden of these missions in the tasks of the community beat

---

(bodily harm), vandalism / mischief / graffiti, fraudulent practices, swindle, fraud, sex offences, false name, questioning a suspect / victim / witness, interviewing a local resident after a crime.

<sup>74</sup> 60% of the incidents labelled as serious crime that were observed during emergency patrol work in the three Belgian cities involve some kind of theft.



patrol, which could explain the high proportion of serious crime in this city.<sup>75</sup> In Dendermonde the proportion of serious crime is significantly below average: only 2,7% of all incidents in community patrol work involves serious crime. This could be due to a higher level of security compared to the other Belgian cities.

The above figures indicate that the crime fighting image that is often still attached to police work is more of a myth than reality. Indeed, former observational research demonstrates that far less police time is spent on crime-related activity than in providing a service by, for instance, calming disturbances, negotiating disputes and responding to a wide range of accidents and emergencies (Bowling, Foster, 2002). However, it should be noted that police work seems to be very difficult to categorize in terms of crime, as many incidents that at first sight might not seem crime-related, in fact are ‘potential crime’ (Shapland, Vagg, 1990). Several incidents that involve giving assistance are indeed potential crime.

*The officers receive a call about a young girl that has been pulled inside a car with force. Apparently a thirteen-year old girl was trying to get out of a car and ran into some bushes. The driver of the car followed her and pulled her back in. Witnesses were able to take note of the car’s driving licence and called the police. The officers search the neighbourhood and question a man passing by who apparently witnessed the incident as well. His version of the story is slightly different and less alarming than the call they received from the other witnesses. According to this man, it was a 17-year old girl and the incident didn’t look aggressive at all. The officers check the man in their computer system, but he doesn’t seem to be known in the system. (...) As this could be a case of kidnapping, the officers decide to notify the police office of the district where the witness is resident for further follow-up. (Dendermonde EP)*

## 6.4 Police Mobilization

Table 6.7: proportion of incidents on the initiative of the police

	Emergency Patrol					
	Traffic		Non-traffic		All incidents	
Brussel	58	89,7	133	* 20,3	191	* 41,4
Dendermonde	33	60,6	76	27,6	109	* 37,6
Aarschot	63	71,4	89	28,1	152	46,1
<i>Total PSE</i>	868	77,9	1.221	32,6	2.089	51,4
	Community Beat Policing					
Brussel	6	100,0	169	** 76,9	175	77,7
Dendermonde	203	97,0	286	51,0	489	70,1
Aarschot	8	75,0	70	** 78,6	78	78,2
<i>Total PSE</i>	611	92,8	1.483	58,6	2.094	68,6

\*  $p < 0,01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0,001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

In general the proportion of incidents on the initiative of the police is bigger in community patrol work (68,6%) than in emergency patrol work (51,4%). The same pattern can be observed in the three Belgian cities.

<sup>75</sup> As hearings of suspect / witnesses were labeled as ‘serious crime’

These differences were to be expected when considering the goal of emergency patrol work, which is: answering any call necessitating a police intervention within a reasonable term (MO, PLP 10). As emergency patrol work is highly dependent of calls from citizens, it is often being compared to the activities of a fire-brigade (Vandevoorde ea, 2003). Community patrol work on the other hand is described as ‘a visible and easily approachable police service that is highly oriented to the needs and expectations of its surroundings’ (KB September 17, 2001). Community patrols thus have a significantly higher level of freedom, enabling a more proactive approach. Indirect calls from citizens do not distract their activities as they are not connected to dispatching during patrol work.

Emergency patrol work characterizes itself by a strong proactive approach in the domain of traffic: in general about 80% is handled on the initiative of the police (77,9% total PSE). These proportions are similar in the three Belgian cities, with Brussels ranking highest with 89,7% of all traffic incidents being on the initiative of the police.

*“The officers notice a car driving from the wrong direction into a one-way street. They stop the car and confront the driver with the violation she has just made. The woman apologizes, says her GPS had sent her that way and that she wasn’t really paying attention to the traffic signs. The officers ask her identity card, driver licence and insurance papers, check them, tell the lady which way to go and continue their track.” (Brussels EP)*

Non-traffic incidents are handled much less on the initiative of the police (in general in 32,6% of all cases). This proportion is smaller in Brussels: only 20,3%. Taking all incidents into consideration, about half of them are handled on the initiative of the police. This proportion is smaller in Brussels (41,4%) and Dendermonde (37,6%). In Brussels this is due to a less proactive approach in non-traffic incidents, in Dendermonde the proportion of incidents on behalf of the police is smaller in both fields.

Community patrol work is handled mainly on the initiative of the police: 77,7% of all incidents in Brussels, 70,1% in Dendermonde and 78,2% in Aarschot. The percentages are not significantly different than the general proportion. In Brussels and Aarschot we can establish a higher proportion of incidents on the initiative of the police in the non-traffic domain. Often these cases involve the treatment of missions given by the public prosecutor.

*“The police officer has received a mission of the public prosecutor about the non-payment of a traffic fine. The officer now has to go to the offender in order to hand him over a transfer form to pay the penalty. If he doesn’t pay within the coming two weeks, the case will go to the court. The man, who is a truck driver, knows what the situation is all about and says he will give the fine as soon as possible to his boss, as he will take care of the payment. A limited declaration is being written down.” (Aarschot CBP)*

## 6.5 Knowledge of the People in the Neighbourhood

Table 6.8: proportion of incidents in which the officers meet an acquaintance: EP

Traffic		Social problems		Other		All incidents	
N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<i>Emergency patrol</i>							

Brussel	58	0,0	30	**13,3	103	13,6	191	9,4
Dendermonde	33	6,1	26	38,5	50	26,0	109	* 22,9
Aarschot	63	4,8	18	22,2	71	8,5	152	8,6
Total PSE	868	2,8	294	35,7	927	14,5	2.089	12,6
<i>community beat patrol</i>								
Brussel	6	50,0	8	75,0	161	** 63,4	175	** 63,4
Dendermonde	203	3,9	17	47,1	269	42,4	489	26,6
Aarschot	8	12,5	4	** 0,0	66	** 13,6	78	** 12,8
Total PSE	611	7,5	168	57,7	1.315	38,3	2.094	30,9

\* p<0,01; \*\* p<0,001 (with respect to Total PSE).

In general, in emergency patrol work about 10% of all incidents involves meeting an acquaintance. In Dendermonde this proportion is significantly bigger: 22,9%. Within every subdomain (traffic, social problems, other) police officers meet more acquaintances.

Community beat patrol work involves a lot more incidents with acquaintances: about 30% in general (30,9% total PSE), yet these percentages are a lot higher in Brussels (63,4%) and a lot lower in Aarschot (12,8%)<sup>76</sup>.

The Brussels Marollen district is well-known for its ‘typical’ habitants who are nearly the only ones still left to speak the old Brussels dialect (a mixture of French and Flemish). Within this relatively poor population there is very little mobility. They are born in this area and it’s very likely that they will die there, resulting in a close connection between the people residing there. The older police men working in the Marollen know almost every one in their precinct. In Aarschot the connection with the public is much lower. As mentioned earlier, there seems to be a lack of engagement towards the public in Aarschot. The police zone is well aware of this problem and is trying to find solutions. In its new police plan 2009-2012 measures to ameliorate this situation are presented.

*“A man whom the officer is acquainted with stops us while walking in the street. The officer has already met him several times due to problems related to his ex-wife. This time his motive is again his ex-wife. The man wants to make an appointment with the officer to talk about his problems. The officer asks him to meet him the next day in the police office, where he will see what can be done about his problem.” (Brussels CBP)*

*“The officer is being stopped by a woman he knows from the neighbourhood. She expresses her concern about a co-tenant of her apartment. Apparently this person has suddenly started to ask her for money (...). The woman is worried about the mental state of this person. The officer promises he will pass by the coming day to check out the situation. The woman thanks him and we continue our road” (Brussels CBP)*

In Dendermonde we can see a slightly different pattern: whereas emergency patrols meet more acquaintances than in general, we can not conclude the same for the community patrols. Consequently, in Dendermonde there is no real difference in the level of meeting acquaintances between emergency patrols and community patrols. We can hypothesize that -

<sup>76</sup> We already noted earlier in the text that in Aarschot the proportion of networking is significantly less than the overall proportion of networking.

conform with our earlier observations - emergency patrol work in Dendermonde deals with a lot of social problems, thus meeting more people they are already acquainted with.

*“We receive a call from a couple having problems. It’s not the first time the officers have to intervene in a conflict between these two people. The woman is addicted to heroin, the man has a drinking problem and is known to be aggressive towards his girlfriend. A few months ago the man was arrested for an attempt of murder on his girlfriend’s daughter. Now they are again in the middle of a fight. (...) The officers try to negotiate and calm them down. When the situation seems to be under control, they continue their patrol.” (Dendermonde EP)*

## 6.6 Marginal persons

Table 6.9: proportions of incidents with marginal persons<sup>77</sup>

	Traffic		Non-traffic		All incidents	
	<i>PSE – EP</i>					
Brussel	58		133		191	2,1
Dendermonde	33		76		109	0,9
Aarschot	63		89		152	2,0
<i>Total PSE</i>	868		1.221		2.089	5,8
	<i>PSE – CBP</i>					
Brussel	6		169		175	1,1
Dendermonde	203		286		489	** 1,2
Aarschot	8		70		78	0,0
<i>Total PSE</i>	611		1.483		2.094	4,3

\* p<0,01; \*\* p<0,001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Overall the proportion of incidents that involve marginal persons is very low: about 5% for both emergency patrol work as community patrol work (5,8% total PSE in EP; 4,3% total PSE in CP).

In Brussels the marginal persons are all homeless people. As we mentioned before, one of the main problems in this area are homeless people. Aarschot has problems with homeless people and alcoholics.

*“Dispatching asks the patrol team to remove an unwanted person from a self-banking office. Arriving at the scene they establish that it’s a homeless person sleeping on the floor. The officers wake him up and ask him to go somewhere else. As the man is not able to show them his identity card, they just write down his name and date of birth. The man leaves the building and the officers continue their road.” (Brussels EP)*

## 6.7 The Outcome of Incidents

Table 6.10a: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – all incidents

<sup>77</sup> In this research defined as: addicted person, mentally ill person, suicidal person, beggar, homeless person

	N	Warning	Summons	Arrest	One of these
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>					
Brussel	191	22,5	** 3,1	3,1	28,8
Dendermonde	109	15,6	** 2,8	4,6	* 22,9
Aarschot	152	17,8	4,6	3,3	*25,7
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>20,1</i>	<i>10,4</i>	<i>5,0</i>	<i>35,4</i>
<i>Community Beat Patrol</i>					
Brussel	175	** 4,0	*0,0	0,6	** 4,6
Dendermonde	489	** 35,4	** 0,0	0,2	** 35,6
Aarschot	78	* 7,7	0,0	0,0	** 7,7
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.094</i>	<i>20,0</i>	<i>3,1</i>	<i>1,3</i>	<i>24,4</i>

\* p<0,01; \*\* p<0,001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Emergency patrols seem to use more repressive measures than community patrols: in general emergency patrols use repressive measures in 35,4% of all cases, opposed to 24,4% used by community beat patrols. The difference manifests itself mostly in the use of summons and arrests. Warnings are used the most frequently, both by emergency patrol units as by community patrol units.

In a recent study (Easton, M., P. Ponsaers, et al., 2008) a particular culture was observed within the community beat patrol services. Almost every officer involved in this study was convinced that attempts to improve the relationship with the public (as prescribed by community oriented policing guidelines) were incompatible with a repressive attitude. To their opinion, repressive reactions jeopardize good relations with the public and undermine their status as accessible and friendly police officers.

The following incident was reported as atypical by our observer:

*“The community patrol officer stops a car that is leaving its parking spot without a number plate. The driver of the car explains that he had to get a number plate after having a car accident. The officer checks the car’s documents and the driver’s identity card and dismisses the man.”*

The incident was reported as atypical as community patrol officers usually do not intervene in situations as such. This approach is considered as too repressive, which could violate the level of trust citizens have in their community officer. In this particular case, the officer’s former function as an emergency patrol officer could explain his apparently different approach.

In general repressive measures are taken in 35,4% of all cases handled by emergency patrol units. In Dendermonde (22,9%) and Aarschot (25,7%) the emergency patrols are less repressive. More specific: about 20% of all incidents (20,1% of total PSE) are handled by giving a warning. However, not all incidents require a repressive approach. As not all incidents involve committing an offence, the level in which summoning can be considered, is of course limited to those incidents that involve violating the law. However, although police officers are legally obliged to report any crime they get acquainted with, it is a well known fact that police officers use a certain level of free space in their decision making (Reiner, 2002). An important reason not to react repressive is that they consider legal actions to be

inopportune in some cases (Eliaerts, Enhus, 1992). Police officers are sometimes used as a back-up solution in case an intermediary solution can not be achieved.

*“A woman has been caught trying to steel several goods from a shop. Apparently she’s a resident of an institute for disabled and socially deprived people. The shopkeeper notes that the woman has been trying to shoplift before, however she wishes not take legal actions because of the woman’s mental state. The police officers explain her that they have to file a report, as they are obliged to take note of any criminal fact they know about except when it’s an offence that needs to be initiated by an official complaint. (...) They discuss for a few moments, where upon the shopkeeper adds important information about the incident: apparently the lady had been caught before leaving the shop, so she had not really committed a crime yet. They decide to settle the matter amicably, and all parties that are involved are satisfied about the way the case was handled.”(Aarschot EP)*

*“The officers are sent to a shop where a thief has been caught in the act: the man was trying to steal two ipods. Present are two officers who were accidentally passing by, two shop detectives and a guard. The shop keepers and the offender come to a compromise to avoid legal actions. In a way the presence of the officers was not needed in this case, however, it was due to their presence that the offender agreed to pay for the stolen goods.” (Brussels EP)*

A second important motive not to work repressive is the expected reaction of the public prosecutor. Because of their high work-load, many so-called ‘minor’ criminal facts are dismissed. Police officers know from experience which cases will be prosecuted and which not and adapt their conduct to this knowledge. The following case serves as an example of what we mean by the above.

*“We are informed about an accident on the public road: a lady fell due to road works that were not properly indicated. When the ambulance arrives at the scene, nurses give the lady first aid and take her to the hospital. The officers write down all necessary information, yet they decide not to write an official report. Their argument not to do so is the fact that they consider it as useless and waste of time because these types of reports are generally dismissed by the public prosecutors.”*

In emergency patrol work generally 10.4% of all incidents are handled by writing a summon. In Belgium this seems to be a lot less: the proportions of summons in Brussels (3.1%) and Dendermonde (2.8%) are significantly less. In table 6.10b we can see that especially in traffic-related incidents the percentages of incidents handled by summons are considerably lower than in general.

*Table 6.10b: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – in the sphere of traffic*

	N	Warning	Summons	Arrest	One of these
<i>emergency patrol</i>					
Brussel	58	** 63,8	* 5,2	0,0	69,0
Dendermonde	33	42,4	6,1	3,0	51,5
Aarschot	63	27,0	* 7,9	4,8	* 39,7
<i>Total PSE</i>	868	35,7	21,4	1,2	58,3
<i>community beat patrol</i>					



Brussel	6	33,3	0,0	0,0	33,3
Dendermonde	203	** 82,3	** 0,0	0,0	** 82,3
Aarschot	8	37,5	0,0	0,0	37,5
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>611</i>	<i>59,9</i>	<i>8,2</i>	<i>0,0</i>	<i>68,1</i>

\*  $p < 0,01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0,001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

In Aarschot and Brussels private firms are responsible for the control and collection of parking fees. This influences largely the tasks of emergency and community beat patrol. In Brussels the emergency patrol nearly exclusively give warnings, in Dendermonde this task is performed by the community beat patrol. We have already provided an explanation for the high proportion of warnings in Dendermonde earlier in the text (see 6.2)

*“While patrolling one of the officers notices a car that is parked on the pavement. The officer is very upset about this incident because the person involved had already committed the same offence before on the exact same place. The officer decided then to let him go with a warning, but he told him he would get a fine if it ever happened again. The officer reprimands the man severely and asks him to show him his ID, driver licence and car documents. He writes a summon and gives the man a 100 € fine. Back on patrol the officers complain about the lack of respect some citizens seem to have towards the police.” (Aarschot EP)*

The discretion of the police men is also influenced by the expectations of the citizens involved. In certain cases citizens are co-producers of the outcome of a problem. Their impact is greater in order maintenance problems than in problems with clear law breaking conduct.

*“We are informed about a problem of aggression between a couple. Arriving at the scene, the woman is waiting for us at the entrance. She has several bruises and her teeth have been punched out by her partner. The police officers confront the two, but as they still seem to be relatively aggressive, they take the woman to the police office to take note of her declaration. The woman doesn’t want to file a complaint, but as this is not a criminal offence that needs to be initiated by an official complaint, the officers are legally obliged to file a report.”*

In table 6.10c we can see that in general the level of repressive action is a lot lower in the non-traffic sphere than in the traffic sphere: in 19,2% of all incidents handled by emergency patrols repressive measures have been taken. In Brussels and Dendermonde these percentages are lower: 11,3% (Brussels) and 10,5% (Dendermonde). These differences are not statistically significant. In community beat patrol work 6.3% of all incidents are handled with a repressive measure. In Dendermonde this is only 2.4%.

We already mentioned earlier that warnings are used the most frequently, by emergency units as well as by community patrol units. In general, warnings are given in 20% of all incidents handled by community beat officers. In Brussels and Aarschot however, this is a lot less: 4% in Brussels and 7,7% in Aarschot. In Dendermonde on the other hand, we establish a much higher percentage of warnings (35,4%). In table 6.10b we can see that this higher percentage is mainly due to warnings given in the sphere of traffic. Earlier in the text we established a higher level of traffic incidents in the community patrol work in Dendermonde<sup>78</sup>. These incidents mainly consisted of minor offences such as riding one’s bike on the pavement, driving in one-way streets, etc...

<sup>78</sup> See traffic projects in this city. The high proportion of warnings is due to the traffic project that first started by giving warnings.

No summons were written during the community patrol work observed in the three Belgian cities, whereas in general 3,1% of all CBP incidents are handled as such. As noted earlier, community patrols seem to have a less repressive approach than emergency patrols. However, this is not the only explanation for these low figures. We already noticed earlier in the text that community beat patrols have a relatively low proportion of incidents that involve crime in a first line approach. Often it is first the emergency police that acts, the follow-up is being taking care of by the community patrols.

*Table 6.10c: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – outside the sphere of traffic*

	N	Warning	Summons	Arrest	One of these
<i>emergency patrol</i>					
Brussel	133	4,5	2,3	4,5	11,3
Dendermonde	76	3,9	1,3	5,3	10,5
Aarschot	89	11,2	2,2	2,2	15,7
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.221</i>	<i>8,9</i>	<i>2,5</i>	<i>7,7</i>	<i>19,2</i>
<i>community beat patrol</i>					
Brussel	169	3,0	0,0	0,6	3,6
Dendermonde	286	2,1	0,0	0,3	* 2,4
Aarschot	70	4,3	0,0	0,0	4,3
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.483</i>	<i>3,5</i>	<i>1,0</i>	<i>1,8</i>	<i>6,3</i>

\*  $p < 0,01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0,001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

## 6.8 Use of Information Sources

*Table 6.11a: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – all incidents*

	N	Source from a citizen		Source from the police		One or more of these
		Manual	Digital	Manual	Digital	
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>						
Brussel	191	25,7	0,0	0,5	** 3,1	** 27,2
Dendermonde	109	** 7,3	1,8	0,0	* 10,1	** 16,5
Aarschot	152	29,6	0,0	0,7	* 11,8	38,2
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>28,8</i>	<i>0,7</i>	<i>2,7</i>	<i>22,6</i>	<i>39,9</i>
<i>Community Beat Policing</i>						
Brussel	175	14,9	0,0	1,7	* 0,6	17,1
Dendermonde	489	* 9,4	0,0	** 0,0	** 0,2	** 9,4
Aarschot	78	** 26,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	26,9
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.094</i>	<i>14,0</i>	<i>0,4</i>	<i>3,4</i>	<i>6,0</i>	<i>18,9</i>

\*  $p < 0,01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0,001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

In general, emergency patrols seem to use more specific information sources than community beat officers: information sources are used in 39,9% of all cases handled by emergency

patrols, whereas this is only 18,9% of all cases handled by community beat patrols. In Brussels and Dendermonde the percentages for the emergency patrols are significantly lower. Compared to the general proportions the Belgian police seems to use less police information sources. Especially the percentages of the digital police sources are significantly lower, both for emergency patrol work as for community patrol work (emergency patrols: 3,1% in Brussels, 10,1% in Dendermonde, 11,8% in Aarschot, compared to 22,6% in general). In Dendermonde there is also considerably less usage of (manual) information sources from citizens (7,3%, whereas it is 28,8% in general). Manual sources from citizens often refer to their identity cards.

As we can see in table 6.11b the use of information sources in the sphere of traffic is generally higher than the average values described above, both in emergency patrol work as in community patrol work: 57,1% in emergency work and 25,5% in community patrol work.

Again the proportions for police sources are significantly lower in the three Belgian cities. And again it is especially the use of digital police sources that is severely below average: whereas in general emergency patrols use digital police sources in 32,1% of all cases, these proportions are less than half in Belgium (12,7% in Aarschot, 6,1% in Dendermonde and 0% in Brussels). In community patrols digital police sources are used in 11,8% of all cases, whereas no digital police sources were used in the three Belgian cities.

