ECONOMIC RESEARCH CENTRE

ROUND TABLE 123

VANDALISM, TERRORISM AND SECURITY IN URBAN PUBLIC PASSENGER TRANSPORT

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Over the past few years increasing importance has been attached to the subject of public security in public places, in the streets and open spaces and particularly at stations, bus stops and any other places where people come into contact with strangers. Inspired by developments in New York and the “zero-tolerance” strategy followed there, urban and district authorities have begun to pay particular attention not only to public security but also to what is referred to as the “subjective sense of security”, marred by the often groundless but all too common subjective fears and anxieties of citizens. Empirical studies in this field have shown that there is usually no correlation between the crimes reported in surveys (by the victims themselves), police records of crime and individuals’ subjective sense of security. In the case of Germany, for example, it has been possible to show that there is no connection between the levels of criminality in a city, region or federal state and the fear of crime and subjective sense of security revealed by surveys. The situation is clearly depicted in Figure 1, based on the results of a survey conducted in Germany in 1996, in which 20,000 citizens were questioned1 (Picture 1).

These findings have significant consequences: public discussion focuses more closely on the citizens’ subjective sense of security – hardly considered until now – and on the associated problem of unknown cases that are not reported. The essential theoretical and practical considerations related to the problem are presented below.

Public security, like individual security, is increasingly seen as an important feature of post-modern society – both in the “private” and in the “public” domain, of which local transport is a part. The democratic state has a duty to guarantee the security of its citizens in public spaces and it is increasingly judged by its success in fulfilling this duty. The same is true of local transport: important factors in public transport include not only punctuality, value for money and quality, but also the feeling that it is safe to use. Security is of considerable importance as a locational factor both for firms and service companies and increasingly for private individuals.

Generally speaking, security depends on the intangible infrastructure of all social groups, though mainly that of the sections of society who use local public transport. Here the perceived quality of life need not be identical to the actual quality of life and the subjective sense of well-being. As early as the seventies, though to a greater extent in the eighties, criminological research was able to show that special as well as routine preventive measures had their limits. The problem of criminality could not be solved either by treatment/therapy or by deterrence/repression. Even conventional wisdom on police measures had to be abandoned, including the idea that it was possible to increase the probability of detection only to a limited degree and that, even where it was increased (by a massive police presence, for example), the problem was not solved but merely transferred to another place or made to assume a different form.

Even the declining opportunities for crime and the protective measures taken by individuals do not lead to a real reduction in crime, at least not always and not permanently. It has thus been impossible to implement the "defensible space" scheme or the "social engineering" scheme involving control networks. Moreover security achieved through an excessive police presence may lead to a far stronger feeling of insecurity and a greater perception of lawlessness, which counteract the moves to instil a greater sense of security.
The example of New York has shown the following: recorded crime undeniably fell there and many citizens and visitors reported that they now felt safer in certain areas of the city. Bratton, the chief of the New York police, had taken the so-called “zero-tolerance strategy” from the field of public transport. He and his successor Safir wanted to apply the strategy that had been effectively implemented there to city streets and open spaces. The success of the initiative was nevertheless highly controversial, not least because of the often brutal behaviour of the New York police, mainly towards marginal groups and minorities. While the New York model and the fall in crime in the USA may have attracted worldwide attention, New York’s Mayor Giuliani and his chief of police were also the object of severe criticism up until 11 September 2001. Thus, as early as 1997, 54% of New Yorkers were of the opinion that the police lied, broke laws and falsified evidence in order to increase the number of convictions. By 1998 the number of complaints against the police had risen by 40% on the 1995 figure, and in 1997 the City of New York had to pay around 27 million dollars in compensation for unlawful police action. At the beginning of 1999 two-thirds of New Yorkers believed that the use of violence against minorities was very widespread in the police and the proportion of the population that supported the policing strategy of Bratton and Giuliani fell from over 80% to 42%. Three-quarters of black New Yorkers and at least a third of the whites rated their police as “unsatisfactory” and more than half of the population as a whole believed that most police officers used more force than was necessary when on duty.