*Tabel 6.11b: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – in the sphere of traffic*

	N	Source from a citizen		Source from the police		One or more of these
		Manual	Digital	Manual	Digital	
	<i>PSE</i>					
Brussel	58	** 6,9	0,0	0,0	** 0,0	** 6,9
Dendermonde	33	** 15,2	0,0	0,0	** 6,1	** 18,2
Aarschot	63	38,1	0,0	1,6	** 12,7	46,0
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>868</i>	<i>46,9</i>	<i>0,2</i>	<i>3,6</i>	<i>32,1</i>	<i>57,1</i>
	<i>PSE</i>					
Brussel	6	16,7	0,0	0,0	** 0,0	16,7
Dendermonde	203	** 1,0	0,0	0,0	** 0,0	** 1,0
Aarschot	8	0,0	0,0	0,0	** 0,0	** 0,0
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>611</i>	<i>23,0</i>	<i>0,0</i>	<i>2,1</i>	<i>11,8</i>	<i>25,5</i>

\*  $p < 0,01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0,001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

When considering cases that are not traffic-related, the observed Belgian proportions do not differ so much from the general proportions. Only in emergency patrol work in Brussels and community patrol work in Dendermonde there is significantly less use of digital police sources.

*Table 6.11c: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – outside the sphere of traffic*

	N	Source from a citizen		Source from the police		One or more of these
		Manual	Digital	Manual	Digital	

	<i>PSE – EP</i>					
Brussel	133	** 33,8	0,0	0,8	** 4,5	36,1
Dendermonde	76	* 3,9	2,6	0,0	11,8	15,8
Aarschot	89	23,6	0,0	0,0	11,2	32,6
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.221</i>	<i>15,9</i>	<i>1,0</i>	<i>2,1</i>	<i>15,9</i>	<i>27,7</i>
	<i>PSE – CBP</i>					
Brussel	169	14,8	0,0	1,8	0,6	17,2
Dendermonde	286	15,4	0,0	** 0,0	* 0,3	15,4
Aarschot	70	** 30,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	* 30,0
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.483</i>	<i>10,3</i>	<i>0,5</i>	<i>3,9</i>	<i>3,6</i>	<i>16,2</i>

\*  $p < 0,01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0,001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

In theory the Belgian emergency patrol units have easy access to digital police sources. Their cars suppose to be connected by radio with the central dispatching and should have a built-in terminal to consult information. In practice however these plans -to be developed by the 'Astrid' project- are not yet fully implemented.

The community beat patrol officers have only a radio or/and gsm at their disposal while walking their beat. Depending of the time the officers have spent in their beat, the oldest have gathered a considerable knowledge of the people residing there. The beat officers in the study of Easton, Ponsaers (2008) distrusted the police sources and preferred to work with information they could gather in their beat. Only in case of the verification of cars they contacted the central dispatching to get information.

## 6.9 What Determines What is Involved in Police Patrol Work

When comparing the sorts of incidents emergency patrol work is involved in, we found very limited variation in the sort of incidents they deal with: their most important activity is traffic. The second most important activity was for Brussels 'Twist / quarrel / argument, problems between people' and in Dendermonde it was dealing with 'Relationship problems'. In Aarschot the second was 'Standing Guard' / looking at suspicious situations'. The traffic interventions are predominantly proactive and the interventions concerning conflicts are reactive police work. These findings confirm former insights mentioned in chapter 1: proactive emergency work consists mainly of traffic incidents (routine controls, stops ...) As former Belgian research demonstrates (Eliaerts, Enhus, 1992), emergency patrols fill the gaps between interventions with proactive activities related to traffic. These interventions usually have a short duration and can be stopped whenever an emergency call comes in.

The second most important activity in both Brussels and Dendermonde is dealing with social conflicts (in relationships or with others). In both settings the proportion of inhabitants with low income and multiple problems is higher than in Aarschot. Based on the field reports we get the impression that these groups can be classified as police property groups (Reiner, 2000). These specific groups are well-known police clients. Because of the accumulation of problems and their lower education level they lack alternatives for solving their problems. As they are incapable to solve their own problems, they use the police monopoly of violence to calm down conflicts, obtaining as such a temporary solution to their problems (Eliaerts, Enhus, 1992).

The emergency cases consist predominantly of reactive police work, which means that the expectations the public has towards the police, play a major role in the sorts of problems they ask the police to intervene in. The problems they ask police interventions for have a relatively low degree of seriousness and show comparable patterns in the three observed cities. Due to this important role of the public, except for the local urbanisation, little influence can be seen from the other variables in the model.

In community beat patrol activities the observed differences between the three cities were more striking. This type of police activity seems to be influenced by local urbanisation, by national legislation (the historical role of the beat officers in treating the missions of the public prosecutor and his politics of dismissing cases), the culture (the central implementation of community policing in Belgium), the way community policing is translated throughout the local police force (management), the wanted outcome and the basic strategy (the overall police culture, the culture of the community beat patrol, the willingness to implement community policing).

These factors influence the sort of police work but strangely enough not so much the outcome of the incidents. We will discuss them in order of importance.

More than in the case of the emergency patrols, local urbanisation is influencing the work of community beat officers. The socio-demographic features of the population in a beat play a major role in their tasks.

In Brussels the high density and the accumulation of problems of people with lower income seem to create or stimulate a style of beat officer acting as a father, as an educator, as a liaison between the people of the beat and between the world outside. People rarely get summons: they get warnings, are coached, praised when reacting appropriately, helped when things are unclear or getting out of control, get a listening ear when problems outgrow them... The outcome is rarely repressive: nearly every intervention ends in doing administrative paperwork or giving a warning. This way of treating problems of the inhabitants matches the more traditional view on the tasks of the community beat patrol. In this force the community beat officers have a huge amount of administrative tasks which they combine with networking and small talks with the people.

In Dendermonde the community beat officers acted more as the mediators in their beat. A response was given to everything that was out of line. They tried to keep peace in their beat by listening to small resentments of the inhabitants and working on solutions in cooperation with them. Although Dendermonde is the safest city of the three, lots of conflicts between the citizens subsist. This situation seems to emanate a mediating style that is considered not to be compatible with a repressive attitude.

In Aarschot we found community beat officers that have a low work load and that spend little time on the streets. From the field notes we got the impression that they used a much more instrumentalist view on their tasks.

It must be clear that the impressions we gave on the styles of community beat working are much too global to do justice to great diversity in reactions and interventions that can be found in the work of community beat officers. It was not really the focus of this research, but when we look at the results on the way beat officers handle cases, it coincides with the styles found in recent research by Terpstra (2008). He found two important dimensions in the work

style of beat officers: the amount of attention for repression and order maintenance and the orientation towards the citizens. When combining both dimensions four work styles appear:

	Communicative orientation	Instrumental orientation
Relatively low level of attention for maintaining order and repression	(1) a nearby, communicative oriented beat officer with a relatively low level of attention for maintaining order and repression	(3) a beat officer oriented on prevention while focusing on the cooperation with external partners
Relatively high level of attention given to maintaining order and repression	(2) in many aspects close to the people of the beat but also correcting 'his people'	(4) the community beat officer as distant maintainer

(Terpstra, 2008, 329)

Some elements in the research results could be interpreted as expressions of one of these 4 styles. The Brussels community beat officers seem to work as in style 1, Dendermonde in style 2 and Aarschot in style 3. If this interpretation is correct and compared with the context in which they work, this would lead to the conclusion that local urbanization influences highly the role the community beat officer choose to play in their beat. Although the community beat officers have more freedom in their activities than emergency patrol officers, the context of their daily work structures their choices.

In explaining the difference between the community beat patrol units, the transformation of the police structure and the national orientation towards community policing enabled the establishment of new working styles. However, although this model should be adopted by every zone, it needs to get a translation throughout the police force by the management (creating the conditions and the culture) and translated in daily practice. In Aarschot the management was not able to change the conditions (due to a lack of personnel) to create a new way of working as aimed in the ministerial circular. In Brussels efforts were made to enlarge the amount of beat officers, but the management didn't reallocate the more administrative tasks to other services in the force. The beat officers still work in the traditional way. Only Dendermonde seems to have succeeded in translating COP-principles into practice.

Although in this research evidence can be found that emergency patrol and community beat patrol function like communication vessels, a transfer of tasks from police work formerly done by the community beat patrol to the emergency patrol can only occur in the case of non-urgent activities. For the emergency patrol they are only performed in-between dealing with emergency calls. In forces with a high frequency of such calls, changes in tasks of the community beat patrol only have a limited effect on the emergency patrol. This means that managerial changes in the tasks of both patrol forms have little effect on the tasks of the emergency patrol.

Differences between the emergency patrol and the community beat patrol can be found in their activities and in their treatment of the cases. Due to the culture of the community beat patrol they rarely respond in a repressive way. The emergency patrol on the other hand acts much more repressive.



We found that on the European level, emergency patrol work handles 10.4% of all incidents by writing a summon. In Belgium this is a lot less: the proportions of summons in Brussels (3.1%) and Dendermonde (2.8%) are significantly less. The functioning of the Belgian penal system could be an important explanatory factor for the choices police officers make when handling cases. A former study in which cases treated by the police were traced on the level of the public prosecutor and the criminal courts, demonstrates that only 4% of all cases found their way to the courts (Van den Herreweghe, Vandevoorde, et.al, 2006) The amount of cases that were dismissed at the level of the public prosecutor elevates for some types of crime up to 75%. Especially problems of social order, criminal facts without known offenders and crime with seriousness are dismissed due to the heavy work-load of public prosecution. The research revealed that police officers anticipate to the expected treatment by the penal system. Although there is no standardised feedback mechanism between the public prosecutor and police, the individual police officers seem to have a clear view on the opinions and priorities of public prosecution (Vandevoorde, Vaerewijck, et.al, 2003). Because they anticipate the dismissal of a series of facts police officers are not motivated to do all the administrative work needed to get a case to the public prosecutor. This could possibly explain the low level of summons found in Belgium.

### *Literature*

Easton, M., P. Ponsaers, et al. (2008). Multiple community policing. Hoezo? Brussel, Federaal Wetenschapsbeleid. Programma Samenleving en toekomst.

Eliaerts, C., E. Enhus (1992), Politie en bevolking. Vragen staat vrij... De politionele afhandeling van vragen uit de bevolking, Vanden Broele, Brugge.

Enhus, E. (1998). Tussen hamer en aambeeld. Het Belgisch centraal politiebeleid: een analyse van het vertoog in de periode 1980-1997. Faculteit Rechten, Vakgroep Criminologie. Brussel, V.U.B.

Enhus, E. and P. Ponsaers (2005). "Onmacht tot cultuurverandering. Politiehervorming in België." Tijdschrift voor Criminologie 47(4): 345-354.

Reiner, R. (2002) Police discretion In Maguire, M., Morgan, R. & Reiner, R. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, second ed., pp. 1008-1024

Ponsaers, P. and S. De Kimpe, Eds. (2001). Consensusmania. Over de achtergronden van de politiehervorming. Leuven/Leusden, Acco.

Stol, W., Ph., A. P. van Wijk, et al. (2004). Politiestraatwerk in Nederland. Noodhulp en gebiedswerk: inhoud, samenhang, verandering en sturing. Zeist, Uitgeverij Kerckebosch bv.

Terpstra, J. (2008) Wijkagenten en hun dagelijks werk. Een onderzoek naar de uitvoering van gebiedsgebonden politiewerk, Politiewetenschap nr. 46, Reed Business, Den Haag.

Vandevoorde, N., W. Vaerewyck, et al. (2003). Politie in de steigers. Bouwen aan gemeenschapsgerichte politiefuncties in een lokale context. Brussel, Politeia.

Van den Herrewegen, E., Vandevoorde, N., Enhus, E., & Ponsaers, P. (2006). De strafrechtelijke keten ontsluit. In Devroe, E., Beyens, K. & Enhus, E. (Eds.), Zwart op wit? Duiding van cijfers over onveiligheid en strafrechtsbedeling in België (pp. 409-440). Brussel: Vubpress.

Van Nuffel, D. (2006). "Blauw staat niet in steraanbieding! Over politiekerntaken: diepgaande bezinning of gewoonweg pragmatisme?" Orde van de dag 33(maart): 49-54.

#### *Other sources*

Commissie ter begeleiding van de politiehervorming op lokaal niveau (2007), Derde evaluatieverslag, Brussel, Politeia

KB 5 september 2001 houdende het minimaal effectief van het operationeel en van het administratief en logistiek personeel van de lokale politie, B.S., 12 oktober 2001.

Omzendbrief PLP10 van 9 oktober 2001 inzake de organisatie- en werkingsnormen van de lokale politie met het oog op het waarborgen van een minimale gelijkwaardige dienstverlening aan de bevolking, B.S., 16 oktober 2001.

Omzendbrief CP1 van 27 mei 2003 betreffende community policing, definitie van de Belgische interpretatie van toepassing op de geïntegreerde politiedienst gestructureerd op twee niveaus, B.S., 9 juli 2003.

Omzendbrief CP2 van 3 november 2004 betreffende het bevorderen van de organisatieontwikkeling van de lokale politie met als finaliteit een gemeenschapsgerichte politiezorg, B.S., 29 december 2004.

Wet van 7 december 1998 tot organisatie van een geïntegreerde politiedienst, gestructureerd op twee niveaus, B.S., 5 januari 1999.

## CHAPTER 7

**7. Policing the Streets in Norway**

*Helene Oppen Gundhus, Siv Runhovde, Karianne Rønning*

**7.1 The Norwegian Police**

In this chapter we compare police patrolling in two Norwegian cities, one urban and one more rural, with each other and with the observations from other European cities. Before we start to explore similarities and differences in the fieldwork at the local police stations, we will shortly introduce the Norwegian police organization, the national police management and policy, and the national computer databases that are available to the Norwegian police.

*The national police organization*


The Norwegian police and prosecuting authority is organized in a two-track system. This means that the responsibility for providing the necessary police services is shared between the Ministry of Justice and the Director General of Public Prosecutions<sup>79</sup>. The Law of police describes the duties and responsibilities of the Norwegian police. In short, the law states that the police are to maintain public order and secure the safety of person, property and common goods and defend against all that threatens the general safety in society. The police have the responsibility to prevent, uncover and fight crime and provide help and assistance to citizens in dangerous situations, legal incidents or whenever the circumstances demand it.

The National Police Directorate was established in 2001 and is organized under the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police acts, under the Minister of Justice's constitutional responsibility. The police reform 2000 was based on The Parliamentary White Paper no. 22 which called for the most comprehensive police reform in Norway in the last 100 years. In 2002, the number of police districts was reduced from 54 to 27 (St.meld. nr. 22 (2000-2001)). This figure shows the organization chart of the police structure on a national level:

Figure 1: Organization structure of the Norwegian

---

<sup>79</sup> The Director General of Public Prosecutions has been assigned responsibility for the professional handling of criminal prosecutions. All other areas are the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice, although this responsibility has largely been delegated to the National Police Directorate. The principle is that the prosecuting authority shall make its own independent decisions. No other professional authority, not even the Minister of Justice, has the opportunity to instruct the prosecuting authority. Only The King in Council can instruct the prosecuting authority when it comes to making decisions in criminal prosecution cases.



Police.

Figure comment. In 2008, the national police service consists of the Police Directorate, managed by the National Police Commissioner, the Police Security Service, 27 Police districts, rural police districts and local police stations. In addition there are seven special services; National Criminal Investigation Service, National Police Immigration Service, National Police Computing and Material Service, Norwegian Police University College, National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime, Central Mobile Police Service and Border Commissioner – Norwegian/Russian border Governor of Svalbard.

At the national level there are no further planned reorganizations like ‘Reform 2000’. An important structural change worth mentioning is the Police Directorate’s “National strategy for intelligence and analysis” suggesting that intelligence- and analysis units should be established in all of the 27 police districts and in the special units mentioned above (Politidirektoratet 2007). This structural change is meant to impose a better basis for the national police policy called knowledge-led policing.

#### *National police management*

The main objective of The National Police Directorate is the professional leadership, management and development of the Norwegian police service, with a basis in the strategic and budgetary limitations laid down by the government (Politidirektoratet 2008). The National Police Directorate is responsible for managing and following up the police districts and the special police agencies, which employ a total of roughly 12,000 people, including both civilians and police educated personnel. On a national level there is approximately 1.8 police officers pr every 1000 inhabitant. The National Police Directorate has a staff of approximately 120 employees. Their main tasks in respect of the police districts and the special police agencies are strategic co-ordination, agency management, personnel and organizational development, support and supervisory duties, administrative duties, contingency planning and the handling of complaints.

The organization of the Norwegian Police is largely based on the principle of an integrated police, meaning that all the functions of the police are collected in one organization. This national police are divided into smaller police districts. The 27 local police districts, are each under the command of a Chief of Police. The Chief of Police has full responsibility for all kinds of policing in the district. Each police district has its own headquarter, as well as several police stations and so called offices for ‘lensmenn’ in rural districts. The districts are divided into rural police districts, under the command of a Police Chief Superintendent.

All police officers are trained as generalists at the Norwegian Police University College, and there is only one Police University College in Norway. The police students are educated to bachelor level in a three year program, and should be able to fulfill every aspect of ordinary police work, including criminal investigation as well as public order and community policing. Within each police district, special contingency units have been established. Their primary task is to provide reinforcements and assistance within the police district in connection with the solving of difficult assignments and in instances where firearms are involved.

### *National police policy*

The National Police Directorate argues in the recent strategy plan that four factors are central in future public policing in Norway (Politidirektoratet 2007). The police have to be knowledge-led, increase the police availability and interaction with the citizens, expand the police focus on co-operation with private, public sector and non-governmental organizations, and increase international co-operation. This system of governance from a distance places police and a range of actors in a co-operative organization where the mutual responsibilities differ and depend on local variation. The objective is to act preemptively and proactively before crime occurs.

The idea that the police should have close ties to citizens and local communities as such has long traditions in the Norwegian police. In 1978-79, community policing was introduced by a number of experiments with local policing, decentralisation, foot patrol and establishing closer ties to local communities (Lorentzen 1980). In 1981 the Police role committee defined the police role in society by using ten principles describing good policing in Norway – for example that the police should be decentralized, in close interaction with citizens, reflect the society's ideals and have a civil trait. Overall, these principles have been understood as key principles describing community policing. According to White Paper 42 (St. meld. 42 (2004-2005)), these ten principles are still valid and guiding the contemporary police role as well.

Since the National Police Directorate was established in 2001, one important task has been to make national police policies. In 2008 there are three policy documents that are guiding the police patrol work.

The *first* policy document is the action plan for preventive policing (Politidirektoratet 2002), which is still valid. The plan's main focus is on problem-oriented policing (POP). POP employs a process model called SARA which is a practical guide for better allocation of resources by applying an analytical approach for dealing with crime. SARA is an acronym which refers to the four stages in POP<sup>80</sup>; scanning, analysis, response and assessment. By introducing analytical responses to a crime problem, the objective is to ensure that problems are effectively identified and tackled in such a way that even future crime is prevented. Implementing the SARA-model has significance for aims concerning how patrolling is executed. For example, patrolling can be used as an instrument for collecting information to the scanning-process, or it can be used to perform responses. The philosophy behind patrolling changes; it becomes an instrument for doing POP. The analytical approach to police work is intended to change traditional police patrol by intervening on the basis of knowing what causes crime. POP is then a strategy to manage potential crime more effectively by

---

<sup>80</sup> The first step is to identify and scan hotspots; the second is to analyze spatial patterns of crime and criminal behavior and to make hypotheses about problems. Third, it is used to find new ways of intervening earlier and more fitting the problem to make it less likely to occur in the future. The fourth step is to assess the impact of the interventions (Clarke and Eck 2003).

governing the police officers tasks more in detail and target the police organization directly through the POP-process. For example, the patrols would to a lesser degree decide what to do themselves, but follow a plan described in the POP-manual.

The *second* guiding document focus on how to communicate the knowledge of crime to the community, and make crime the responsibility for more agencies through partnerships (Politidirektoratet 2005). This trend towards specifying relations with special authorities in the local community and not with the citizens in general, is due to the trend towards dispersal and plurality of safety and security providers, and strengthens ties to specific partners in policing. Plurality here refers to the emergence of local and municipal policy bodies, enlisted by the local community in the tasks of social control. This distribution of responsibility involves a way of thinking by which the government actively enlists participation by non-state actors and agencies and thus shares the burden of policing. The objective is to improve the communication and partnerships between local municipalities and the police, and to achieve central community policing objectives; for example establishing closer ties to the citizens and prevent crime through partnerships with communities (Balvig og Holmberg 2004, Holmberg 2004).

The partnership idea in the policy document is based on the recognition that the police are dependent on other agencies to prevent crime and achieve community safety. One important collaboration partner for the police is the Norwegian National Crime Prevention Council's (KRÅD), which is an agency under the Ministry of Justice. The councils' main task is to encourage local municipalities to follow a model for coordination of local crime preventive enterprises (or SLT which is the abbreviation in Norwegian).<sup>81</sup> This model came to use in Norway in the early 1990's after a Danish model called SSP. At present, approximately 170 of 430<sup>82</sup> Norwegian municipalities are working by this model. The police are intended to have an important role in this partnership. The key factor is to coordinate all co-operations in the municipality in the crime prevention field.<sup>83</sup>

The *third* policy document is the National strategy for intelligence and analysis (2007). The strategy intend to improve the crime analysis functions in the police organisations, so that better crime reduction efforts will be implemented by the different police officers, including patrolling police officers. In this document the headline for all the new strategies and working philosophies is knowledge-led policing.<sup>84</sup> The common aim of these basic assumptions is to implement methods based on systematic use of information sources to interject in various patterns of crime and defined problems. The crime analysis involves the identification and analysis of problems, and the subsequent planning and implementation of targeted measures. Since knowledge-led policing indicates a police role that is subordinate to the knowledge processes, the aim of police patrol is changed. The patrolling is to become an instrument for this process. To collect information and register it in computers so it can be used in analysis,

---

<sup>81</sup> KRÅD receives funding from the Ministry of Justice to distribute amongst municipalities who choose to adopt this way of work.