Moreover comparable falls in crime levels have been noted throughout the USA and in states that have not adopted the “New York model”. In Boston, where the police have followed a quite different course from that of their New York counterparts, co-operating closely with citizens and community institutions, the decline has been even sharper. Homicides there have fallen by 77% over the same period, despite the fact that the Boston police force has not taken on more officers or adopted the New York line. Indeed, relations between the police and the ethnic groups in Boston have visibly improved with, for example, black councillors meeting regularly with the police to discuss appropriate strategies. The “ten-point coalition” may have been the real key to success, together with a clear separation between the police leadership and the police authority and rigorous prosecution of police misconduct. Other models, such as that of Chicago have also shown that co-operation with citizens is the decisive factor and that there are lessons here for local public transport.

The American experience and various European projects show that a communal security plan, like a communal transport plan, needs to be tailored to the situation. Such a plan calls first of all for a precise and comprehensive assessment, taking stock of the problems and difficulties as well as the opportunities in a given municipality or a given area. Just as the fit of a made-to-measure suit depends on accurate measurements, a customised security plan can only be as good as the assessment of the framework conditions it is designed to deal with.

This means:

First of all, it is necessary to analyse the known security situation, as revealed, for example, in the crime statistics or in the records of the local transport operator. Recognised limitations, such as the problem of unknown cases that are not reported and any factors that may affect reporting behaviour, are to be taken into account in the process.

Second, it is necessary to analyse the subjective sense of security of the citizens or the customers as well as the general problems cited by them.

The modus operandi is therefore important since it is necessary to change the subjective perception and the objective situation. It also provides a better focus on the difference between the subjective sense of security and the objective situation. This analysis draws attention to the situations and circumstances that disturb individual citizens or customers and might otherwise go unnoticed. The analysis may be
made on the basis of a representative but selective survey (e.g. a survey of experts or a series of interviews with opinion formers). If these surveys lead to perceptible change, their consequences are not limited to the information they yield: citizens and customers feel that they and their problems or needs are being taken seriously. Here the value of the analysis lies in the way in which it identifies the problems and fears experienced by citizens and customers and provides for common remedies.

Of particular importance is the task of determining when a problem directly concerns (for example) the operator, when it is a “mixed problem” concerning various institutions, and when the problems that arise or become manifest in the local public transport sphere are actually the responsibility of other authorities and institutions (vagrancy at railway stations, for example). These problems can only be solved in co-operation with other bodies or by other bodies.

In short, an analysis of this kind may have various consequences including more rigorous control and surveillance measures, further preventive measures (including technical ones), and even completely new approaches. It is important to involve all persons and institutions with responsibility in the district from the outset, both in the analysis and in decisions on the conclusions to be drawn from it.

Whenever measures are adopted, it should be borne in mind that the fear of criminal acts per se (i.e. of being the victim of such acts) is actually a secondary concern for most citizens and is often overestimated. If citizens are asked to speak frankly of the problems that threaten them or lower the quality of their lives, only a small minority actually say they feel threatened by crime. If, however, the subject of crime is raised explicitly, the majority of people questioned will acknowledge that it is a problem. They will respond as they would when asked specific questions about particular places or situations. Crime is seen as a problem, not only by older people, but also increasingly by younger people. Various surveys in Germany have revealed a marked fear of crime amongst males aged 14 to 20 and women below 25, together with an associated trend towards behaviour designed to avoid it, particularly on the part of women. These trends point to a decline in the quality of urban life, even in municipalities with rich historical traditions, reflecting as they do the change in the function of the inner city (predominance of the commercial function with the loss of the residential and communications function).

The perceived threat of crime is only one (and by no means the dominant) aspect of the development of the urban environment. One need only consider the much greater importance the public attach to the problem of transport. Thus in all surveys in which citizens are asked “open-ended” questions – i.e. without multiple-choice answers – about the most serious problems in their district, transport problems always come out top.