<sup>82</sup> The amount of municipalities are from 01.01.2008

<sup>83</sup> This requires that the municipal authorities at top level and the local head of the police make a promise to be involved by participating in an administrative board. One person is engaged as a coordinator, a role similar to the British community safety manager (Hughes 2007).

<sup>84</sup> According to the Police Directorate knowledge-led-policing includes both strategies as problem-oriented policing directed towards 'problems', and intelligence-led policing directed towards serious crime using law enforcement instruments (Politidirektoratet 2007).



is one of the central differences it implies for patrolling. Another is to perform responses made to different targets, or collect information to evaluate the responses.

The National Police Directorate's principal intention is that all police districts are familiar with and work in accordance to the principles of partnerships and knowledge-led policing. The police patrol work is to be more goal-oriented and standardized on the basis of scanning and analyses of possible crime trends. Since these changes are dependent on changes in organizational structures, this is an on-going process that is implemented differently in the 27 police districts.

#### *National police computer databases*

One important aim of knowledge-led policing is the co-operation and exchange of information in different computer databases. Flow of information through the different levels in the police organizations is a premise for implementing knowledge-led policing (Gundhus 2006). In a recent study, Gundhus quantify that the police service has 90 computer databases available, and the challenge is to gather the information and ensure the quality of the information. But some police computer databases are more important than others, and in the following we will present the most central.

Indicia is the name of the latest developed national intelligence system in the Norwegian police. This database is to be implemented in the police districts in 2007-2008. This ICT-architecture is replacing the eleven National Police Databases (see Gundhus 2006: 471-473 for a description of them) that police officers and civilian analysts have access to. The aim of Indicia is to support visible police functions like police patrol, through the generation, storage and dissemination of information. Another important system is Central register for crime and police information (SSP), which contains information about people who are convicted and sanctioned, plus searches, arrests, physical descriptions, DNA, wanted or missing persons etc. The National Criminal Investigation Service is responsible for updating the register. Strasak is a national electronic system comprising all reports and criminal proceedings in the country including a system for the hearing of criminal cases. This system forms the basis for the national criminal statistics. Police operational system (PO) is the local police districts individual system for assisting police operations. It is supposed to be a supportive tool for decision making and assist and coordinate the proceedings of assignments by logging data and updating the status of the patrols. Last, Basic solutions (BL), is a local criminal case register for the control of criminal proceedings in the district. The system has an overview of all deadlines, the status of the case, name of the executive officers and written manuals for all steps in the case procedures.

## **7.2 Police in Lillestrøm and Oslo**

### **Lillestrøm**

#### Skedsmo local council, Lillestrøm and Romerike police district

##### *Skedsmo local council*

Lillestrøm police station is located within the Lillestrøm city area which is the largest city at Romerike comprising about 14 000 inhabitants. Lillestrøm lies within Skedsmo local council, one of a total of 430 Norwegian councils. The geographical area is 77 km<sup>2</sup> and the council has about 44 500 inhabitants. There has been a growth in population of about 3 percent the

last year. Skedsmo has a combination of rural and urban population. The city of Lillestrøm has a fairly high degree of urbanisation compared to its small size and few inhabitants. There is a university, industry, restaurants and shops. The train and bus terminal connects the district with the capital city and is busy with passengers. Other more or less urban places where people live within the council are Skedsmokorset, Strømmen and Skjetten. The rest is more rural and contains farmland. Strømmen has a big shopping centre that attracts people from the whole district. Lillestrøm police station's basic area of patrolling is Skedsmo local council, but as a part of a cooperation within the police district the patrol cars also get assignments in other parts of the district.

### *Romerike police district*

As mentioned in 7.1, the Norwegian police service is divided into 27 police districts. Skedsmo council and Lillestrøm lies within Romerike police district which is organized into two police stations; Lillestrøm (where our fieldwork was carried out) and Gardermoen (main airport), and 9 local deputy offices.<sup>85</sup> In total the police district has about 560 employees and a budget of more than 300 million NOK a year. The police district covers 13 local councils comprising in total 234 000 inhabitants. Romerike is a rural area but also contains more urban places such as small cities and housing areas. The biggest highway in Norway runs through the area and brings a lot of challenges in handling traffic for the police.

Romerike police district is neighbouring Oslo police district; Oslo is the capital city in Norway and has different challenges than most of Romerike. However, the more urban parts of Romerike struggle with the same kind of problems as the capital city; public drunkenness in the weekends, drugs etc. Police officers patrolling Romerike has their biggest challenge in the enormous geographical area they are set to control. The distances are very large and there are usually not many police cars patrolling the area (ref. head of police force).

### Lillestrøm police station

The police station is divided into four sections; Order Maintenance section (which has been the subject of observation), criminal investigators, the traffic unit and the incident room. The first two is set to cover Skedsmo local council. The traffic section and the incident room cover the whole police district. The incident room, Order Maintenance section and the criminal investigators are located in the same part of the building and also contain a 24 hour public service desk.

The administration has their offices in the same building. The Chief of Police at Romerike police district and his staff is located at Lillestrøm police station. There is a public service counter where people can be issued passports and other permissions. The building is located next to the courthouse and is close to city hall. Child welfare also has an office there. This creates a close connection between the police and other participants in the cooperation of crime coordination. According to the head of the police force, this also strengthens the cooperation between the sections at the police station.

Romerike police district has one person hired as a POP coordinator, mostly working at the police station and one person working with preventive police work towards young people in the community. Together with The Police Chief Superintendent and Police Superintendent for the Order maintenance Section, are both participating in the local crime preventive enterprise Samordning av Lokale kriminalitetsforebyggende Tiltak (SLT), which is a partnership between the police and the local authorities in Norway. The POP coordinator and the officer

---

<sup>85</sup> The Police Chief Superintendent at the local deputy offices is in Norwegian referred to as 'lensmenn'.

working with preventing youth crime, do not have their own patrol car. Since these police officers crime prevention work are separated from the rest of the sections at the police station, their work is absent from our observations in Lillestrøm.

*The police force – Order Maintenance section*

All of our observations in Lillestrøm took place at the Order Maintenance Section where there are 49 employees including the manager<sup>86</sup>. The 48 employees are divided into 6 teams which all have their own team leader. The team leaders usually don't work in the patrol car but are located at the police station during the shift. At each shift they have one person working at the station who is responsible for the people brought into the county jail. This function is called the "picket", but can be described as a front desk, since the main duty is to give response to people visiting the police station asking for help. The receiver of the request can be a person with police background or a person with special training (but not police education). The rest of the officers working the shift are supposed to spend most of their time out in the police car responding to calls from the incident room. In addition they are supposed to carry out preventive efforts targeted towards identified challenges and problems in the community, generated from POP-projects. Vandalism around the local train station was such a prioritized problem area.

There are 8 women and 40 men included in the teams. It is a 'young' section; most of the patrolling officers are between 25 and 35 years old. Two men in the force have an Asian background, the rest is ethnic Norwegian. The team leaders are often older and experienced officers. A police officer at Lillestrøm can be police inspector (pb3), police sergeant (pb2) or police constable (pb1), all referred to as police officers in this chapter.

The force include 9 dog handlers in active duty who all have their own dogs trained for different assignments such as tracking drugs, people etc. They work a normal schedule but are often used for special assignments and also have more time to spend for training their dogs during work hours. In addition to the dog handlers there are 14 police officers with special operative training (UEH). These officers form a unit for special assignments such as transporting dangerous prisoners, dangerous situations where weapons are involved and other special operations. There are 6 employees without police background which have special training in handling prisoners.

The usual patrol car at Romerike fits the definition of the **emergency beat patrol** in this study. It is two uniformed police officers in a marked police car. The main focus for the EP is patrolling the streets in their area. Out on patrol the officers respond to calls from the incident room and act on their own initiative towards incidents in the community. Between assignments the EP are supposed to work proactive towards problems defined by the problem-oriented policing plans at the station.

While not responding to calls or acting on police initiative the officers, according to the head of the police section, are supposed to spend their time on other assignments such as:

- Getting assignments from their team leader such as transporting documents etc.
- Transporting prisoners back to jail
- Sitting guard in the courthouse during trial
- Transporting psychiatric patients to the hospital
- Writing cases at the police station

---

<sup>86</sup> This information is based on the situation during the study in February 2007.

- Personal and professional training

As a part of the cooperation in the police district the EP also have to respond to calls in other parts of the district.

Lillestrøm does not have officers exclusively assigned to **community beat policing**. Since CBP is integrated in the emergency beat patrol, it was necessary to classify CBP differently. While observing we separated the different shifts between EP as defined in the project and the rest as CBP. This means that the different patrols observed as CBP is:

- Dog handler: two uniformed officers in a marked car with a working dog in the car
- Unmarked car/ surveillance: one or two officers not wearing a uniform in an unmarked car
- Unmarked car with a uniformed officer and a student wearing uniform
- Local police officer from another local county: EP

### Workload and management Lillestrøm

#### *Problem oriented policing*

Problem oriented policing was introduced to Romerike Police district in 2004. This was done according to a national plan of action. A superior plan for the whole district was made but it was up to each local unit to work out their own plan based on local analyzes. The POP plan at Romerike police district of 2006 is focused on narcotics in connection to young people and theft. Lillestrøm is supposed to have a special focus on theft at Strømmen shopping centre. As mentioned, there is one person dedicated to work with this strategic plan at the station.

The officers are supposed to work in line with the schedule for problem oriented policing while policing the streets. In practice, this means to be aware of the prioritized efforts which have been outlined according to the problem oriented policing model. During the period of observation, management changed the work schedule to make the officers work more active against specific problems. These assignments were in relation to the problems defined in the POP plans for the station, especially towards drugs and violence. In the weekends the officers are instructed to park the car outside the entrance to pubs and discotheques at closing time when people are pouring out into the street. The strategy is an example of the police wanting to be at the right place at the right time, believing that the presence of visible police has a preventive effect.

In 2006/2007 Romerike took part in cooperation with Oslo police district to combat gangs and gang related problems in Oslo and Akershus. For years there has been problems related to gangs mostly with Pakistani origin. There were also a project towards drugs and drug related problems.

#### *The activity plan*

The activity plan for Lillestrøm police station lists the focus and the amount of work the force has to fill. The officers have to check a certain amount of cars, give a certain number of tickets etc. According to the chief of the Order Maintenance Section, the activity plan gives

the criteria for success in crime fighting in the community. Striking hard against public drunkenness and violence is part of the strategy to reduce these incidents. In the issue of traffic, the officers have to stop and check a certain amount of cars each year.

#### *Work schedule*

The police force at Lillestrøm has their own work schedule but are also part of a cooperation with the lower part of the police district. The lower part contains Lillestrøm police station and 5 local police offices (Lørenskog, Nittedal, Sørum, Aurskog-Høland and Fet/Rælingen). During daytime they are each responsible for their own area but at night and during weekends they cooperate. Officers working at the local offices have the same police education but they often have more versatile assignments in their daily work. While out on patrol they have the same workload as the emergency beat patrol. They also get assignments from the emergency room. If there are not enough officers at work at the same police office they cooperate and patrol together in one car.

During the observations at Lillestrøm there were students in active duty. Students at the police academy spend their whole second year in practice at a police station, both as patrolling officers and as criminal investigators. They also spend time at child welfare. The students follow one specific officer while out on patrol. If there is only the student and an officer out patrolling they use the unmarked car. The students are not allowed to attend dangerous assignments where the officers are armed.

The officers do not have one steady partner but are set together as best seen fit for the workload that specific day. During observation, the schedule was changed to make the officers able to attend instruction days with professional training every sixth week. At the beginning of a shift, the team leader sometimes arranges a meeting with the officers on duty to discuss their workload. In addition, the chief of police force holds a parole meeting three times a week.

#### *The incident room*

The incident room is located at the police station in Lillestrøm and is set to cover the entire Romerike police district. Three or four people are usually there to respond to calls from the public 24 hours a day. They have access to all the police computer systems and other useful files. When a call is received, a decision is made whether to send a police patrol to the scene or not. If it's not important the assignment is set on hold and a patrol is sent when available. If there is an emergency, a police car is instantly called over the radio and given information about the incident. The officers are also instructed whether to act as in the case of an emergency and/or if they need to be armed. The police in Norway are not armed but have hand weapons locked in a room in the car. They need special permission to be armed. For use of heavier arms they need to go back to the station to get the right equipment. In dangerous situations, the officers with UEH training or the special emergency squad in Oslo is called.

When the incident room get a call they decide which patrol to send to the incident. The following criteria are used:

- Geographical position
- The aim of distributing assignments equally between patrols
- Type of car and type of assignment



The people in the incident room always know which patrols are available in the district and since all cars have a sender they can follow the location of the police cars at all times. All calls and incidents are written in the Police Operative (PO) log. The PO log is a very important information source for the police. Each district has a local log. Also prisoners and items taken by the police are written in the log. While patrolling, the incident room is one of the most important sources of information for the officers. The police officers working at the incident room have access to all national and local computer databases mentioned in chapter 7.1.

## Oslo

### Oslo police district

Oslo is the capital of Norway. Sentrum Police station is organized under the police district of Oslo. The total number of inhabitants in Oslo is just over 560 000. The city's population is rising, due to both increasing birth number and new people moving in. Oslo has the country's highest population of ethnic minorities; the percentage of people with non-western background is 25 percent. Oslo council and Oslo Police districts have established an important partnership based upon the SLT-model, which in Oslo is referred to as SaLTo.<sup>87</sup> The police station covers three different parts of the city with a total of 70 000 inhabitants<sup>88</sup>.

### Sentrum police station

There are a total of five police stations within the police district of Oslo. Sentrum police station is among the biggest, and the only one with a 24-hour contact service functioning as a front desk. Still, the area the station covers has the fewest number of inhabitants. Despite the rule of patrolling within the area of one's own station, the patrol cars often cross over to the other stations designated areas. Sentrum police station covers three different parts of Oslo. The area *Bygdøy-Frogner* has 45 000 inhabitants and varies from close settlement just west of the city centre, scattered houses and more rural, open areas, to the islands in Oslofjorden just south of the city centre. The area covering the *city centre* has around 600 inhabitants with a lot of business activity with service institutions like restaurants, hotels, banks, shops and bars which draw much traffic to parts of the area. The area *St.Hanshaugen-Ullevål* has 27 000 inhabitants. Here you find some business- and service activities and large institutions including a hospital. In recent years the area has received an increasing number of hospices and shelters and in turn, 12 00 social clients in the form of unemployed people, drugs- and alcohol addicts and mental patients.

Sentrum police station is localized in the middle of downtown Oslo. The station has 240 employees scattered over four different sections; order maintenance section (the subject of observation), criminal investigation unit, strategic planning unit and administration/management. All sections are localized in the same building. This is also the case for a child welfare office connected to the station.

### *Order Maintenance Section*

The Order Maintenance Section is the largest section, comprising around 150 employees. The section is divided into four divisions or work teams, working shifts day, afternoon and night.

<sup>87</sup> It is possible to read more about the SaLTo-model on this URL: <http://www.salto.oslo.kommune.no/>

<sup>88</sup> All numbers are from 2007, obtained through the Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics



This is the group of observation. In addition the section also holds the groups Operative planning, Community contact and Intelligence. These three groups work day- and afternoon shifts. The Community contact group is doing PR-work and children and youths are their main target group. They also work with the local authorities, the commercial community, restaurants and bars, and the taxi industry among others. Tasks often consist of traditional preventive work within the area, conflict solution, advice and guidance to individuals and groups. The Community contact group also cooperates with different problem-owners in drawing up and seeing through initiatives to reduce crime. These initiatives are later evaluated.

*The four divisions* are led by a division leader or chief inspector, two for each division. The divisions' main responsibility is to prevent and pursue criminal offenses, carry out other assignments determined by law or instruction to assure safety for the public, reduce crime and do guard duty at the 24 hour service desk at the station. Each division has a staff of between 30-35 officers. The number of officers on active duty varies as some has a leave of absence, some work at the service desk and so on. At Sentrum police station there is no sharp line between the emergency beat patrols and the community beat patrols. Who does what type of patrolling changes from day to day, meaning the same officers does both. As we will see, this organization structure has implications for the profile of patrolling the streets in Oslo.

Like in Lillestrøm, the patrol cars in Oslo fit the definition of the **emergency beat patrol** in this study. Two or often three uniformed police officers patrol the streets in a marked police car. A shift consists of many different types of tasks. They respond to calls from the incident room, get assignments from their division leader, transport prisoners to and from jail and sit guard in the courthouse during trial. During observation and through talking with the officers it became clear that, different from Lillestrøm, the EP in Oslo spend quite a lot of time searching for, and transporting mentally ill patients to the emergency room or hospital. Between assignments the EP are supposed to work proactive, such as checking cars they find suspicious, visiting places or addresses where there have been incidents before etc. and report their proactive activity to management afterwards. This is a crucial point for achieving good evaluations of the POP-projects. Without proper reporting, the strategic planning unit and management have a difficult time measuring the efficiency, making new plans and then communicating their efforts to other divisions. Without proper control from management, it is possible the officers do less problem oriented, proactive work. At the stations staff meetings, we did hear management comment on the lack of reported proactive activity from EP.

Sentrum police station does not have officers exclusively assigned to **community beat** or problem oriented policing, and EP are always prioritized if there are not enough officers on duty to fill both EP and CBP. Often, there were no CBP for us to follow; sometimes there were only a CBP for half the shift. CBP often get the same assignments as the traditional EP, but the incident room usually sends the EP first so the CBP can spend their time on proactive work. The CBP were labeled 620/621, indicating their category and ranking order for assignments. The basic assignments look like EP in their way of patrolling and they get their assignments through the incident room.

The following three groups are also part of the Order Maintenance Section; *the Group for operative planning* is responsible for organizing and preparing equipment, training and events for officers in operative service plus to plan and follow up state visits and other activities within the district. *The Community contact group* has children and youths as their target group. Their main task is to work crime preventive towards these groups by uncover problems and initiate contact with the municipalities youth and child welfare service. They also work

with the local authorities, the commercial community, restaurants and bars, and the taxi industry among others. Tasks often consist of traditional preventive work within the area, conflict solution, advice and guidance to individuals and groups. In addition the Community contact group cooperates with different problem-owners in drawing up and seeing through initiatives to reduce crime. They later evaluate these initiatives. *The Intelligence group* collects and organizes intelligence information according to the police station priority areas, with problem oriented police work as their work philosophy. The group is intended to coordinate and further communicate the flow of information in and out of the station.

#### *Strategic planning unit*

This unit holds five positions and is led by a chief inspector. The unit was established in connection with the introduction of problem oriented policing as a work philosophy at the station in 2000. The unit's objective is to monitor the development of crime within the district and work out analyses and evaluations of completed initiatives. This unit is the management's tool for acquiring knowledge concerning the current crime situation. The information is meant to give an overview of the type of criminal actions that dominates the district, at what point in time crime takes place, geographical localization, perpetrators and victims. This information is to be organized and processed to be the foundation for specific and goal-oriented efforts against crime in the district. This forms a base for the stations "Virksomhetsplan", an activity plan which outlines what the station should be working on, and what priorities that is to be made.

The plan is particular for the station and is based on the activity plan for the whole of Oslo police district, with larger and smaller aims according to the current crime rate in the area. According to the activity plan 2006, management had the following police priorities based on knowledge derived from the strategic planning unit's crime analysis at the time of observation: Most of the resources of Sentrum police station are to be distributed in the urban part of the district. The biggest problems recent years is said to be violence linked to the large number of bars and pubs in the centre and grand larceny from civilians in public places and daylight robbery for instance from shoppers. Recent years the emphasized trends and challenges in the activity plan have been violence, pick pocketing and robbery. The Strategic planning unit cooperates with all sections at the station. Since 2005, this unit has actively used a newly established intelligence group to gather information for crime analyses. In addition, effort is made to use research based material in the development of the analyses.

#### *Child welfare*

In the same building, there is also a 24 hour-child welfare office. The office is open every day with the responsibility to handle acute child care cases outside office hours. Assistance to children, youths and adults in crisis is the main task of the office. They assist in the form of conversation, dispute resolution, temporary follow-up of children and youths in collaboration with the parents and in the most serious cases, emergency placing in institution or foster care. In Norway the age of criminal responsibility is 15 years, but their target group is children and youths between 0-18 years and their parents/guardians. They are also responsible for juveniles the police officers take into custody in relation to criminal activity, serious drug- and behavioral problems, different types of domestic troubles or minors with psychological- or other problems and therefore in need of immediate help. The officers leave the child in the care of child welfare personnel, who makes contact with the parents.

## Workload and management Oslo

### *Implementing problem oriented policing.*

Problem oriented policing was introduced as a work philosophy in 2000. Through focusing on problem areas the station is supposed to develop detailed analyses with suggested goal-oriented initiatives plus cooperate with other problem-owners. The intention is to reduce the use of law enforcement as a crime reduction tool. POP also aims to make crime the responsibility of others than the police, and to prevent crime means to intervene early before crimes occur. The work model is called SARA as explained in 7.1; short for scanning, analysis, response and assessment. Sentrum police station was the first station in Norway to implement problem-oriented policing (POP) and they wanted to improve it with the use of electronic maps – geographical information systems (GIS). The aim was to implement GIS as an analytical tool in a problem-oriented policing context, not only to use GIS to improve efficiency in responding to crime, e.g. reduce the response time.

The GIS-story started in 1999 and the objective was to form an analytical basis for the leaders in their effort to make better decisions. GIS is used to enhance the police ability to identify and scan hot spots, the maps show where problems are located. Further it is used to analyze spatial patterns of crime and criminal behavior and to find new ways of intervening earlier to prevent the problems from occurring in the future (Clarke and Eck 2003). These systems are governed by the strategic planning department at the station. The intention with the use of these communication technologies is to keep close contact with what citizens are reporting to the station as problems, and also stay in tune with what they experience as difficult in their everyday life, to reduce so called ‘repeat victimisation’ and ‘prolific offenders’. This means that POP/GIS is implemented in a community safety context at the police station– the intention is to move away from the law enforcement paradigm towards crime prevention by using a partnership strategy.

### *Daily routines*

Each shift starts with a “parole” or staff meeting at the station. The most important meeting, where all employees that are present attends, is every afternoon at 15.00. Management decides in the morning what is to be reviewed and discussed at the main meeting. According to the activity plan this meeting is a mandatory daily gathering for the whole station staff, and is to be a segment of- and support for the stations work-philosophy and expressed goals. Assignments for the following shift and feedback on already performed tasks is given here. There is also a briefing on incidents that occurred earlier on the dayshift. The staff meetings are also a place where the officers can address issues concerning the work environment and problems they wish the management to correct. The officers do not have steady partners, but patrol together with different people on their work team. The patrol cars often consist of 2-3 officers, and they take turns in driving, talking on the police radio and sitting in the back. The officer with the highest rank has the final word, and age also matters when it comes to making decisions. Most of the officers are between 25-35 years old.

When it comes to priority problem-areas, violence during weekends and patrolling on Friday and Saturday night often has precedence. In addition the police station also has the responsibility for guarding the American embassy. This is only during office hours Monday to Friday where a marked police car should be parked in immediate vicinity to the embassy building.

### *Operation central*

As described for Lillestrøm, the patrol cars are controlled by an operation central. This is a common command central for all the stations within Oslo police district and is located at the police headquarters in Oslo. Each Norwegian police district has a common front desk which receives requests for assistance concerning accidents, emergencies, other dangerous situations and whenever there is the need for immediate help. The central has an outline on most of what goes on in the district and is able to quickly direct police patrols to where they are needed. The daily management and running of the operation central in Oslo is similar to the one in Lillestrøm and the cars are distributed according to comparable criteria. In Oslo, the rule is to save the patrol cars labeled 620/621 which are meant to work problem oriented, and primarily give the assignments to emergency patrol cars according to their ranking order. During the period of information, GPS senders were started to be installed in the patrol cars to make the incident room able to locate the cars at all times.

*Table 7.1 below expresses the strength of the Norwegian police teams under observation, the police-inhabitant ratio and population density.*

	Strength (number of employees) *	Area covered by EP (km <sup>2</sup> )	Inhabitants in this area #	Inhabitants per employee	Population density (inh./km <sup>2</sup> )
Oslo	240	16.7	70,000	290	4190
Lillestrøm	202	77.0	44,600	220	580
<i>TOTAL PSE</i>	<i>1,741</i>	<i>1,646.9</i>	<i>837,420</i>	<i>480</i>	<i>510</i>

\*: including all employees: law enforcement officers as well as administrative staff.

#: number of inhabitants in the area covered by Emergency Patrol (EP) – the area under observation.

Comment to table 7.1: the area listed is the basic area for patrolling for Lillestrøm police station; Skedsmo local council. As part of cooperation in the district they are also obliged to respond to calls or patrol other parts of the district, especially at the lower part of Romerike (6 other local counties). Although the area covered by Lillestrøm is much wider than Oslo, the number of inhabitants per employee is much the same, 210 to 1 in Oslo and 220 to 1 in Lillestrøm. This is much lower than the European averages that are 1 employee per 480 inhabitants. As stated in 7.1, there are approximately 1.8 police officers per every 1000 inhabitant on a national level. The aim of the National Police Directorate is to increase this ratio to a minimum of 2 police officers per every 1000 inhabitant within 2020.

*As described in chapter 2.5, the research data consist of observed incidents that can be separated into calls from citizens and police initiatives. Table 7.2 describe the workload of the two Norwegian stations.*

*Table 7.2: work load*

<i>Observed incidents</i>	<i>... of which are calls *</i>	<i>Inc./hour Emergency Patrol</i>	<i>Calls/hour</i>	<i>Police Initiatives hour</i>
-------------------------------	-------------------------------------	---------------------------------------	-------------------	------------------------------------

Oslo	199	81	1.4	0.6	0.9
Lillestrøm	133	66	1.2	0.6	0.6
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>911</i>	<i>1.8</i>	<i>0.8</i>	<i>1.0</i>
<i>Community Policing</i>					
Oslo	155	34	1.8	0.4	1.4
Lillestrøm	82	30	1.5	0.6	1.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.094</i>	<i>323</i>	<i>2.6</i>	<i>0.4</i>	<i>2.2</i>

\*: calls are all incidents to which a citizen took the first step, excluding ‘answering a question from the public’ (var06=65) and ‘chatting with the public’ (var06=84).

The work load per hour in Oslo and Lillestrøm does not differ significantly from the European average, although the incidents per hour in the study data are lower in both the Norwegian cities.

### 7.3 Sort of Incidents Involved in Patrol Work

#### *Traffic*

Traffic is a sort of incident that can explain differences in incidents that are initiatives from the police and initiatives from the citizen.

*Table 7.3: proportion of traffic (= 3.2: 61, 4.2: 93)*

	Incidents on the initiative of the police		Incidents on the initiative of a citizen		All incidents	
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>						
Oslo	94	69.1	105	9.5	199	37.7
Lillestrøm	61	** 29.5	72	30.6	133	* 30.1
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.074</i>	<i>62.9</i>	<i>1.015</i>	<i>18.9</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>41.6</i>
<i>Community Policing</i>						
Oslo	91	** 58.2	64	9.4	155	38.1
Lillestrøm	45	51.1	37	* 18.9	82	36.6
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>567</i>	<i>39.5</i>	<i>658</i>	<i>6.7</i>	<i>2.094</i>	<i>29.2</i>

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

#### *Lillestrøm*

The field work shows that Lillestrøm handles a relatively small proportion of traffic violations on their own initiative compared to the average of the places observed. Traffic is part of the activity plan and as a consequence the officers often spend time doing traffic controls to fulfil the demand in number of cars they are obliged to control each period.

Romerike police district have a special traffic unit located at Lillestrøm police station. They have one marked and one unmarked car in active duty. The workload contains routine traffic controls and patrolling the streets with traffic violations as their main priority. They have their own work schedule and are available for the whole police district. Four times a year the traffic unit arranges a huge traffic control in cooperation with boarder control, customs and the highway authorities. It also involves one emergency patrol and officers from the traffic unit. They stop all the cars on one specific road and ask all the drivers for license and registration.



If a car appears suspicious or it's a foreign car the officers gives a message over the radio and the car will be stopped and checked by one of the others. Several hundreds of cars and drivers may be stopped and checked in these controls. During the period of observation one traffic control like this where observed. It was organized by the traffic unit and also included one EP patrol car with two uniformed police officers.

A highly active traffic unit can be one explanation for why the EP officers in Lillestrøm come in to action on their own initiative more rarely than the average. On the other hand, the observation showed that the EP officers spend lots of time observing cars while patrolling the streets. Since the officers have such a large area to patrol they spend most of the time in the car driving around. They always keep an eye out for other cars since this has shown to be a good entrance to many incidents. In the study we did not report it as an incident if the officers did not get into contact with the public. To us it seemed like the officers did check a lot of cars by calling the incident room and getting them to check the license plate number in the computer files. However, we cannot be sure whether officers in Lillestrøm did this more often than officers in other places since we have not systematically recorded activities without the officers interacting with the public. Hence, we cannot compare these observations. Only if there was a specific reason, they would stop the car and check the driver. The active use of information sources as shown in the later introduced table 7.11, can be seen in connection to the active use of the incident room to get information. Even the officers themselves commented on the number of PO searches they asked for each day.

In Lillestrøm CBP includes a large proportion of traffic incidents in which the police are mobilized by citizens. This is so because the officers patrol in a car and the incident room assigns jobs to them. Also the patrol work observed does not have the character of "real" CBP as defined in this study. In chapter 1 the factors which determine what is involved in police work is outlined. In Lillestrøm we see that particularly basic assignment and police roles, way of patrolling as well as the profile and nature of incidents are different in Lillestrøm compared to the original definition of CBC. Also the time of the year is a factor of relevance. This is particularly related to weather conditions like heavy rain and flooding, snow and ice on the roads during winter time, plus more traffic during holidays etc. The patrol cars are often handling collisions, especially during winter when the weather conditions are difficult. The officers often spend a lot of time on these incidents. Another explanation why emergency beat patrols at Lillestrøm show a small proportion of traffic on police initiative may be that there are few police cars patrolling the area at all times and they have a large area to cover. Our empirical observations do not give foundation for making such assumptions, but it points to the argument that putting more police officers on the road can lead to more traffic checks on police initiative.

### *Oslo*

In Oslo CBP includes a large proportion of traffic when the officers come into action on their own initiative. The officers told us that the CBP more often are given assignments from their own station. This is tasks of a more administrative type that are implemented as situational prevention techniques, like putting up temporary street signs, for instance "no entry signs" in streets crowded with people, public drunkenness and pirate taxis on weekend nights. After ten pm the officers drive around putting up street signs on designated places. The next shift has the responsibility for collecting the signs in the early morning hours when the pubs are closed and people have gone home.



To what level police officers are active in the area of traffic is determined by how busy they are with other work, for example citizen calls or POP-responses. Both in Oslo and Lillestrøm, traffic violations are the duty of other special departments which handle a large part of traffic related incidents. However, both EP and CBP in Oslo are encouraged to spend their time partly on traffic controls whenever they are free between assignments. The portion of traffic incidents is probably a result of a number of circumstances. Partly, it depends on the portion of other tasks, the extent management emphasizes traffic as a priority and the fact that some teams of officers are simply more devoted to traffic than others, and when given a choice, prefer traffic stops to other activities. Another explanation may be that because car theft and theft from cars is not clearly expressed as a priority area at the station, some attention to traffic is further lost. Also, like in Lillestrøm, weather conditions might influence the degree of traffic incidents the police work consists of. During a large part of the observation period the weather in Oslo were quite warm for the season, therefore snow in the streets did seldom cause problems.

#### *Maintaining the law and other main themes in policing*

The traditional categories in police patrol work are: maintaining the law, maintaining public order, giving assistance (and of course ‘other’). In this study we have enlarged this classification by adding ‘networking’ and ‘internal job’ because these play an important role in CBP. Maintaining the law, maintaining public order and giving assistance are traditional categories that came into being with regard to ‘classic policing’ – EP). Also in this study, maintaining the law always is the largest category in the European average. We will now point out local characteristics and explanations for differences between Oslo and Lillestrøm and the incidents in the European average in table 7.4.

*Table 7.4: patrol work subdivided into main categories (percentages) (= 3.1: 57, 4.1: 85)*

	<i>N</i>	<i>Maintain -ing the law</i>	<i>Maintai n-ing public order</i>	<i>Giving assistan ce</i>	<i>Networki ng</i>	<i>Internal job</i>	<i>Else</i>
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>							
Oslo	199	55.3	12.6	21.1	6.5	2.0	2.5
Lillestrøm	133	** 33.8	10.5	30.8	* 10.5	7.5	6.8
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>56.8</i>	<i>8.1</i>	<i>23.0</i>	<i>4.9</i>	<i>3.3</i>	<i>4.0</i>
<i>Community Beat Patrol</i>							
Oslo	155	45.8	10.3	26.5	* 11.0	* 3.2	3.2
Lillestrøm	82	46.3	8.5	14.6	14.6	8.5	7.3
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.094</i>	<i>37.1</i>	<i>5.8</i>	<i>18.4</i>	<i>21.4</i>	<i>11.6</i>	<i>5.8</i>

\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.001$  (with respect to ‘Total PSE’).

#### *Lillestrøm*

EP at Lillestrøm shows a small proportion of maintaining law and order. They also give a fine more rarely than the average of the study and often let people go with a warning (see table 7.10a). This can be in connection to the small proportion of traffic explained above but perhaps more likely it has to do with population density. It can also be connected to the large proportion of networking the study shows. Since the officers in many cases are well known with the person involved in an incident they might be more likely to let them go with a warning. Still, according to the activity plan and the head of the police section, the officers are

expected to give fines more often than they did during the observation. However, there is a balance between striking hard against public disorder and keeping a good connection with the public and doing networking in the community.

During weekends the police force always has patrol cars in the streets observing and maintaining order. This is especially true at night when all the restaurants and the discotheques close at the same time and drunken people are let out in the streets. This is the time when many fights, assaults or other problems related to public drunkenness occur. A fine is according to the activity plan the correct reaction to public disorder, but in many cases the officer chose to let people go with a warning.

The geographical area the officers in Lillestrøm are patrolling is large and most of the time is spent in the patrol car. Opportunities to do foot patrol are rare because of the large distances in the area. However, during Christmas and on special occasions the officers patrol on foot in shopping centres and in the streets. Most of the networking the officers do is thus during incidents they are involved in. In addition to reacting to incidents and maintaining law and order the officers work proactive according to the POP plan. They patrol specific areas, addresses etc already known to them as problem areas.

When it comes to implementation of POP, we were told that once a week, management tried to have enough people on shift to be able to work more proactive. Our observation is that the POP orientation at Lillestrøm is basically related to law enforcement maybe more than networking. They work specifically against potential criminal cases using surveillance and undercover police work. The officers got information from the intelligence service so they could work towards specific addresses or people known to the police, especially concerning drugs or gambling. These assignments required working in an unmarked car without wearing a uniform. These are examples of what we call CBP patrols in Lillestrøm. However, this was only done if there were also a marked car with uniformed officers on duty. This car was the one to respond to calls from the central, but the unmarked car got calls as well, when necessary. The new schedule was a positive experience for the officers since they got more information to work towards while patrolling and they also got to see more results of their own work in the police car. In addition, more time were left to spend on personal and professional development.

While not patrolling the streets the officers spent time at the station writing cases, training etc. Officers were also used as guards in the courtroom in specific cases. They are often used to transport prisoners and psychiatric patients and they often help the front desk if they bring in people to the arrest at the police station. These are all assignments that keep the officers away from policing the streets. The officers are also required to register all their own cases in the computers and this is done during work hours. Below is an outline of the course of events one Saturday night shift we observed at Lillestrøm;

- 01.25: overdose of heroin in a private home (call from the incident room)
- 02.25: youth drinking in public (own initiative)
- 02.35: public drunkenness (call from incident room)
- 03.24: public drunkenness (own initiative)
- 03.27: youth still drinking in public (own initiative)
- 03.39: a fight outside a bar (call from incident room)
- 05.30: checking out an address (own initiative)
- 05.56: stops and checks car and driver (own initiative)

- 06.10: stops and checks car and driver (own initiative)
- 06.30: stops and checks car and driver (own initiative)
- 06.45: stops and checks car and driver (own initiative)
- 07.00: helping a taxi driver with a drunken passenger (call from incident room)

*The example below shows police cooperation between the units in the police district.*

*Lillestrøm – a Saturday night incident:*

*The police have gotten a tip from the public that two groups of young people in the upper part of the district are gathering to fight. There has been some trouble with these groups before and the police decide to send patrol cars from the whole district to set things straight. Arriving at the scene there are more than 50 young people in the street and the situation is tense. Seven police cars and over 15 officers, including a dog handler are present. The officers bring in ten young men, all known troublemakers. They also close the pub and tell the youngsters to go home. While at the scene, several cars arrives and the police fear more fighting. After a few hours the situation is calmed and the officers head on back to their own area.*

*Oslo*

Both the emergency patrols and the patrols which in this project is labeled community beat patrol, spends most of the time patrolling the streets in uniformed police cars. With the exception of a meal break, a potential meeting or tasks concerning for instance maintenance of the cars, more or less the whole shift is spent driving on patrols. This is the case for all shifts, day, afternoon and night. Especially “driving at night” was by the informants emphasized as particular for Sentrum police station compared to other stations both in Oslo and in other parts of the country. When it comes to workload and types of assignments, there is a big variation for both EP and CBP between the different shifts, depending on the time of day and whether it is a working-day or weekend. The officers claim this is particularly the case for this station, which is responsible for the city centre.

There is a strong focus on law and order, concerning both EP and CBP in Oslo. The proportion of networking for CBP in Oslo is small compared to other large cities in the study. This may be because of a high degree of motorized patrol and presumably also because of police priorities / police policy in community beat patrol. The proportion of internal jobs in Oslo appears small. This might be because CBP in Belgium and Denmark consists of a large proportion of internal jobs.

Friday and Saturday night are busy shifts and the officers rush from handling one assignment after the other. The incidents at these times are often related to nightlife and to handling people under the influence of alcohol. Still, the officers seemed to be relatively free to prioritize and chose incidents themselves. During the day, both EP and CBP were given assignments concerning maintenance of the cars, picking up and dropping of other officers etc. Several officers uttered they much rather wanted to spend their time on what they called “real police work”.

*Example: one shift with EP started with a stop at the engineering workshop to install a GPS sender and change lights on the car. They were told this would take the whole day, and therefore had to change car. The officers spent an hour on this assignment.*

The incorporation and function of problem oriented policing at Sentrum police station is a time consuming process. In the activity plan it is pointed out that adjusting the organization to working problem oriented is a lot about building competence and developing more flexible ways of working together. This is a demanding process which will take many years. Some officers claim problem oriented police work doesn't exist at the station. They argue that the few projects that have been undertaken lacks evaluation and that the implementation therefore seems incomplete and halfhearted. This is in line with earlier observation studies of implementation of POP at the police stations in Oslo (Gundhus 2005, 2006; Sollund 2007). The nearest we observed as problem oriented policing at Sentrum police station was the patrol cars 620/621 which are less controlled by the operation central/dispatch central. These cars are intended to work more proactive, but the evaluation and control of these responses are pretty much absent. In essence, this means they stop and control a few more cars, do various preventive assignments like placing out temporary street signs and occasional guard duty. The emergency patrols are instructed to work proactive between assignments. During Christmas the officers took part in a project where they parked the car in the city centre and went on foot patrol in popular shopping malls and shopping streets. It was mainly the community beat patrols that took part in this, and the objective was to increase the public's sense of safety in the downtown areas by a more visible police. A similar project was conducted during the summer months of 2006.

As stated, the type of activity varies depending on the time of day. During daytime the CBP officers sometimes followed up on earlier incidents, like searching for wanted persons, surveillance/ observing suspicious situations or persons, standing guard at state visits etc. During late evenings and at night, the CBP work is often related to nightlife in downtown Oslo. Here is a few examples of typical assignments for the CBP patrols:

*On more than one occasion the officers, on Friday and Saturday night, were told by their division leader to visit pubs and bars where there are often trouble on weekend nights to collect work lists from the staff. In case something would happen at the bar later that night, the police saw it as an advantage to know who was working behind the counter and at the door. The staff was told on forehand to have the work lists ready for the police. Still, they often didn't and the officers had to drive back and forwards several times while waiting for the manager to come to work.*

*Another example is that the officers often parked the car in central Oslo and went on foot patrol in shopping streets and shopping malls. This happened mostly around Christmas when a lot of people were out shopping, but also in the weeks before and after Christmas. It was mainly during day- and afternoon shifts, but also at night on one occasion. During these foot patrols, a lot of people came up to the officers asking questions, or just making conversations.*

Each EP and CBP shift ends with writing incident reports at the police station. Both the EP and CBP in Oslo spends a large part of the shift patrolling the streets by car, being visible to the public and ready to act if something happens. Unlike the CBP, EP spent almost all their time in the car, without the occasional stops to do foot patrols.

*Table 7.5: patrol work subdivided into subjects (percentages)*

	Traffic				Law		Order/ Assistance				Other			
	Coll.	Viol.	Check	Other	Serious crime	Other	Social problem	Questions from public	Troublesome youth	Public order	Other	Networking	Int. job.	Else
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>														
07 Oslo	2.5	26.5	5.5	3.0	18.6	1.0	3.0	* 9.5	0.0	* 10.6	7.0	6.5	2.0	4.0
07 Lilles	9.8	* 9.8	5.3	5.3	8.3	7.5	9.8	3.0	2.3	8.3	12.0	10.5	7.5	0.8
Tot PSE	6.1	21.9	10.1	3.4	15.5	5.4	8.6	3.8	1.2	5.3	7.6	4.9	3.3	2.8
<i>Community Beat Policing</i>														
07 Oslo	1.3	* 31.0	2.6	3.2	4.5	5.8	1.9	17.4	0.0	** 9.7	7.7	* 9.7	* 3.2	1.9
07 Lilles	* 3.7	11.0	** 17.1	4.9	6.1	* 8.5	3.7	2.4	2.4	3.7	7.3	14.6	8.5	6.1
Tot PSE	0.7	21.5	3.2	3.8	7.4	2.6	3.7	11.4	1.3	3.3	4.3	21.3	11.6	3.8

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

#### *Profile of EP (different sorts of incidents):*

The profile of emergency patrol in Lillestrøm differs significantly from the European average when it comes to traffic violations. The proportion is significantly low compared to the total PSE percent. One explanation can be the before mentioned fact that special agencies are handling traffic violations and the fact that the EP often use organized traffic controls to fulfill the demand of the amount of cars checked. A perhaps more plausible explanation is the size of the patrol area meaning traffic violations are less likely to be observed by the police.

In Oslo the proportions of (1) 'questions from the public' and (2) 'public order' are relatively large:(1) in large cities people often turn to a police officer with a question and the officers in Oslo often park their car for a while in the pedestrian area or Karl Johan's gate;(2) in the center of a large city there are always drug addicted or homeless people which by their simple presence is considered to be disturbing the public order. In these cases either a citizen call the police or the police come into action on their own initiative.