Why then, even though from a strictly objective standpoint there is often no cause for concern, is the public afraid? A survey I conducted at the beginning of 2000 in four Swiss cities on the subject of victimisation, fear of crime and assessment of the police yielded the following results. As regards the fear of crime and the sense of personal insecurity, the respondents who had themselves been victims of crime were no different from those who had not been victims. However, those who knew somebody who had been a victim of crime exhibited far higher levels of fear and anxiety – and this was true for all areas and in all places, even in the individuals’ own homes, despite the fact that they themselves had not been victims of crime. It is thus clear that “the sense of victimisation resulting from hearsay” has more serious negative effects on the individual’s sense of security and hence quality of life than actual victimisation (this applies in the case of less serious crimes that are not repeated). This means that the communication of insecurity is more important or more threatening than insecurity or security itself. It is well known that a poor image (even in the case of local passenger transport operators) can be acquired very quickly, but can only be shed very slowly and at great expense.
In this and other surveys we focused more closely on precisely what makes the public afraid and what they are afraid of. The public feel afraid wherever it is dark, wherever it is, in the broadest sense, “disorderly” and wherever there are “strangers”. This fear is an indirect expression of the primordial fears which originally served to help and protect man: it was impossible to know whether the intentions of an approaching stranger were good or bad. But this fear has since become more of a burden, paralysing the individual, and is increasingly exploited for socio-political ends.

What lies behind these, objectively speaking, largely unfounded fears? Empirical investigations indicate that a transference occurs, whereby abstract and normal existential fears are channelled into the specific fear of crime. Many citizens see both their own future as individuals and the future of society as something threatening and not as a refuge or a “promised land”. A “political economy of insecurity”, as Bourdieu terms it, is spreading; it is “tormenting the conscious mind and the subconscious”9. But to get through life safely, you need firm ground under your feet and because the ground is becoming more and more shaky, unstable and unreliable, confidence – in the state and its organs, and also in other people – is evaporating10. People withdraw, cut themselves off, deplore the growing egotism, nihilism and cynicism of their contemporaries and call upon strong government, the criminal law and the police to deal with the problems which (so they allege) are caused by others and which (so they believe) can be specifically identified. If the global economy, the struggle for power against a background of organised state terror, the decline of the health service and the uncertainty surrounding pensions are found to be too complex, insufficiently transparent and beyond their control, people will dwell upon the most obvious threats and the “usual suspects”, delivered directly to their homes. At this point the asylum-seeker, the black African drug dealer or the foreigner will generally become a scapegoat for those whose fears are not specifically defined and are therefore uncontrollable. And their attitude receives strong support from politicians inasmuch as they foster the notion that one need simply expel all foreign criminals as quickly as possible (or better still, not let them into the country in the first place), and the problems will be as good as solved.

Sociologists like Jürgen Habermas say that modern societies are marked by increasing individualism in life styles, more and more searching for the meaning of life down various avenues, more marginalisation and more “filtering-down”, the impoverishment of communication and a consequent fall in the level of interaction, lower tolerance thresholds and less willingness to settle conflicts informally, and finally the increasingly inhospitable nature of cities, as described by Alexander Mitscherlich as early as 196911. Furthermore, there are many signs that the social contract that has prevailed for years, indeed centuries, is being rejected, power relationships are hardening and an arrogant liberalism is being proclaimed, which dismisses or even justifies unemployment. Pierre Bourdieu has called this the return of social chauvinism12.

This development gives rise to insecurity, mistrust, fear and greater isolation. Certain visible groups or phenomena (young people, foreigners, disorder) are held to be the cause of developments that arouse negative feelings in the individual, with the result that scapegoats for the changes in society are sought and found. Moreover the subjective sense of being afraid of them can lead to a sense of victimisation, to an excessive preoccupation: everything centres on this one point, both when other causes of fear and anxiety (illness, age, unemployment) are not present and, more especially, when they are, and are expressed through the fear of crime. Whereas people somehow feel personally responsible for illness and health, age and social status, crime has to do with “others people”, “foreigners”, and originates with them. This “scapegoat function” of crime was identified by criminologists a long time ago, but its significance as a factor in people’s sense of security is still not sufficiently recognised.