#### *Profile of CBP (different sorts of incidents):*

In Lillestrøm "CBP" includes (1) a large proportion of collisions and traffic checks and (2) a large proportion of law enforcement outside the sphere of traffic and other than serious crime (namely: searching for wanted persons; observing suspicious situations).

There is only a small difference between the types of incidents the EP and the CBP are involved in because it is the same officers working both types of patrol cars. There are only minor differences in the types of assignments the EP patrol car get from the incident room and the patrol cars here defined as CBP (surveillance, dog handler, students). This explains the differences in table 7.5 concerning CBP compared to the average PSE.



The difference in EP and CBP (as defined in the study) at Lillestrøm is caused by the fact that the patrol cars take different roles according to specific types of incidents/ assignments. While patrolling, the officers basically act in the same way but due to calls from the incident room there can be a difference. A dog handler is often “saved” for special assignment where a dog is needed. Still if they are not occupied they are most likely to be used on calls concerning car accidents etc. The unmarked car is often used if the officer is alone, if there is an officer driving only with a student or if there is a specific focus on surveillance that day. The patrol cars defined under CBP are used for the same kind of assignments as the EP but if there is an EP available, the incident room chooses this for assignments where a marked car and uniformed officers are preferred.

In Oslo CBP patrol includes (1) a large proportion of traffic violation (comparable with EP in Oslo: 26.5%) and (2) a large proportion of local order maintenance (comparable with EP in Oslo: 10.6%). Because of this there is a small proportion of networking (EP: 10.5%) plus a small proportion of internal jobs (partly because CBP in Belgium and Denmark consists of a large proportion of internal jobs).

As stated earlier, the findings indicate that CBP in Oslo is more directed towards ‘law and order’ than towards networking (establishing good relationships between the police and the public). As with the case for Lillestrøm, the lacking differences between working EP and CBP in Oslo is related to the same officers doing both types of patrolling. There is no strict separation between the two types of police work.

#### *Serious crimes*

Many police officers talk about serious crime and catching criminals as real policing. Especially police officers at Sentrum Police station in Oslo, who are young and hungry for real policing eager for this. However, when we look at table 7.6, only a small proportion of incidents are criminal offences. The European average is 16.1 per cent when it comes to emergency patrols.

*Table 7.6: proportion of serious crimes*

	Incidents on the initiative of the police		Incidents on the initiative of a citizen		All incidents	
	<i>Emergency Patrol</i>					
Oslo	94	3.2	105	33.3	199	19.1
Lillestrøm	61	3.3	72	13.9	133	9.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.074</i>	<i>8.0</i>	<i>1.015</i>	<i>24.6</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>16.1</i>
	<i>Community Beat Policing</i>					
Oslo	91	1.1	64	10.9	155	5.2
Lillestrøm	45	4.4	37	10.8	82	7.3
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.436</i>	<i>7.4</i>	<i>658</i>	<i>7.8</i>	<i>2.094</i>	<i>7.5</i>

\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

According to the study of Oslo and Lillestrøm, there are no numerical differences between these two cities concerning the part that criminal offences play in patrol work.

When it comes to both emergency patrol and community beat patrol, Oslo as well as Lillestrøm does not differ from the average values. It should be mentioned that during the study we were not allowed to observe incidents where the officers were armed. In these cases the observer left the car before the officers entered the scene.



*Lillestrøm*

Because of the fairly small number of police cars patrolling the streets of Romerike they often have to use all types of patrol cars on incidents concerning serious crimes. Sometimes the type of car is not of importance but factors related to the officer are; such as gender, experience etc. A CBP can in many cases act as an EP all in relation to the type of crime involved. A few examples may illustrate this:

*A mother had called the incident room and told them her daughter had been assaulted and raped by a group of young boys earlier that day. The patrol car was a dog handler but since the officer driving was a woman and an experienced officer, the incident room chose her to do the assignment.*

*The incident room gets a call that a boy has been stabbed by a group of young men. The boy has been brought to the hospital but the boys who attacked him are still on the loose. All available cars are sent to the scene and on their way they get permission to be armed. The officers under observation are dog handlers (narcotics) but in this incident they are sent as an EP. In total there are five police cars at the scene, including another dog handler.*

*Oslo*

The number of serious crimes during the observation period in Oslo was few. This may be partly a result of Oslo having a special emergency squad that handles the most serious cases. However, we did not witness any incidents where the special emergency squad took over for the order maintenance section during observation. On the other hand, what we did see several times was rather fierce competition between patrols from different stations for the most exciting assignments. Often, when an alarm went off, the operation central made all cars close to the area drive to the location. Whoever got there first, got the assignment. The example below shows the nature of one of the few incidents we witness in Oslo which fits the definition of a serious crime.

*One morning shift started with a call about a robbery at a city gas station. The officers got the message over the radio after the staff had called in the incident. They drive to the station and one officer talks to the victim who had been working behind the counter and been threatened with a needle by the robber, while the other two drive around the area looking for the perpetrators. They stop two drug addicts who fit the description and does a PO search based on name and birth number. Both have prior convictions, including robbery. They find a needle in one man's backpack and drugs in the others pocket. Both men admit to have visited the gas station just before, but claim to have not seen anything of importance. After viewing the surveillance tape the police conclude none of the men committed the robbery, but suspect they may know something more about the robbery they are not saying, and take them to the station for further interrogation.*

**7.4 Police Mobilization**

The proportion of initiatives of the police expresses the reactive or proactive profile of the police work. According to the European average, police officers take their own initiatives in the majority of incidents. Again we see a strong connection between traffic and police

initiatives; 77.9 per cent when it comes to the European average of the EP traffic, and 92.8 per cent when it comes to CBP and traffic.

*Table 7.7: proportion of incidents on the initiative of the police (= 3.4: 66, 4.4: 97)*

	<i>Emergency Patrol</i>					
	Traffic		Non-traffic		All incidents	
Oslo	75	86.7	124	23.4	199	47.2
Lillestrøm	40	** 45.0	93	46.2	133	45.9
<i>Total PSE</i>	868	77.9	1.221	32.6	2.089	51.4
	<i>Community Beat Policing</i>					
Oslo	59	89.8	96	** 39.6	155	58.7
Lillestrøm	30	* 76.7	52	42.3	82	* 54.9
<i>Total PSE</i>	611	92.8	1.483	58.6	2.094	68.6

- $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

### *Lillestrøm*

In Lillestrøm, police officers do not come into action on their own initiative as frequently as elsewhere (EP: 45.0 % and CBP: 76.7 %). Several factors might help explain why EP and CBP show such a small proportion of police initiative. One explanation is that the patrols observed were not community beat patrols as originally defined in this project, but a form of patrol that might be called ‘preventive patrol’. This was mentioned in 7.2. When it comes to emergency patrol, the frequencies in which police officers come into action on their own initiative are relatively low in Lillestrøm.

The question related to traffic is already discussed in addition to table 7.3. The lack of initiative in the field of traffic might be related to the types of patrol cars observed in Lillestrøm. We have earlier explained that there was a lack of “real” community beat patrol cars in Lillestrøm and that we observed different types of patrols here. These were labelled as CBP cars while the EP cars were similar to EP in other places. Sometimes our CBP patrols were in fact designated to work specifically with traffic which made that their priority. Thus the types of patrol cars observed might partly explain the low degree of police initiative for EP in the sphere of traffic. Different from in other European places the CBP in both Oslo and Lillestrøm are given assignments from the incident room. In addition to this, the police in Lillestrøm are more often than the average mobilized by citizens. This can be connected to the fact that there are few cars patrolling at each time in the district and this means that the patrol cars are occupied responding to calls from the public. They also have large distances to drive, leaving less time to check cars on their own initiative. However, we have not documented how many police cars that are on duty at the same time thus we cannot be sure about this factor.

Below is an example of an incident on police initiative which illustrate the use of information sources

### *Lillestrøm – a Sunday night incident*

*There is a quiet Sunday night shift and the officers are patrolling the streets of Strømmen. While driving by a construction site they see a man running on the inside of the fence. They stop the car and catch the man. He tells them his car broke down and he was looking for tools to fix his car. The officers tell him to show them the car but the car*

*is suddenly gone when we arrive. The officers find the whole situation suspicious and bring the man to the police car. They check his id and call the incident room to get information. The man has a criminal record as a car thief several years' back; he was then working for a well-known gang in Oslo. The officers search the man and find both tools and car keys on him. They also take his cell phone. The man tells them there was another man in his car and they call him. The car has stopped again nearby and the officers drive to the place. The man in the car shows to be a known drug addict in the records and they also find drugs on him. They call another patrol car to pick him up to bring him back to the station. The man in the police car has a hard time explaining the situation. A call to the incident room also shows that the car they were driving does not belong to either of the men and that there is a warrant to take the licence plates. They move the car and take the plates and the keys. Since they don't have anything specific on the man they have to let him go but they ask the incident room to report the incident in the PO log.*

### *Oslo*

For CBP in Oslo the proportion of incidents in which the officers come into action on their own initiative is small outside the sphere of traffic. This might be partly related to the small proportions of 'networking' and 'internal jobs' – something that might have to do with an orientation towards law and order. When it comes to the CBP, the low number of incidents on the initiative of the police may be partly related to the fact that the incident room has the opportunity to assign CBP officers to incidents, leaving them with less time to act on their own initiative. Compared to the profile of patrolling in the other cities, the profile of both EP and CBP in Oslo are to a high degree incidents-led. This is especially interesting because of the proactive and problem-oriented police strategy at the station. The finding is indicating a gap between police strategy, basic assignment and profile of the police patrol work, which we will elaborate in chapter 7.9.

### **7.5 Knowledge of the People in the Neighbourhood**

In this study knowledge of the people in the neighbourhood means that the police officers deal with an incident "that involves a person known to (one of) them" (Stol et. al 2006: 67). The police officers then have ready background information they can use to interpret the situation. This type of information can be used to take into consideration specific circumstances in the context before they take action. If the police officers know personally who they are dealing with, or get information from the police computer databases, they know more about the persons background and social relationship, which can help in giving the right assistance in relation to for example social problems. It might be used to solve problems in a more preventive way by finding support for their action in the social surroundings of those involved. This does not necessarily turn out positive for the person involved. The background information can also be used to interpret the person in a more negative way, if the person for instance has been involved in a lot of criminal incidents. It can also help the police officer to be correctly prepared in regards of security.

*Table 7.8: proportion of incidents in which the officers meet an acquaintance: EP*

Traffic		Social problems		Other		All incidents	
N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>							

Oslo	75	1.3	31	25.8	93	2.2	199	* 5.5
Lillestrøm	40	2.5	21	47.6	72	18.1	133	18.0
Total PSE	868	2.8	294	35.7	927	14.5	2.089	12.6
<i>Community Beat Policing</i>								
Oslo	59	0.0	16	** 6.3	80	** 1.3	155	** 1.3
Lillestrøm	30	6.7	7	42.9	45	22.2	82	18.3
Total PSE	611	7.5	168	57.7	1.315	38.3	2.094	30.9

\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

The type of police work determines the possible extent of background information. As we see in table 7.8 background information is connected to the type of incident in which they take action. Police officers often meet acquaintances when they take action in cases of social problems. They more seldom have background information when they take action in traffic matters.

### *Lillestrøm*

Even though Skedsmo and Romerike are large geographical areas to patrol, the people living there are often gathered in smaller places. Lillestrøm is a small city with 14 000 inhabitants. This makes it easier to control and help the officers to gain local knowledge. Many of the officers are also from or live in the area. So even though there is a young police force at Lillestrøm the officers in general have good knowledge of their own neighbourhood. The close contact with the intelligence service at the station also provides the officers with additional information about people in their community. The officers sometimes got important information directly from the intelligence section during meetings between shifts. This was information they used while patrolling.

The study shows that officers at Lillestrøm in many incidents already know the people involved. During the period of observation they had a specific problem with young people selling drugs at the local train station and many incidents involved these young boys even in incidents not including the train station. The officers knew the boys well by name and face, both from earlier incidents or information from the intelligence service. The young boys also knew the officers. The results of the study show the same percentage in where the officer meets an acquaintance for both CBP an EP. This is because Lillestrøm has no CBP and that the officers can be the same in CBP as EP, and that they have almost the same work load and assignments. Below are a couple examples from the fieldwork involving the officers in Lillestrøm meeting people they are acquainted with from earlier episodes.

*On a Monday night the officers get a call from the incident room about a person making trouble at the train station. They drive to the station and find a woman they know from earlier episodes with public drunkenness. They start talking to her and she is very upset, claiming her heart to be broken. After a while she calms down promises to behave quietly and take the train home. The officers let her go with a warning.*

*On a Friday night an EP is patrolling the streets in the city centre during the time the restaurants and pubs are closing. They spot a boy who is standing in the street while yelling and screaming. They recognize the boy from previous incidents of public drunkenness. They drive up to him and give him a warning for making trouble. His friends seem to grasp the seriousness in the situation and promise to take him home with them.*

### Oslo

In Oslo the proportion of incidents in which police officers on EP meet a person they know is relatively small compared to the European average. This is true even though patrols often consist of three officers. Population density may be of relevance but is not the decisive factor since cities with a similar population density do not always have a smaller proportion than the average (Groningen: 12.1%, Brussels: 9.4%, Leeuwarden: 33.3%, Bochum: 5.4% ( $p < 0,01$ ) and Amsterdam 2001: 14.4%). It is not possible to identify a specific type of incident that is responsible for this 5.5% in Oslo (it seems an overall phenomenon). When it comes to CBP in Oslo, the proportion of incidents in which the officers meet an acquaintance is the smallest of all cities involved (next smallest is Aarschot in Belgium: 12.8%, followed by Lillestrøm 18.3%). This once again indicates that the CBP officers in Oslo are not strong in establishing / maintaining police-citizen relationships.

In Oslo, the officers' low degree of acquaintance with the citizens is striking. Partly, this can be attributed to the fact that many of the officers working at Sentrum police station are quite young. They have just finished the police academy, they often come from other parts of the country and they often don't stay at Sentrum very long. This means that they don't have enough work experience to get to know the people who roam the city streets, like drug addicts or homeless people. This despite the fact that a large proportion of the incidents in this study is related to "marginal people", meaning drug addicts, drug dealers, mentally ill people and homeless people. In addition it might be a result of an often changing marginal population. It is reasonable to assume that Oslo, being the biggest city in Norway and being a city surrounded by smaller places, attracts these kinds of people. Last, coincidence may also, to some extent play a part here. It might be, for some reason, that the officers in our sample had a slightly lower knowledge of marginal people in Oslo than the average officer at the station. While we did follow a large number of different officers, we did not follow all the officers at the station.

Since Oslo and Lillestrøm have problem oriented policing as their work philosophy, their knowledge about the people in the community can be interpreted as surprisingly low. But interrelated factors can also determine the low knowledge of people in Oslo. How well officers know their neighbourhood depends on the type of work they do together with the number of years that they work in the neighbourhood. Younger police officers seldom have the specific background which the older ones have (Stol et.al 2006), and in both Lillestrøm and Oslo the police officers patrolling the streets are quite young.

In Lillestrøm the officers know their neighbourhood and their area of policing. But there is a small amount of cars patrolling simultaneously and there is no CBP as defined. At the same time all the patrol cars are more or less EP since their main focus is responding to calls from the incident room. Still, while doing surveillance and working proactive against certain people or places they are close to the model for problem oriented policing. Nevertheless, because this is done in response to specific problems this work is closer to reactive policing.

## 7.6 Marginal persons

Table 7.9a: proportions of incidents with marginal persons

	Traffic		Non-traffic		All incidents	
	<i>Emergency Patrol</i>					
Oslo	75		124		199	** 13.6
Lillestrøm	40		93		133	6.0



<i>Total PSE</i>	868		1.221		2.089	5.8
	<i>Community Beat Policing</i>					
Oslo	59		96		155	8.4
Lillestrøm	30		52		82	4.9
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>611</i>		<i>1.483</i>		<i>2.094</i>	<i>4.3</i>

\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

### *Lillestrøm*

In spite of the relative urbanisation of Lillestrøm, the city has a small proportion of social problems. In Skedsmo there are places with a fairly high concentration of people with social problems. This is in certain housing areas owned by the municipality which offer cheap housing. The people living here are usually struggling with drug and alcohol problems and have been in the game for a long time. There have been a number of incidents in this area earlier. The police force works proactive towards these housing areas and patrols here on a daily basis. Because of previous incidents in the area the officers has good knowledge about the neighbourhoods and the people living there. The example below takes place in the vicinity of such a housing area:

*The officers get a call from the incident room that a woman has reported a “crazy” person on a bicycle in the snow by the shopping centre. The patrolling officers take a walk through the shopping centre witch is close to the known housing area. In a book store they see a familiar face who is a known drug addict. He comes out to talk to them and recognises one of the officers. They chat for a few minutes but leave him after a while since he is calm. They assume he was the reported “crazy” person.*

In addition to the housing areas, the community has a grooving problem concerning young people and drugs. Especially the train station has been a popular place for selling and using drugs. There has been done a lot of surveillance and proactive work against these persons. Many of the young people were also involved in incidents in local schools or in the city. The police officers therefore knew many of them by both name and face, as is illustrated in the example below:

*The officers are called out to an incident in the upper part of the police district. A young boy has called and said his parents has thrown him out of the house and are acting violently towards him. At the house the officers recognise the boy right away. He has been involved in several incidents at his school because he has been beaten up and threatened by other boys. Many of these boys are involved in incidents at the train station in connection to drugs and public disturbance.*

### *Oslo*

In Oslo the proportion of incidents on EP where the officers have to deal with a ‘marginal person’ is relatively large. In this study, “marginal person” relates to alcoholics, drug addicts, drug dealers, mentally ill people and homeless people. The large proportion of these incidents could be attributed to Oslo being a large city surrounded by smaller places, thereby attracting these kinds of people. Several officers complained about how much time they spend on psychiatry-related assignments. In 2005, the year before our observations begun, the police in Oslo reportedly did about 2200 transports of psychiatric patients. This correspond to around 6 transports every day and the officers feel that way too much time is spent picking up, driving and waiting for these people at the emergency room or hospital. Below is an example of a psychiatry related incident involving three EP officers:



*One morning the officers are called to an apartment where psychiatric health personnel are unable to get in contact with a female patient who has locked herself inside her own home. On their way to the address, the officers get information about the woman from a collage that has previous experience with the woman. After ringing the doorbell, shouting her name, calling her on the phone and trying to communicate with the woman through the entrance door to convince her to open the door; they call a locksmith who breaks down the door. Nobody has been in contact with the woman for a week. She's alive but very weak. The psychiatric team takes her with them. Three police officers spend almost three hours on this assignment.*

As stated earlier, the police officers in Oslo seldom know these marginal persons. Table 7.9b and 7.9.c, which are combinations of table 7.8 and 7.9a, indicates clearly that the officers in Oslo are less acquainted with their marginal persons than their colleagues elsewhere. The first table 7.9b separates between emergency patrol and community patrol, and table 7.9c combine emergency patrol and community beat patrol.

In Lillestrøm the police officers quite often are familiar with marginal people, and this can be explained by both the basic police role in Lillestrøm plus the relatively small proportion of marginal persons in the area. As a result of surveillance, tips from the public and the officers own knowledge based on personal experience, the officers have relatively good knowledge about marginal persons and the addresses they live at. In addition, the intelligence unit at the station is a source of information through close cooperation and by participating at the parole meetings with the order maintenance section. Overall, the officers seem curious about people in their community and were eager to get information that could be in relation to problems already known to them. The following example might shed some light on the manner which patrolling officers in Lillestrøm become familiar with marginal people in the area:

*While on patrol in the city the police officers spot two persons they think resemble drug addicts but who the officers do not remember to have seen in Lillestrøm before. They stop the car next to them and start a conversation through the window. The officers ask questions like where they live and why they are in Lillestrøm.*

Table 7.9b Incidents with marginal persons (N) and % of these incidents in which the officers are acquainted with the marginal person in question

	<i>Emergency Patrol</i>	
Oslo	27	29.6
Lillestrøm	8	50.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>121</i>	<i>48.8</i>
	<i>Community Beat Policing</i>	
Oslo	13	*7.7
Lillestrøm	4	75.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>91</i>	<i>70.3</i>

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Table 7.9c Incidents with marginal persons (N) and % of these incidents in which the officers are acquainted with the marginal person in question

	<i>Emergency Patrol and Community Beat Policing</i>	
Oslo	40	** 22.5
Lillestrøm	12	58.3
<i>Total PSE</i>	212	58.0

\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

The police officers in Oslo often gain information and knowledge about their neighbourhood on a more individual level from the strategic plan department and the scanning part of the POP-process. This combined with the low prioritising of networking, can explain why they have so little personal information about specific marginal persons. Information about crime situation, GIS analysis and communication at briefings often give them an overview of dangerous persons that are asked for by public notice etc., but this type of information seldom correspond with the marginal persons they meet when they are patrolling the streets of Oslo. This can be seen in contrast to the fact that there are a large number of marginal people in Oslo, and that the officers often are in contact with them. One explanation may be that the marginal people the officers mostly come in contact with on the street is worn out, inoffensive drug addicts and/or pitiful mental patients that are only a risk to themselves. These are rarely dangerous, hard core criminals on the police's most wanted list.

### 7.7 The Outcome of Incidents

Incidents can be managed and be reacted to in different ways by the police officers; by a warning, by a summons or by the most repressive action, an arrest. How the police officers are taking action in different types of incidents, may express the police officers working style in the cities. In table 7.10a we treat these three ways as mutually exclusive in a way that each category are more serious than the one before. Table 7.10a shows differences in proportion of officers taking repressive measures when it comes to emergency patrols and community beat patrol. In Oslo police officers take repressive action in more than one third of the incidents in both EP (33.7%) and CBP (31.6%). Usually it deals with warnings, which are in line with the European average.

Table 7.10a: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – all incidents

	N	Warning	Summons	Arrest	One of these
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>					
Oslo	199	22.1	6.0	5.5	33.7
Lillestrøm	133	18.0	* 2.3	6.8	27.1
<i>Total PSE</i>	2.089	20.1	10.4	5.0	35.4
<i>Community Beat Patrol</i>					
Oslo	155	23.9	6.5	1.3	31.6
Lillestrøm	82	12.2	2.4	3.7	18.3
<i>Total PSE</i>	2.089	20.0	3.1	1.3	24.4

\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

In table 7.10b and 7.10c the repressive action in emergency patrol and community beat patrol are categorized as either related to traffic or not.

*Table 7.10b: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – in the sphere of traffic*

	N	Warning	Summons	Arrest	One of these
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>					
Oslo	75	46.7	14.7	0.0	61.3
Lillestrøm	40	27.5	5.0	2.5	* 35.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	868	35.7	21.4	1.2	58.3
<i>Community Beat Policing</i>					
Oslo	59	59.3	10.2	0.0	69.5
Lillestrøm	30	** 26.7	6.7	0.0	** 33.3
<i>Total PSE</i>	611	59.9	8.2	0.0	68.1

\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

*Table 7.10c: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – outside the sphere of traffic*

	N	Warning	Summons	Arrest	One of these
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>					
Oslo	124	7.3	0.8	8.9	16.9
Lillestrøm	93	14.0	1.1	8.6	23.7
<i>Total PSE</i>	1.221	8.9	2.5	7.7	19.2
<i>Community Beat Policing</i>					
Oslo	96	2.1	* 4.2	2.1	8.3
Lillestrøm	52	3.8	0.0	5.8	9.6
<i>Total PSE</i>	1.483	3.5	1.0	1.8	6.3

\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

Table 7.10b and 7.10c reveal the difference between Oslo and Lillestrøm when it comes to the proportion of traffic, and how it is related to repressive action. Outside traffic there is no striking local difference in the numbers. Inside the sphere of traffic, police patrol work in Lillestrøm is less repressive. This might/will have to do with Lillestrøm having a small proportion of observed traffic violations.

### *Lillestrøm*

Inside the sphere of traffic the police officers in Lillestrøm often let people go with a warning and more rarely give a ticket or a summons compared to Oslo. This can be explained in connection to the small proportion of traffic or perhaps the fact that the officers in many incidents are familiar with the person involved. Below are a few examples.

*One Thursday night, on their way to another incident, the officers spot a car they find suspicious. They stop the car to check the driver. There is a young couple with a baby in the car and the driver has forgotten his driver's licence at home and risks getting a fine. He explains that they have trouble getting the baby to fall asleep and that driving around helps. The officers believe him and let him go with a warning.*

*One a Saturday night the EP pulls over a car on a feeling that something is not right. The car is loaded with people and the officers give the driver a lesson about the danger of driving with too many people in the car, especially kids, and the importance of wearing seat belts. They let the driver go with a warning.*

*On a Friday night the officers is parked in a city street while observing the night life. They see a car driving against a stop sign. The officers pull over the driver and give him a fine for the traffic violation.*

### *Oslo*

In Oslo outside the area of traffic the proportion of incidents in which officers on CBP fine a citizen is relatively large (4.2% - 4 incidents). Below is two examples of the officers on CBP giving a ticket to a person for an offence outside the sphere of traffic plus one in which a man is arrested.

*The officers spot a young man drinking from a beer bottle on the street pavement. They stop and tell him to empty out the bottle. The man says ok but takes another drink before he puts the bottle down on the street. This is not accepted by the officers who asks for his id and writes him a ticket.*

*The officers approach a man who is urinating on the street. They decide to give him a ticket and the man gives them his id and they write down his name, personal number and address. The man accepts the ticket but clearly expresses his opinion that police should spend their time on more important business. One of the officers asks for a PO search on the man which reveals a prior criminal history, concerning narcotics and violence towards the police.*

*The officers receive an assignment from the operation central about the staff in a grocery shop have reported a shoplifter who has threatened them with a hypodermic needle. They get a description of the man and drives towards the location. On the road there the officers spot a man fitting the description and pulls over. The man admits he is the one they are looking for right away. They put him in the back of the car and first drive to the store where they get a statement from the staff and watch the videotape. The staff explains that the man was stopped for shoplifting on his way out of the store and asked to show his id when he pulled out a needle and threatened the staff before he ran out. The officers transport the man to the arrest and write a report.*

The CBP officers high degree of repressive measures might be caused by the officer's orientation towards law and order, and confirm a working style oriented towards repressive action. This means holding the public responsible for their illegal actions and thinking people might be prevented from breaking the law the next time by making them pay heavy fines. The officers' right to take repressive action is there for them to use and the proportion of incidents which the police take repressive measures in traffic is quite large. On one occasion the

officers indicated that they are obligated to write out tickets or bringing people in for arrest, even though it might feel harsh sometimes. Below is an example of an incident where the officers decided not to give a ticket.

*On a Wednesday night the officers pull over a driver on the account of his abrupt driving, and the fact that one of his rear lights is missing and the cars windows is covered with dew. Two of the officers talk to the man and asks for his license and registration. The car is registered to the man and they ask him to correct the faults. Later in the car the officers describe the man as cooperative. He listens to what the officers tell him without arguing and promises to correct the faults. Because the officers believe the man will do as they tell him to, they let him drive on without a ticket.*

## 7.8 Use of Information Sources

The police officers in Norway do not have computers in the car. The digital equipment available is mobile phone, the police radio, the police pilot and GPS. The police pilot is an instrument placed on the dash board in the police car to, among other things, measure the speed of other cars. Of manual sources they have a map. If the officer need more information than his or hers knowledge about the situation they have to call the incident room over the police radio or phone, or call their officer in charge at the police station. While working proactive in their community they use information from the incident room as a background to act against persons, stopping cars etc. They usually ask for a Police Operative search (PO). PO is the log for incidents which is administrated by the people working in the incident room, meaning they search the system whenever the officers ask for information. If the officers make an arrest, takes a person or an item into custody they register the case in a system called BL; which is an abbreviation for “basic solutions”.<sup>89</sup> Out on patrol they have no digital source for writing down information – they either have to use their personal note book or report to the incident room through the police radio and the information will be registered in the PO log.

Table 7.11a shows the proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources, and it is divided into source from citizen, source from the police, if it is manual or digital or if it is classified as under emergency patrol or community beat policing. When it comes to emergency patrol, Oslo as well as Lillestrøm does not differ from the average values.

*Table 7.11a: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – all incidents*

	N	Source from a citizen		Source from the police		One or more of these
		Manual	Digital	Manual	Digital	
		<i>Emergency Patrol</i>				
Oslo	199	30.7	1.5	5.0	23.1	41.2
Lillestrøm	133	33.8	0.8	1.5	26.3	37.6

<sup>89</sup> In Norwegian BL is the abbreviation for “basis løsninger”

<i>Total PSE</i>	2.089	28.8	0.7	2.7	22.6	39.9
<i>Community Beat Policing</i>						
Oslo	155	** 30.3	0.6	3.9	** 20.0	** 34.8
Lillestrøm	82	** 28.0	* 2.4	1.2	** 24.4	** 36.6
<i>Total PSE</i>	2.094	14.0	0.4	3.4	6.0	18.9

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

*Table 7.11b: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – in the sphere of traffic*

	N	Source from a citizen		Source from the police		One or more of these
		Manual	Digital	Manual	Digital	
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>						
Oslo	75	45.3	0.0	5.3	28.0	52.0
Lillestrøm	40	60.0	0.0	2.5	47.5	60.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	868	46.9	0.2	3.6	32.1	57.1
<i>Community Beat Policing</i>						
Oslo	59	** 50.8	0.0	0.0	** 32.2	** 50.8
Lillestrøm	30	** 70.0	0.0	3.3	** 56.7	** 80.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	611	23.0	0.0	2.1	11.8	25.5

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

*Table 7.11c: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – outside the sphere of traffic*

	N	Source from a citizen		Source from the police		One or more of these
		Manual	Digital	Manual	Digital	
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>						
Oslo	124	21.8	2.4	4.8	20.2	34.7
Lillestrøm	93	22.6	1.1	1.1	17.2	28.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	1.221	15.9	1.0	2.1	15.9	27.7
<i>Community Beat Policing</i>						
Oslo	96	17.7	1.0	6.3	** 12.5	25.0
Lillestrøm	52	3.8	* 3.8	0.0	5.8	11.5
<i>Total PSE</i>	1.483	10.3	0.5	3.9	3.6	16.2

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

In Oslo as well as Lillestrøm the proportion of incidents in which CBP officers use information sources is large (largest and second largest in the research). To some extent, this probably has to do with the fact that CBP in Oslo and Lillestrøm is more law and order oriented than compared to other places. When table 7.11b and c is compared, we see that the difference can be derived from community beat patrolling when an officer use specific source from a citizen inside the sphere of traffic. In Oslo it is 50.8 % and in Lillestrøm it is 70.0 %. The number also differs significantly when it comes to CBP and the source is digital from the police inside the sphere of traffic. In Oslo it is 32.2 % and in Lillestrøm it is 56.7 %.



### *Lillestrøm*

The difference in the tables 7.11 when it comes to CBP can again be explained by that there is no significant difference between EP and CBP in Lillestrøm and that in general, officers in Lillestrøm are frequent users of information sources. Because of the lack of information sources in the police car they need to gain information from police sources (through the incident room) or get information from the citizen such as checking id documents, mobile phones etc. The officers have a large geographical area to control and spend most of their time in the police car. One way to patrol the streets while not responding to a call from the incident room is to look for suspicious situations. This can be specific types of cars, places where crime often is committed etc. The officers call the incident room using the police radio and ask for information about license plates, addresses etc. If they receive information that gives them a right to act towards the situation, they can stop the car, enter the address etc. At Lillestrøm this working method is very common and several incidents started this way. This makes the access to information very important in fighting crime and maintaining the law. Below is one example showing the use of information sources during a dayshift:

*The officers are patrolling the area by car and spot another driver without the lights on. They follow the car and call the incident room to get information about the car before they ask the driver to pull over. It appears that there is an order to take the licence plates on the car and the owner of the car has a criminal record. The officers stop the car and checks id on the driver. To get more information about him they once again call the incident room. He is not the owner and there is no criminal record on him. The officers ask him to drive to a gas station where they can park the car and leave it. The officers take the licence plates and tell the man to get home by other transportation.*

In the car the officers can also bring printed lists from the police systems such as cars stolen the last 24-hours, wanted or missing persons etc. This is an important source of information in their daily work. In Norway the drivers are obliged to bring a valid driver's license with them while driving. The officers also have a right to ask for id if they stop a person on the street or from people involved in incidents. This makes ID cards and drivers license an important source of information. The parole meetings in the beginning of the shift are also a good source of information. Once a week or more they got information from the operational intelligence service at the police station. This contained specific addresses, places or persons they wanted under surveillance or observation. This was especially in connection with selling drugs.

### *Oslo*

In Oslo, manual information source from a citizen often concerned a tourist with a city map asking for directions. However, more often manual sources concerned documents like a driver's license, car registration documents and other identity papers. The CBP and EP have the same manual and digital information sources available. Like in Lillestrøm, the officers in Oslo also brought with them printed lists from the police system or other documents. In one case this was a pile of printed photographs of wanted persons. Below are a couple examples on the police officers use of information sources in Oslo.

*Out on patrol, the officers spot a drug addict from the car that is standing on the pavement in a busy shopping area in the middle of down town Oslo. He is clearly under the influence of narcotics, barely able to stand up. They stop the car and two officers go*

*out to talk to the man. He gives them his identity papers and the officers ask the operation central to search his name and personal number to check if the police are looking for him in relation to a crime or anything else. The man is not wanted and the officers make him move away from the pavement. Later, one of the officers explains that they often do this kind of search because these people frequently lack a steady address. Random stop and search at the street is often the only way to get a hold of them in case they are wanted by the police.*


*Out on patrol the officers spot an old car with four youths, and decide to pull them over for control. One officer walks over to the car and gets the drivers licence and registration. Another officer asks the operation central to search the registration number and the driver's personal number. The central reports that the car lacks insurance, but there is no request for removal of the vehicles plates yet. The driver has no prior record. The owner insists that the car has just been insured. One officer says this can mean that the Norwegian Department of Motor Vehicles is not yet updated. The officer calls the insurance company on the phone and they can confirm that the car is insured. The youths are allowed to drive on.*

### **7.9 What determines what is involved in police patrol work**

In this chapter we will discuss the observations in light of the conceptual model, and find explanations for any difference between local policing and the 'European average'.

What in Oslo and Lillestrøm determine what is involved in local police patrol work? According to figure 1.2 in chapter 1 there are seven factors on the level of local police services that have influence on what patrol work consists of: basic assignment, basic police strategy, management control (particularly where it concerns priorities), national features, information facilities, and the degree of urbanization. For example Stol et al (2006) found that urbanization can cause a larger degree of anonymity, result in less severe action taken against traffic violations plus lead to less activity in networking. The last factor influencing the police patrol work is exceptional circumstances, which reasonably are rare.

Figure 1.2: conceptual model of police patrol work



The determining factors can be categorised into internal factors generated by the police organisation and external factors interplaying with the local policing. Before we refine the model by explaining the difference between local policing and the 'European average', we will resume what these differences consist of. What determines the sort of incidents involved in emergency- and community beat patrol work? What determines the outcome of the incidents?

#### *Determinants in emergency patrol*

In Lillestrøm, the EP has a small proportion of traffic violations. Because of the high level of traffic in the area, this is likely to be connected to external rather than internal factors. We believe it is mainly linked to the *organizational* structure of the police station, where traffic violations are handled by special agencies. It may also be a consequence of the *policy* concerning police strategy and priorities. Since 2001, the making of national police policies has been a priority in Norway, and the first strategic plan for preventive policing focused on introducing problem-oriented policing. Further, the police policy is to act preventively and proactively before crime occurs, and form close ties to citizens and local communities. In 7.2 we made clear that according to the districts POP plan, the officers in Lillestrøm are instructed to focus on drug- and violence related crime. This strategy is especially directed towards young people, and the importance of working proactive and the assumed preventive effect of visible police in the streets, are emphasized. The small proportion of incidents in which the officers fine members of the public might, to some extent, also be a result from this. The overall indication is that it is in the power of national police management to affect the character or basic assignment of local police patrol work, that is to say; to affect the proportion of traffic in emergency patrol in Lillestrøm.

In Oslo the EP incidents involve a relatively large proportion of 'questions from the public'.

Determinants which might explain this is the nature of the area they patrol, primarily related to the high degree of urbanization in the city centre. Parts of the inner city are busy with people, many of them are visitors and not familiar with the area. In addition, basic strategy or the way of patrolling might also account for the large proportion of questions from the public. The amount of incidents in which officers use specific information sources and where the source is from a citizen can illustrate how the urban area influence the way of patrolling. One determinant for the large proportions of these incidents is mainly because the citizens are tourists asking the police to show them the way on the map.

Observations in Oslo also revealed a large proportion of public order related incidents and a large proportion of “marginal persons”, which might be connected to urbanization as well. The proportion of incidents in which the officers deal with a person they know is small. We believe this might be explained in different ways. Our observations indicate that one explanation probably is that the officers have minor work experience with only a few years of duty. However, work force/experience is not a defined factor in the conceptual model above, and additional analysis is needed to make valid assumptions concerning the relationship between knowledge of people in the neighbourhood and determinants for what is involved in police work. We do not know whether police officers knowing or not knowing a lot of people in the community have any influence on the profile of police patrol work, whether this affects the outcome of incidents and/or the nature of incidents.

The urbanization of the area combined with a less developed or failing contact between the police and the public might also account for the officers’ very limited knowledge of marginal people in Oslo. Community policing have not been a part of the emergency patrols basic strategy. This police approach is ensured by building partnerships with other authorities and local actors in general, not the more elusive goal of building partnerships with local communities as such. This part of policing is reserved to police officers working in the Community contact group and dealing with public relations, as mentioned in 7.2. Both in Oslo and Lillestrøm these officers work separate from both the emergency and community beat patrols and do not go out on patrols. An interesting question is whether these groups undertake and fulfill some part of the desired proactive, community directed police work, thereby reducing the degree of community work done by the EP and CBP, as we are suggesting in relation to specialized traffic patrols.

#### *Determinants in community beat patrol*

As described in the chapter about Lillestrøm police station, the station does not have real community beat patrols. This is obviously influencing the sort of incidents involved in community beat patrol work and the outcome of the incidents categorized as such. In Lillestrøm, community beat patrolling consists of incidents very similar to the emergency patrols. There are large proportions of collisions, traffic checks, searching for wanted persons, observing suspicious situations, information use, and traffic incidents in which the police are mobilized by citizens. The proportion of police initiative is small. The main reason for these findings is most likely that the patrol work observed was not “real” community beat patrol. Since primarily basic assignment, but also way of patrolling and way of managerial control (assignments of jobs via the incident room) for community beat patrol is similar to emergency patrol, these two ways of patrolling look alike. Another factor was weather conditions which played an additional, minor role as it was snowing a lot in Lillestrøm during the observation period. This had implications both for the nature of incidents and the portion of incidents in which the police was mobilized by the public (for example in traffic collisions).

It should be stressed that neither in Oslo was community beat patrol congruent with the original definition of CBP. Rather, we could speak of POP-patrols, since that may be closer to what we actually observed. However, for the purpose of this study and to prevent confusion by using too many different terms, CBP has been our chosen definition. The observations of the community beat patrols in Oslo involve small proportions of networking and of incidents in which the officers meet an acquaintance. There are large proportions of traffic violation, order maintenance, and information use. This can be explained by the determinant basic strategy, principally way of patrolling, which for the most part is motorized patrol and seldom foot patrol.<sup>90</sup> Since the incident room assigns the cars for jobs according to a priority list, this influences the space for problem-oriented policing and the follow-up and evaluation of these efforts. The orientation is towards law and order, which also can be explained by a combination of basic strategy and way of patrolling on street level at the station, plus a focus on *crime* reduction. Because community beat patrol is organized as part of the priorities of the incident room's assigning of jobs, meaning basic assignment, it is shaping the incidents-led aspects of the community beat patrolling on the streets. Although this is not part of the police manager's policy at the station, the incident-led focus is in line with the police officers at the street levels understanding of real policing at the station. Since POP-patrols and emergency patrols are done by the same police officers, the observation study indicates that emergency patrols are influencing how the POP-responses are done by the POP-patrols in Oslo.

To sum up the observational study; emergency patrol in Lillestrøm includes a small proportion of traffic violations, and a small proportion of police initiatives. As stated earlier, neither Lillestrøm, nor Oslo has community beat patrols in the original sense of the word. Because of this, community beat patrol in Lillestrøm (and Oslo) is very similar to emergency patrol. Emergency policing in Oslo has typical features of emergency patrolling in a capital city: many questions from the public and a relatively high proportion of marginal persons. Furthermore it appears that police patrol work in Oslo, both emergency patrol and community beat patrol is particularly directed towards law and order maintenance and not so much towards the establishment and maintenance of close contact between the police and the public.

### **Towards an integration between emergency patrol work and community policing?**

When we develop a conceptual model of police patrol, especially with regard to the concept of 'community beat policing', an important factor to take into consideration is police policy. Questions to discuss are what the national and the local police service views on 'CBP' are, and how the local police stations are practising these policies. According to Stol (2007) it is possible to distinguish between four models of community policing in Europe:

1. CBP officers are put at the service of other authorities, such as police chiefs and judicial bodies (support model).
2. CBP officers are put at the service of local society (reactive model, like EP).

---

<sup>90</sup> For example shifts at Friday and Saturday night in Oslo are busy and the officers rush from handling one assignment after the other. Still, they are relatively free to prioritize and chose incidents themselves. Both the emergency patrols and the patrol which in this project is labeled community beat patrol, spends most of the time patrolling the streets in uniformed police cars. With the exception of a meal break, a potential meeting or tasks concerning for instance maintenance of the cars, more or less the whole shift is spent driving on patrols. This is the case for all shifts, day, afternoon and night. Especially driving at night was emphasized as particular for Sentrum police station compared to other stations both in Oslo and in other parts of the country. This can be linked to the basic police role at the station, to go foot patrol is a rare and seldom exception.



3. CBP officers conduct an analysis of criminological/social problems in their area and act pro-active (POP model).
4. Same as 3 – in addition to which EP officers are put at the service of CBP officers (full POP model).

According to the above description, community beat patrol in Oslo looks most like model number 2. However the police station does not have a separate group of CBP officers which is the original premise for model number 2. In Lillestrøm there is no community beat patrol as such. When it comes to model 3, both in Oslo and Lillestrøm the analysis of criminological and social problems is done in separate intelligence groups as mentioned in 7.2. These groups does not have a regular patrol function and is more directed towards collecting and systematizing information as defined in the activity plan and function as contacts within their areas. The co-operation between the intelligence groups and the patrol departments seems to vary in both frequency and efficiency.

When we compare the above descriptions with the Norwegian national policy, model 4 appear as is in line with the main objective of the national policy documents about policing in Norway. According to the National Police Directorate, the Norwegian model of police patrol work does not separate groups responsible for interrelations and softer aspects of basic police work. The overall plan and ultimate desire is to make all police work preventive, from emergency patrols to interrogation departments. There are also trends towards closing down specialized crime prevention units, since the whole organization is supposed to work proactive and prevent crime. As the observation study indicates, this policy does not have significant consequences for the way of patrolling. At some local police stations, specialized units are established, working with youths under 18 years of age, with specialized youth police prosecutors. However, the existence and function of such units are varying across the country. The implementation is different between the local police districts, and one influential factor is that the local police districts only to a certain degree are measured through preventive performance indicators from the National Police Directorate.

### **More safety policy less community beat patrol?**

We will now discuss what impact, if any, national policy strategies have on the local police organization (organizational structure); and what impact these national police strategies have on what is involved in patrol work? What are the similarities and differences between police policy and everyday practice?

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the National Police Policy in Norway can be described as knowledge-led community policing. As described in chapter 7.1, the police are imposed from the National Police Directorate to make multi-agency partnerships with specific agencies. This can be described as community policing that is aimed towards improving networking with other authorities and local actors in general. To some extent, our observations may illustrate whether this community policing strategy downsizes community beat patrolling and partnership-building with the local community as such. Since the police officers that work with partnership-building with other authorities and the local community in general are separated from the patrolling, the information flow and interaction between these different tasks are not part of the practicing community policing at the station.

The finding are also indicating that the process of implementing and putting into practice the principles of SLT in a way that manifests itself in everyday police patrol work is far from completed. The administrative level and the police patrol level is still very much two different



worlds. We were not able to point out any evidence of direct influence from the police participating in SLT during the observations in either place.

The findings are maybe indicating a tension between a community- and/or citizen-driven policing style and a policing regime driven by performance indicators and targets, although it is not documented in the empirical study. It points to that maybe the weight on knowledge-led policing as an instrument for crime reduction, overshadow the primary goal of community policing in patrolling; to make better relations with the general citizens.

On more than one occasion during observation, the officers expressed a wish for a more systematic evaluation on the problem oriented police work they carried out. It is our impression that there is a lack of realistic performance indicators that facilitate both the national and local management policy in the two cities. Nor seems the information facilities to make incentives for, or motivate the police officers to report on their POP police work, which are necessary for evaluating efforts in the POP-process. Without a proper evaluation there is a danger that important experiences and results from the work is overlooked and forgotten. This is revealing some of the weaknesses of POP. Too much weight on crime and accountability facilitate traditional- not innovative policing. One problem with implementing POP is features with the police organisation, namely it's hierarchic and less flexible and changeable organisation. Accountability does not have to be a threat for problem-oriented policing. However, because the way patrolling are managed in Oslo is in collision with the ground level's conceptions of real policing, it becomes a threat. This finding reveal POPs dilemma between greater accountability and more personal involvement, although it does not have to be an antagonism. This is in line with Sollunds (2007: 17) conclusions in her study of patrol work at three stations in Oslo. She argues that the implementation of POP reduced rank and file officers' autonomy and caused a subversive dissatisfaction and negative loyalty to the POP ideas.

### **Multiple basic assignments**

Our observations in Lillestrøm and Oslo points to an existence of different point of views and ideas about policing within one station, connected to the officers belonging to different positions in the organization inside the police station. Since the implementation of knowledge-led policing are so far from the ideal, it can reveal how practices are shaped by different conceptions of "real policing". The dominant perceptions of this at the ground-level are different from how this is conceived by management. This indicates that different basic assignments may have a greater place as a factor in shaping the manner of patrolling than management control.

However, during our recent observations in Oslo it should be stressed that most officers did not express a strong aversion towards working problem oriented. In fact, many seemed quite positive and aware of the benefits of both POP and community policing. Their critique was more in the line of: "there is not much point of doing this unless it is done properly and management start to adequately evaluate the efforts and afterwards communicate the results from the evaluation back to the officers". Still, during shifts there was a clear preference for being part of an emergency patrol compared to a community beat patrol. This seemed to be linked with the probability of getting assignments from the operation central since CBP have lower priority. The clearest aversion among the officers was towards being in the patrol car standing guard outside the American embassy during most of the shift. These patrol cars were in a separate category, neither EP nor CBP, thus did we not observe any such patrols.

In Oslo, useful information was also described as ‘informative’ and connected to potential criminal offenders by the police officers. Our observations show a huge interest among the patrol officers to search in police databases for information about individuals and relations in the criminal milieu. As presented in table 7.11a-c the frequency of incidents in which officers in Lillestrøm and Oslo use specific information sources is largest and second largest in the research.

### **Summing up and refining the model**

To sum up, our observation is that the POP orientation at Lillestrøm and Oslo is basically related to law enforcement maybe more than networking. They work specifically against potential criminal cases using surveillance and undercover police work. There is only a small difference between the types of incidents the EP and the CBP are involved in because it is the same officers working both types of patrol cars. The CBP officers high degree of repressive measures might be caused by the officer’s orientation towards law and order, and confirm a working style oriented towards repressive action. Compared to the profile of patrolling in the other cities, the profile of both EP and CBP in Oslo are to a high degree incidents-led.

However, there is a balance between striking hard against public disorder and keeping a good connection with the public and doing networking in the community. The finding is especially interesting because of the proactive and problem-oriented police strategy at the station. The finding is indicating a gap between police strategy, basic assignment and profile of the police patrol work.

The observation study of Oslo and Lillestrøm indicates that the implementation of POP has to a lesser degree influenced police patrols in the street of Lillestrøm and Oslo than expected. From this we assume that the internal factors; basic assignment, basic strategy and management control are important determinants for the practice of both emergency patrol and community beat patrol in the streets of Oslo and Lillestrøm. Meaning, we believe these are the factors that mainly affect what police officers do on a day to day basis.

Findings in Oslo indicate that the community policing model where the patrolling are integrated, are more focused on reducing crime through preventive work than networking and strengthening the relations to the citizens. Community policing is more directed towards strengthen the ties between the police and the partnerships. The profile of the strategy is to integrate emergency patrol with POP-patrols. One possible interpretation of effect of the integration is that the POP-patrols are doing less networking than the European average.

The observation study of Oslo reveals POPs dilemma between greater accountability and more personal involvement, although it does not have to be an antagonism. It also uncovers that the police strategy seldom has to be implemented in practice, it is translated into the organizational context, and it is depending on management’s internal control.

## References chapter 7:

Balvig, Flemming and Lars Holmberg (2004). *Politi og Tryghed. Forsøg med nærpoliti i Danmark*, København: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag.

Clarke Ronald V og John Eck (2003). *Become a problem solving crime analyst: in 55 small steps*. London : Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science.

Gundhus, Helene Oppen (2005). ‘‘Catching’ and ‘Targeting’: Risk-Based Policing, Local Culture and Gendered Practices’, *Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention*, 6(2).

Gundhus, Helene Oppen (2006): ”For sikkerhets skyld” – IKT, yrkeskulturer og kunnskapsarbeid i politiet, Oslo: Unipub.

Holmberg, Lars (2004). ‘Community policing in the nordic countries’, *Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime prevention*, 5: 205-219.

Hughes, Gordon (2007). *Politics of crime and community*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lorentzen, Håkon (1980). *Nye metoder i den uniformerte patruljetjeneste. En evaluering av prøveprosjektene ved Oslo og Kristiansand politikamre*, Oslo: Justisdepartementet.

Politidirektoratet (2002): *Strategiplan for forebyggende politiarbeid 2002 – 2005*, Oslo: Politidirektoratet.

Politidirektoratet (2005). *Politiet i lokalsamfunnet : veileder om politiets kommunikasjon og samhandling med kommuner og andre aktører på lokalt og regionalt nivå*, Oslo : Politidirektoratet. (12/2005)

Politidirektoratet (2007): *Nasjonal strategi for etterretning og analyse*, Oslo: Politidirektoratet (POD-publikasjon: 5)

Politidirektoratet (2008) *The police in Norway*. Available HTTP:  
<[http://www.politi.no/downloads/060404\\_thepoliceinnorway.pdf](http://www.politi.no/downloads/060404_thepoliceinnorway.pdf)>  
(accessed 30 April 2008).

Sollund, Ragnhild (2007). ‘The implementation of problemoriented policing in Oslo, Norway: not without problems?’, in *Criminology Research Focus*, Karen T. Froeling (ed.), Nova Science Publishers: 175-193.

St.meld. nr. 42 (2004-2005) *Politiets rolle og oppgaver*, Oslo: Justis- og politidepartementet.

St.meld. nr. 22 (2000-2001) *Politireform 2000*, Oslo: Justis- og politidepartementet.

Stol, Wouter et. al (2006). *Police patrol work in the Netherlands. An observational study in an international perspective*, Frankfurt: Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft.

Stol, Wouter (2007) *Policing the Streets in Europe: An International Comparative Observational Study*, Feedback Meeting, Norway, October 1th 2007

CHAPTER 8

## **8. Policing the Streets in Europe**

*Wouter Stol, Peter Kruize, Thomas Feltes, Sofie DeKimpe, Helene Oppen Gundhus*

### **8.1 Different models of Community Beat Policing**

- the different approaches we have met in the different countries;
- 

### **8.2 The role of information sources**

- how important are information facilities such as computer data bases and digital equipment in the cop car?
- is there a connection between information use and the way police officers deal with incidents;
- 

### **8.3 What determines what police officers do**

- what determines what police officers do?
- towards an empirical grounded theory of policing?
- presentation of a revised conceptual model

### **8.4 Good practices – lessons learned**

- what have we learned about policing (lessons worth while to share)?

### **8.5 Implications for police management**

- what can/should police management learn from our findings?
- what can police management do with our findings?

## Appendix

*Table A.1: strength of the police teams under observation, police-inhabitant ratio and population density*

	Strength (number of employees) *	Area covered by EP (km2)	Inhabitants in this area #	Inhabitants per employee	Population density (inh./km2)
Groningen (NL)	58	4.9	37,380	640	7,600
Leeuwarden (NL)	59	10.7	47,710	810	4,500
Assen (NL)	48	49.9	24,930	520	500
Roskilde (DK)	291	552.1	175,500	600	320
Hillerød (DK)	240	629.0	143,500	600	230
Bochum (D)	275	32.0	123,000	450	3,800
Münster (D)	68	155.5	100,000	1,470	640
Brussel (B)	86	0.9	20,000	230	22,200
Dendermonde (B)	117	55.7	43,400	370	780
Aarschot (B)	57	62.5	27,900	490	450
Oslo (N)	240	16.7	49,500	210	3,000
Lillestrøm (N)	202	77.0	44,600	220	580
<i>TOTAL PSE</i>	<i>1,741</i>	<i>1,646.9</i>	<i>837,420</i>	<i>480</i>	<i>510</i>

\* : including all employees: law enforcement officers as well as administrative staff.

#: number of inhabitants in the area covered by Emergency Patrol (EP) – the area under observation.



**Work load Emeregency Police**

	<i>Inc./hour</i>	<i>Calls/hour</i>
2005 Groningen (NL)	3.1	1.3
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	1.6	0.8
2005 Assen (NL)	2.3	1.0
2006 Roskilde (DK)	1.8	0.6
2006 Hillerød (DK)	2.4	0.6
2006 Bochum (D)	1.8	0.9
2006 Münster (D)	1.3	0.8
2006 Brussel (B)	1.6	0.7
2006 Dendermonde (B)	1.4	0.8
2006 Aarschot (B)	1.9	1.0
2007 Oslo (N)	1.4	0.6
2007 Lillestrøm	1.2	0.6
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.8</i>	<i>0.8</i>

\*: calls are all incidents to which a citizen took the first step, excluding 'answering a question from the public' (var06=65) and 'chatting with the public' (var06=84).

***Proportion of traffic (emergency patrol) in %  
of all patrol police activities***

2005 Groningen (NL)	43.4
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	** 21.1
2005 Assen (NL)	33.1
2006 Roskilde (DK)	* 55.1
2006 Hillerød (DK)	** 59.3
2006 Bochum (D)	** 57.5
2006 Münster (D)	51.2
2006 Brussel (B)	* 30.4
2006 Dendermonde (B)	30.3
2006 Aarschot (B)	41.4
2007 Oslo (N)	37.7
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	* 30.1
<b>Total PSE</b>	<b>41.6</b>

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

*Patrol work subdivided into main categories (percentages)*

	<b>Maintaining the law</b>	<b>Maintaining public order</b>	<b>Giving assistance</b>	<b>Networking</b>	<b>Internal job</b>	<b>else</b>
2005 Groningen(NL)	59.8	* 12.8	20.6	3.6	1.1	2.1
2005 Leeuwarden(NL)	** 43.3	8.2	29.2	7.0	* 7.6	4.7
2005 Assen (NL)	57.7	4.6	22.9	5.7	5.7	3.4
2006 Roskilde (DK)	** 75.7	3.7	* 11.0	2.2	5.1	2.2
2006 Hillerød (DK)	** 74.8	4.9	** 10.6	6.1	0.8	2.8
2006 Bochum (D)	61.1	8.4	22.2	3.0	0.6	4.8
2006 Münster (D)	47.3	3.9	** 38.8	1.6	1.6	7.0
2006 Brussel (B)	51.3	6.8	29.8	3.7	2.1	6.3
2006 Dendermonde(B)	46.8	7.3	31.2	3.7	7.3	3.7
2006 Aarschot (B)	59.6	9.9	19.7	5.3	2.6	3.9
2007 Oslo (N)	55.3	12.6	21.1	6.5	2.0	2.5
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	** 33.8	10.5	30.8	* 10.5	7.5	6.8
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>56.8</i>	<i>8.1</i>	<i>23.0</i>	<i>4.9</i>	<i>3.3</i>	<i>4.0</i>

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to 'Total PSE').

Table A.5: patrol work subdivided into subjects (percentages)

	Traffic				Law		Order/ Assistance					Other		
	Coll.	Viol.	Check	Other	Serious crime	Other	Social problem	Quest. from public	Trouble -some youth	Public order	Other	Net-working	Int. job.	Else
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>														
05 Gron	6.4	17.8	*16.7	2.5	18.9	4.3	8.2	1.8	0.7	* 10.3	6.4	3.6	1.1	1.4
05 Leeuw	5.3	*12.9	** 1.8	1.2	21.6	5.3	11.1	5.8	1.2	8.2	8.8	7.0	* 7.6	2.3
05 Assen	8.0	21.1	* 2.3	1.7	22.3	6.9	8.6	1.7	2.3	1.7	8.6	5.7	5.7	3.4
06 Rosk	2.9	30.9	**19.9	1.5	16.9	4.4	3.7	1.5	0.7	2.2	5.1	2.2	5.1	2.9
06 Hille	3.7	25.6	**28.9	1.2	8.5	8.5	3.7	2.0	1.6	4.1	3.3	6.1	0.8	2.0
06 Boch	*12.0	28.1	13.2	4.2	14.4	3.6	4.2	1.2	0.6	4.2	7.8	3.0	0.6	3.0
06 Munst	**17.8	25.6	5.4	3.1	10.1	3.1	13.2	3.1	0.0	0.8	10.1	1.6	1.6	5.4
06 Bruss	1.6	23.6	** 0.0	5.2	18.3	4.7	13.6	**11.0	3.1	2.1	7.9	3.7	2.1	3.1
06 Dend	3.7	*16.5	** 2.8	** 7.3	12.8	7.3	** 22.9	1.8	1.8	3.7	5.5	3.7	7.3	2.8
06 Aars	4.6	23.0	5.9	7.9	11.2	8.6	9.9	2.0	0.7	2.0	12.5	5.3	2.6	3.9
07 Oslo	2.5	26.5	5.5	3.0	18.6	1.0	3.0	* 9.5	0.0	* 10.6	7.0	6.5	2.0	4.0
07 Lilles	9.8	* 9.8	5.3	5.3	8.3	7.5	9.8	3.0	2.3	8.3	12.0	10.5	7.5	0.8
Tot PSE	6.1	21.9	10.1	3.4	15.5	5.4	8.6	3.8	1.2	5.3	7.6	4.9	3.3	2.8
<i>Community Beat Policing</i>														
05 Gron	0.0	17.2	4.5	3.4	5.6	1.7	* 8.4	10.1	3.4	1.7	7.3	** 34.6	** 1.7	* 0.0
05 Leeuw	1.6	14.1	1.6	1.6	** 23.8	5.4	3.8	7.0	4.3	6.5	4.9	** 10.8	13.5	1.1
05 Assen	0.0	* 31.9	1.2	2.5	4.9	3.1	6.1	6.1	3.7	2.5	3.7	* 31.1	** 0.6	0.6
06 Rosk	0.0	** 7.0	2.6	0.0	14.0	0.9	4.4	4.4	0.9	2.6	6.1	* 32.5	** 23.7	0.9
06 Hille	0.9	** 37.1	* 8.6	2.6	6.0	2.6	6.0	* 3.4	0.0	1.7	4.3	** 6.9	16.4	3.4
06 Boch	1.5	15.8	3.6	3.6	** 1.0	0.5	2.0	** 27.6	0.0	4.6	4.1	** 31.6	** 1.5	2.6
06 Munst	0.6	15.4	** 9.9	4.9	5.6	1.2	1.9	13.0	0.6	6.8	3.7	22.2	14.2	0.0
06 Bruss	0.0	** 2.3	0.0	1.1	7.4	4.6	3.4	10.9	0.0	1.1	1.1	22.3	** 36.6	** 9.1
06 Dend	0.0	* 34.2	** 0.2	* 7.2	** 2.7	* 0.6	2.2	11.9	0.6	* 1.0	2.9	19.2	8.8	** 8.6
06 Aars	1.3	* 6.4	0.0	2.6	** 28.2	2.6	5.1	10.3	0.0	1.3	3.8	* 9.0	** 28.2	1.3
07 Oslo	1.3	* 31.0	2.6	3.2	4.5	5.8	1.9	17.4	0.0	** 9.7	7.7	* 9.7	* 3.2	1.9
07 Lilles	* 3.7	11.0	** 17.1	4.9	6.1	* 8.5	3.7	2.4	2.4	3.7	7.3	14.6	8.5	6.1
Tot PSE	0.7	21.5	3.2	3.8	7.4	2.6	3.7	11.4	1.3	3.3	4.3	21.3	11.6	3.8

\* p&lt;0.01; \*\* p&lt;0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

*Proportion of serious crimes*

	All incidents	
2005 Groningen (NL)	281	19.2
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	171	21.6
2005 Assen (NL)	175	22.3
2006 Roskilde (DK)	136	17.6
2006 Hillerød (DK)	246	** 9.3
2006 Bochum (D)	167	15.0
2006 Münster (D)	129	10.1
2006 Brussel (B)	191	18.3
2006 Dendermonde (B)	109	12.8
2006 Aarschot (B)	152	14.5
2007 Oslo (N)	199	19.1
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	133	9.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>16.1</i>

\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

Table A.7: proportion of incidents on the initiative of the police

	Emergency Patrol					
	Traffic		Non-traffic		All incidents	
2005 Groningen (NL)	122	80.3	159	37.1	281	55.9
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	36	72.7	135	37.8	171	45.0
2005 Assen (NL)	58	70.7	117	43.6	175	52.6
2006 Roskilde (DK)	75	* 90.7	61	37.7	136	** 66.9
2006 Hillerød (DK)	146	** 93.2	100	40.0	246	** 71.5
2006 Bochum (D)	96	66.7	71	28.2	167	50.3
2006 Münster (D)	66	65.2	63	* 14.3	129	40.3
2006 Brussel (B)	58	89.7	133	* 20.3	191	* 41.4
2006 Dendermonde (B)	33	60.6	76	27.6	109	* 37.6
2006 Aarschot (B)	63	71.4	89	28.1	152	46.1
2007 Oslo (N)	75	86.7	124	23.4	199	47.2
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	40	** 45.0	93	46.2	133	45.9
<i>Total PSE</i>	868	77.9	1.221	32.6	2.089	51.4
	<i>PSE</i>					
2005 Groningen (NL)	122	80.3	159	37.1	281	55.9
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	36	72.7	135	37.8	171	45.0
2005 Assen (NL)	58	70.7	117	43.6	175	52.6
2006 Roskilde (DK)	75	* 90.7	61	37.7	136	** 66.9
2006 Hillerød (DK)	146	** 93.2	100	40.0	246	** 71.5
2006 Bochum (D)	96	66.7	71	28.2	167	50.3
2006 Münster (D)	66	65.2	63	* 14.3	129	40.3
2006 Brussel (B)	58	89.7	133	* 20.3	191	* 41.4
2006 Dendermonde (B)	33	60.6	76	27.6	109	* 37.6
2006 Aarschot (B)	63	71.4	89	28.1	152	46.1
2007 Oslo (N)	75	86.7	124	23.4	199	47.2
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	40	** 45.0	93	46.2	133	45.9
<i>Total PSE</i>	611	92.8	1.483	58.6	2.094	68.6

\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.001$  (with respect to Total PSE).



***Proportion of incidents in which the officers meet an acquaintance (in %)***

2005 Groningen (NL)	12.1
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	** 33.3
2005 Assen (NL)	16.0
2006 Roskilde (DK)	6.6
2006 Hillerød (DK)	11.0
2006 Bochum (D)	* 5.4
2006 Münster (D)	6.2
2006 Brussel (B)	9.4
2006 Dendermonde (B)	* 22.9
2006 Aarschot (B)	8.6
2007 Oslo (N)	* 5.5
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	18.0
Total PSE	12.6

*Proportions of incidents with marginal persons:**0 % (Danmark) 13/14 % (Norway + Netherlands)*

	Traffic		Non-traffic		All incidents	
	<i>EP</i>					
2005 Groningen (NL)	122		159		281	* 10.7
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	36		135		171	** 12.9
2005 Assen (NL)	58		117		175	4.6
2006 Roskilde (DK)	75		61		136	* 0.0
2006 Hillerød (DK)	146		100		246	** 0.4
2006 Bochum (D)	96		71		167	6.6
2006 Münster (D)	66		63		129	4.7
2006 Brussel (B)	58		133		191	2.1
2006 Dendermonde (B)	33		76		109	0.9
2006 Aarschot (B)	63		89		152	2.0
2007 Oslo (N)	75		124		199	** 13.6
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	40		93		133	6.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	868		1.221		2.089	5.8
	<i>CBP</i>					
2005 Groningen (NL)	46		133		179	2.2
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	35		150		185	* 8.6
2005 Assen (NL)	58		105		163	6.7
2006 Roskilde (DK)	11		103		114	1.8
2006 Hillerød (DK)	57		59		116	2.6
2006 Bochum (D)	48		148		196	** 11.7
2006 Münster (D)	50		112		162	4.3
2006 Brussel (B)	6		169		175	1.1
2006 Dendermonde (B)	203		286		489	* 1.2
2006 Aarschot (B)	8		70		78	0.0
2007 Oslo (N)	59		96		155	8.4
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	30		52		82	4.9
<i>Total PSE</i>	611		1.483		2.094	4.3

\* p&lt;0.01; \*\* p&lt;0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Table A.10a: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – all incidents

	N	Warning	Summons	Arrest	One of these
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>					
2005 Groningen (NL)	281	16.4	** 18.9	6.0	41.3
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	171	14.6	8.2	9.4	32.2
2005 Assen (NL)	175	13.7	9.1	7.4	30.3
2006 Roskilde (DK)	136	26.5	10.3	3.7	40.4
2006 Hillerød (DK)	246	* 27.6	9.8	2.0	39.4
2006 Bochum (D)	167	21.6	** 22.8	4.8	** 49.1
2006 Münster (D)	129	22.5	** 20.9	3.1	46.5
2006 Brussel (B)	191	22.5	* 3.1	3.1	28.8
2006 Dendermonde (B)	109	15.6	2.8	4.6	* 22.9
2006 Aarschot (B)	152	17.8	4.6	3.3	25.7
2007 Oslo (N)	199	22.1	6.0	5.5	33.7
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	133	18.0	* 2.3	6.8	27.1
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>20.1</i>	<i>10.4</i>	<i>5.0</i>	<i>35.4</i>
<i>Community Beat Patrol</i>					
2005 Groningen (NL)	179	15.1	* 7.8	1.1	24.0
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	185	* 11.9	* 7.6	** 5.4	24.9
2005 Assen (NL)	163	23.3	6.1	0.6	30.1
2006 Roskilde (DK)	114	* 9.6	4.4	1.8	15.8
2006 Hillerød (DK)	116	** 35.3	3.4	1.7	** 40.5
2006 Bochum (D)	196	18.4	1.5	1.0	20.9
2006 Münster (D)	162	** 6.2	1.9	0.6	** 8.6
2006 Brussel (B)	175	** 4.0	0.0	0.6	** 4.6
2006 Dendermonde (B)	489	** 35.4	** 0.0	0.2	** 35.6
2006 Aarschot (B)	78	* 7.7	0.0	0.0	** 7.7
2007 Oslo (N)	155	23.9	6.5	1.3	31.6
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	82	12.2	2.4	3.7	18.3
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>2.089</i>	<i>20.0</i>	<i>3.1</i>	<i>1.3</i>	<i>24.4</i>

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

*Table A.10b: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – in the sphere of traffic*

	N	Warning	Summons	Arrest	One of these
<i>PSE</i>					
2005 Groningen (NL)	122	28.7	** 38.5	1.6	68.9
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	36	33.3	19.4	0.0	52.8
2005 Assen (NL)	58	29.3	27.6	1.7	58.6
2006 Roskilde (DK)	75	36.0	18.7	0.0	54.7
2006 Hillerød (DK)	146	38.4	15.1	0.7	54.1
2006 Bochum (D)	96	30.2	32.3	0.0	62.5
2006 Münster (D)	66	30.3	** 39.4	1.5	71.2
2006 Brussel (B)	58	** 63.8	* 5.2	0.0	69.0
2006 Dendermonde (B)	33	42.4	6.1	3.0	51.5
2006 Aarschot (B)	63	27.0	7.9	4.8	* 39.7
2007 Oslo (N)	75	46.7	14.7	0.0	61.3
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	40	27.5	5.0	2.5	* 35.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	868	35.7	21.4	1.2	58.3
<i>PSE</i>					
2005 Groningen (NL)	46	47.8	** 30.4	0.0	78.3
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	35	40.0	* 28.6	0.0	68.6
2005 Assen (NL)	58	60.3	17.2	0.0	77.6
2006 Roskilde (DK)	11	45.5	27.3	0.0	72.7
2006 Hillerød (DK)	57	68.4	3.5	0.0	71.9
2006 Bochum (D)	48	54.2	4.2	0.0	58.3
2006 Münster (D)	50	** 20.0	2.0	0.0	** 22.0
2006 Brussel (B)	6	33.3	0.0	0.0	33.3
2006 Dendermonde (B)	203	** 82.3	** 0.0	0.0	** 82.3
2006 Aarschot (B)	8	37.5	0.0	0.0	37.5
2007 Oslo (N)	59	59.3	10.2	0.0	69.5
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	30	** 26.7	6.7	0.0	** 33.3
<i>Total PSE</i>	611	59.9	8.2	0.0	68.1

\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

Table A.10c: proportion of incidents in which the officers take repressive measures – outside the sphere of traffic

	N	Warning	Summons	Arrest	One of these
<i>PSE</i>					
2005 Groningen (NL)	159	6.9	3.8	9.4	20.1
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	135	9.6	5.2	11.9	26.7
2005 Assen (NL)	117	6.0	0.0	10.3	16.2
2006 Roskilde (DK)	61	14.8	0.0	8.2	23.0
2006 Hillerød (DK)	100	12.0	2.0	4.0	18.0
2006 Bochum (D)	71	9.9	** 9.9	11.3	31.0
2006 Münster (D)	63	14.3	1.6	4.8	20.6
2006 Brussel (B)	133	4.5	2.3	4.5	11.3
2006 Dendermonde (B)	76	3.9	1.3	5.3	10.5
2006 Aarschot (B)	89	11.2	2.2	2.2	15.7
2007 Oslo (N)	124	7.3	0.8	8.9	16.9
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	93	14.0	1.1	8.6	23.7
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.221</i>	<i>8.9</i>	<i>2.5</i>	<i>7.7</i>	<i>19.2</i>
<i>PSE</i>					
2005 Groningen (NL)	133	3.8	0.0	1.5	5.3
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	150	5.3	2.7	** 6.7	** 14.7
2005 Assen (NL)	105	2.9	0.0	1.0	3.8
2006 Roskilde (DK)	103	5.8	1.9	1.9	9.7
2006 Hillerød (DK)	59	3.4	3.4	3.4	10.2
2006 Bochum (D)	148	6.8	0.7	1.4	8.8
2006 Münster (D)	112	0.0	1.8	0.9	2.7
2006 Brussel (B)	169	3.0	0.0	0.6	3.6
2006 Dendermonde (B)	286	2.1	0.0	0.3	2.4
2006 Aarschot (B)	70	4.3	0.0	0.0	4.3
2007 Oslo (N)	96	2.1	* 4.2	2.1	8.3
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	52	3.8	0.0	5.8	9.6
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.483</i>	<i>3.5</i>	<i>1.0</i>	<i>1.8</i>	<i>6.3</i>

\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.001$  (with respect to Total PSE).

Table A.11a: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific informaton sources – all incidents

	N	Source from a citizen		Source from the police		One or more of these
		Manual	Digital	Manual	Digital	
<i>Emergency Patrol</i>						
2005 Groningen (NL)	281	** 19.2	0.4	5.0	21.7	37.4
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	171	* 19.3	1.8	** 9.9	14.6	35.7
2005 Assen (NL)	175	** 13.1	0.0	0.0	14.9	** 21.7
2006 Roskilde (DK)	163	** 43.4	1.5	1.5	** 41.2	* 52.9
2006 Hillerød (DK)	246	** 40.7	0.0	2.0	** 33.3	** 58.1
2006 Bochum (D)	167	** 50.9	0.6	0.6	** 41.3	** 60.5
2006 Münster (D)	129	30.2	0.8	3.1	29.5	41.9
2006 Brussel (B)	109	25.7	0.0	0.5	** 3.1	* 27.2
2006 Dendermonde (B)	109	** 7.3	1.8	0.0	* 10.1	** 16.5
2006 Aarschot (B)	152	29.6	0.0	0.7	* 11.8	38.2
2007 Oslo (N)	199	30.7	1.5	5.0	23.1	41.2
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	133	33.8	0.8	1.5	26.3	37.6
<i>Total PSE</i>	2.089	28.8	0.7	2.7	22.6	39.9
<i>Community Beat Policing</i>						
2005 Groningen (NL)	179	8.9	0.0	1.1	2.8	* 10.6
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	185	13.5	1.1	** 21.1	10.8	** 36.2
2005 Assen (NL)	163	* 6.1	0.6	0.0	* 0.6	** 7.4
2006 Roskilde (DK)	114	7.9	0.0	0.0	8.8	10.5
2006 Hillerød (DK)	110	19.8	0.0	0.9	** 14.7	27.6
2006 Bochum (D)	196	13.3	0.0	0.5	5.1	14.3
2006 Münster (D)	162	13.6	1.2	** 11.1	6.2	* 27.8
2006 Brussel (B)	175	14.9	0.0	1.7	* 0.6	17.1
2006 Dendermonde (B)	489	* 9.4	0.0	** 0.0	** 0.2	** 9.4
2006 Aarschot (B)	78	* 26.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.9
2007 Oslo (N)	155	** 30.3	0.6	3.9	** 20.0	** 34.8
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	82	** 28.0	* 2.4	1.2	** 24.4	** 36.6
<i>Total PSE</i>	2.094	14.0	0.4	3.4	6.0	18.9

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).



*Tabel A.11b: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific informaton sources – in the sphere of traffic*

	N	Source from a citizen		Source from the police		One or more of these
		Manual	Digital	Manual	Digital	
<i>PSE</i>						
2005 Groningen (NL)	122	38.5	0.0	7.4	25.4	57.4
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	36	44.4	2.8	* 13.9	22.2	58.3
2005 Assen (NL)	58	* 27.6	0.0	0.0	36.2	51.7
2006 Roskilde (DK)	75	** 70.7	1.3	1.3	** 60.0	* 74.7
2006 Hillerød (DK)	146	* 61.0	0.0	3.4	33.6	** 71.9
2006 Bochum (D)	96	** 65.6	0.0	1.0	* 47.9	** 75.0
2006 Münster (D)	66	48.5	0.0	6.1	43.9	60.6
2006 Brussel (B)	58	** 6.9	0.0	0.0	** 0.0	** 6.9
2006 Dendermonde (B)	33	** 15.2	0.0	0.0	* 6.1	** 18.2
2006 Aarschot (B)	63	38.1	0.0	1.6	* 12.7	46.0
2007 Oslo (N)	75	45.3	0.0	5.3	28.0	52.0
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	40	60.0	0.0	2.5	47.5	60.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	868	46.9	0.2	3.6	32.1	57.1
<i>PSE</i>						
2005 Groningen (NL)	46	26.1	0.0	4.3	4.3	28.3
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	35	28.6	0.0	** 25.7	* 28.6	* 45.7
2005 Assen (NL)	58	15.5	0.0	0.0	* 0.0	15.5
2006 Roskilde (DK)	11	* 63.6	0.0	0.0	** 54.5	* 63.6
2006 Hillerød (DK)	57	26.3	0.0	0.0	19.3	35.1
2006 Bochum (D)	48	31.3	0.0	2.1	6.3	31.3
2006 Münster (D)	50	38.0	0.0	0.0	8.0	38.0
2006 Brussel (B)	6	16.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.7
2006 Dendermonde (B)	203	* 1.0	0.0	0.0	** 0.0	** 1.0
2006 Aarschot (B)	8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2007 Oslo (N)	59	** 50.8	0.0	0.0	** 32.2	** 50.8
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	30	** 70.0	0.0	30.3	** 56.7	** 80.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	611	23.0	0.0	2.1	11.8	25.5

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Table A.11c: proportion of incidents in which officers use specific information sources – outside the sphere of traffic

	N	Source from a citizen		Source from the police		One or more of these
		Manual	Digital	Manual	Digital	
<i>PSE – EP</i>						
2005 Groningen (NL)	159	** 4.4	0.6	3.1	18.9	22.0
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	135	12.7	1.5	** 8.9	12.6	29.6
2005 Assen (NL)	117	* 6.0	0.0	0.0	** 4.3	** 6.8
2006 Roskilde (DK)	61	9.8	1.6	1.6	18.0	26.2
2006 Hillerød (DK)	100	11.0	0.0	0.0	** 33.0	38.0
2006 Bochum (D)	71	** 31.0	1.4	0.0	** 32.4	40.8
2006 Münster (D)	63	11.1	1.6	0.0	14.3	22.2
2006 Brussel (B)	133	** 33.8	0.0	0.8	** 4.5	36.1
2006 Dendermonde (B)	76	3.9	2.6	0.0	11.8	15.8
2006 Aarschot (B)	89	23.6	0.0	0.0	11.2	32.6
2007 Oslo (N)	124	21.8	2.4	4.8	20.2	34.7
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	93	22.6	1.1	1.1	17.2	28.0
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.221</i>	<i>15.9</i>	<i>1.0</i>	<i>2.1</i>	<i>15.9</i>	<i>27.7</i>
<i>PSE – CBP</i>						
2005 Groningen (NL)	133	* 3.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	** 4.5
2005 Leeuwarden (NL)	150	10.0	1.3	** 20.0	6.7	** 34.0
2005 Assen (NL)	105	* 1.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	** 2.9
2006 Roskilde (DK)	103	* 1.9	0.0	0.0	3.9	* 4.9
2006 Hillerød (DK)	59	13.6	0.0	1.7	* 10.2	20.3
2006 Bochum (D)	148	7.4	0.0	0.0	4.7	8.8
2006 Münster (D)	112	* 2.7	1.8	** 16.1	5.4	23.2
2006 Brussel (B)	169	14.8	0.0	1.8	0.6	17.2
2006 Dendermonde (B)	286	15.4	0.0	** 0.0	* 0.3	15.4
2006 Aarschot (B)	70	** 30.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	* 30.0
2007 Oslo (N)	96	17.7	1.0	6.3	** 12.5	25.0
2007 Lillestrøm (N)	52	3.8	* 3.8	0.0	5.8	11.5
<i>Total PSE</i>	<i>1.483</i>	<i>10.3</i>	<i>0.5</i>	<i>3.9</i>	<i>3.6</i>	<i>16.2</i>

\* p<0.01; \*\* p<0.001 (with respect to Total PSE).

Table A.12: emergency patrol subdivided into incidents (percentages)

	Gron	Leeuw	Assen	Rosk	Hille	Boch	Münst	Bruss	Dend	Aars	Oslo	Lilles	Total
(N)	281	171	175	136	246	167	129	191	109	152	199	133	2,089
Traffic													
10 accident with casualties	2.8	1.2	3.4	0.7	2.0	1.8	2.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	3.0	1.6
11 acc. without casualties	3.6	4.1	4.6	2.2	1.6	* 10.2	**14.7	1.6	3.7	4.6	1.5	6.8	4.5
12 drunk driving	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	** 3.3	0.5	0.8	0.6
13 directing traffic	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.4	1.2	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.6
14 street furniture	0.4	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.5	** 3.7	** 3.3	0.0	0.8	0.7
15 traffic stop	3.2	1.8	2.3	**19.9	8.5	**13.2	5.4	** 0.0	2.8	1.3	5.5	5.3	5.6
16 traffic violation	17.8	* 12.9	21.1	30.9	25.6	28.1	25.6	23.6	16.5	23.0	26.6	** 9.8	21.9
17 roadside stop	**13.5	* 0.0	* 0.0	0.0	**20.3	* 0.0	* 0.0	* 0.0	0.0	4.6	* 0.0	0.0	4.5
15+16+17	34.5	14.7	23.4	50.8	54.4	41.3	31.0	23.6	19.3	28.9	32.1	15.1	32.0
19 other traffic	0.7	1.2	1.1	0.0	0.0	1.8	3.1	3.7	3.7	1.3	1.0	3.8	1.6
Criminal law / specific laws													
30 burglary	3.9	4.7	5.7	* 9.6	3.7	1.8	4.7	6.3	4.6	2.6	2.5	0.8	4.2
31 car break-in	1.8	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.0	0.0	3.7	0.9	0.0	1.0	0.8	1.0
32 theft motor vehicle	0.7	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.2
33 theft moped/bicycle	0.0	* 1.8	* 1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3
34 shop lifting	1.8	2.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.4	0.8	2.1	1.8	0.7	* 4.5	0.8	1.5
35 robbery/pick pocketing	0.4	1.8	0.0	0.7	0.4	0.6	0.0	2.6	0.9	1.3	2.0	0.8	1.0
36 hold-up bank, shop etc	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.8	0.2
37 narcotics	1.1	1.8	0.6	0.0	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.5	1.5	0.6
38 weapons	1.4	0.0	0.6	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.3
39 assault	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	1.6	** 5.4	2.3	0.5	0.0	0.7	2.5	1.5	1.3
40 vandalism	0.4	2.9	2.9	2.2	0.4	3.0	0.0	2.6	1.8	4.6	1.5	0.8	1.8
41 fraud	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.6	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.4
42 sex offences	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.1
43 café check	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	** 1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
44 suspicious sit.	3.9	4.7	4.6	3.7	2.8	3.6	2.3	3.7	3.7	* 7.9	0.5	2.3	3.6
45 wanted pers/stolen good	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.7	** 3.7	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.9	0.0	0.0	** 4.5	0.9
46 false name	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.1
47 false report	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
48 immigration law	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0
49 other crim. law	0.0	0.6	2.3	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.8	0.5	* 2.8	0.7	0.5	0.0	0.6
Public order / assistance													
50 twist (no relationship)	5.0	5.3	4.6	3.7	2.4	1.8	3.9	**11.5	5.5	4.6	3.0	6.8	4.8
51 relationship problems	1.8	3.5	2.3	0.0	0.4	1.8	0.8	1.0	**11.9	2.6	0.0	1.5	2.0
52 noise nuisance house	0.7	2.3	1.7	0.0	0.4	0.6	** 7.8	0.0	3.7	0.7	0.0	1.5	1.3
53 - from café/bussiness	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.8	1.0	1.8	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
55 environment	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.5	* 2.8	** 4.6	0.0	0.0	0.6
58 dangerous situations	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.8	* 2.6	0.0	** 3.9	0.5	0.0	0.7
59 missing persons	0.0	1.2	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.4
60 publ. drunkenness	* 4.6	2.9	0.6	0.0	2.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	2.8	1.3	2.5	2.3	1.8
61 assistance / unwell pers.	3.9	5.8	4.6	1.5	* 0.0	4.8	3.9	2.1	0.9	3.3	5.0	6.8	3.5
62 public order	5.7	5.3	1.1	2.2	2.0	3.6	0.8	2.1	0.9	0.7	* 8.0	6.0	3.4
63 fire	0.7	0.0	2.3	0.7	0.4	1.8	2.3	0.5	0.0	0.7	0.0	1.5	0.9
64 lost and found	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.8	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.5
65 question from the public	1.8	5.8	1.7	1.5	2.0	1.2	3.1	**11.0	1.8	2.0	** 9.5	3.0	3.8
66 nuisance from yought	0.7	1.2	2.3	0.7	1.6	0.6	0.0	3.1	1.8	0.7	0.0	2.3	1.2
69 other	1.1	1.8	1.1	1.5	1.6	0.6	0.8	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.5	2.3	1.0
Miscellaneous													
80 false alarm	1.1	0.6	2.3	2.2	0.8	0.6	2.3	1.0	2.8	1.3	3.0	0.0	1.4
81 iternal job	1.1	* 7.6	5.7	5.1	0.8	0.6	1.6	2.1	7.3	2.6	2.0	7.5	3.3
82 questioning a person	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.8	0.5	1.8	0.7	0.5	0.8	0.4
83 helping a colleague	0.0	1.8	1.1	0.0	0.0	1.2	3.1	1.6	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.8	0.9
84 chatting with the public	3.6	7.0	5.7	2.2	5.7	3.0	1.6	3.7	3.7	5.3	6.0	9.8	4.8
85 chatting with an official	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.8	0.1
86 interviewing residents <sup>91</sup>	** 6.4	4.7	** 9.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1
87 crime prevention	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
89 other	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.7	1.2	1.2	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

\* p&lt;0.01; \*\* p&lt;0.001 (with respect to row Total).

<sup>91</sup> Interviewing local residents after a crime has occurred, such as a burglary.

*Community beat patrol subdivided into incidents (percentages)*

(N)	Gron	Leeuw	Assen	Rosk	Hille	Boch	Münst	Bruss	Dend	Aars	Oslo	Lilles	Total
	179	185	163	114	116	196	162	175	489	78	155	82	2.094
Public order / assistance													
65 question from the public	10.1	7.0	6.1	4.4	* 3.4	**27.6	13.0	10.9	11.9	10.3	17.4	2.4	11.4
81 internal job	* 1.7	13.5	* 0.6	**23.7	16.4	* 1.5	14.2	**36.6	8.8	**28.2	* 3.2	8.5	11.6
82 questioning a person	0.0	0.5	1.8	1.8	2.6	0.0	0.0	4.6	2.2	**26.9	0.0	0.0	2.3
84 chatting with the public	* 26.3	** 7.0	23.9	24.6	** 3.4	21.4	17.9	22.3	18.0	7.7	* 7.7	14.6	17.1