If people are asked precisely what it is they are fear, about public transport for example, the same old themes resurface – “strangers” and “young people””. “strangers” are strangers to the locality and to the culture, and young people are considered a particular problem if they are not “local”. Accordingly,
where the majority of people are strangers, the sense of personal security is lowest; conversely, in small localities where “everybody knows everybody else” people feel particularly safe. Whether people feel secure or insecure, well or unwell, may well depend on whether they know the other people or not. The question in their minds is: “Can I categorise the people I encounter, and do I know what to expect from them?” In local transport people are faced with a situation in which they are bound to encounter a very large number of strangers, and to an increasing extent. It follows that the situation is bound to be conducive to fear, and we must set out to reduce this fear. To do so it is necessary to learn more of what lies behind these fears and anxieties, so that they may be properly understood. Counter-measures may then be taken, where appropriate. If a person knows the people he has to deal with or the people he encounters, he feels able to categorise the situation in which he finds himself and bring it under control. To the extent that a person is prepared, he is able to adapt his behaviour to make sure he provokes only foreseeable reactions, for “feeling safe” is sometimes just another way of saying “having everything under control”. Encounters with groups of (unknown) youths or young adults demonstrate this point: as soon as a familiar face is identified in the group, the sense of strangeness and uncertainty is lifted and fear is banished.

Particularly unsettling are unfamiliar youths or young adults in gangs who may be behaving in an unusual way. The sense of insecurity is increased by the fact that people are normally alone when they encounter these gangs, because adults usually travel alone (especially on public transport). They therefore feel they are outnumbered by the others and hence insecure. Furthermore a connection is made, consciously or unconsciously, between “hanging around” and deviance and criminality, even if there is no objective proof or suggestion of such a connection. Many of those questioned in the course of the survey I conducted in Switzerland in 2000 said that the reason why they were afraid in certain places in their town (e.g. the station) was that “(they believed) there were assaults around there”\textsuperscript{13}, although this was not necessarily borne out by official statistics.

On the other hand only a fraction of the respondents said that they themselves had been victims of criminal offences in the places they feared. Hearsay, referred to above, clearly plays a more important role here than their own experience. Incidentally these “victims of hearsay” tend to judge security in their cities more harshly than those who have actually been victims and they demand more police patrols, while at the same time judging the work of the police far less favourably than others. For this reason as well greater attention should be given to this group.

In addition to individual fears, signs of security or signs of incivilities play an increasingly important role in this discussion, as does the key factor: “social disorder”. In the course of the survey conducted in Swiss cities, more than 50% of all respondents cited the city stations as places where they felt insecure or at any rate ill at ease. The usual reason given was the presence of “dubious characters”, mainly foreigners whose appearance set them apart from the “natives”. People feel ill at ease in places that are dark and dirty and wherever these particular “strangers” are to be found\textsuperscript{14}. This point also emerged from several surveys conducted some years ago by a research group of which I was a member\textsuperscript{15}.

In one survey I conducted in southern Germany in 2000, the problems (cited in the questionnaire) were rated as follows: of the “other problems”, the ones chiefly identified were dangerous drivers (by up to 53% of the respondents), foreigners or asylum seekers (up to 48%), young people (up to 47%), litter (up to 47%), vandalised telephone booths, drunks and drug addicts (up to 25% each) as well as door-to-door salesmen, house walls covered with graffiti and hostility towards foreigners or right-wing extremism\textsuperscript{16}.

If any group has a sense of being under threat and of having the quality of its life impaired it is the elderly, though also – and increasingly – children and young people, as mentioned above. This fear can
affect everyday behaviour: in the evenings elderly people either stay in their homes or avoid certain places; young people feel afraid both on the way to school and in school. In Great Britain a study by the Home Office in 2001 established that vandalism and graffiti and other damage to property were “serious” or “fairly serious” problems for 32% of the respondents; this figure has risen in recent years and the problem now ranks amongst those most commonly cited, alongside “drug addicts or drug dealers” (33%) and “young people hanging around”, with young people in particular worrying about anti-social behaviour or the prospect of falling victim to it. The study shows that respondents all agree that litter and graffiti have a negative impact on the sense of security. In the conclusions to this study the UK Home Office clearly establishes a statistical connection between disorder, crime and the sense of insecurity; it points out, with reference to a study by the US National Institute of Justice, that the connection is not causal, but that disorder and criminality are particularly rife in areas where social control is minimal and poverty levels are high. This study addressed the question whether public disorder led to crime. In the conclusions the authors show that there is certainly a connection between crime and public disorder, but that disorder is not a direct cause of crime. Rather, the socio-structural conditions of a neighbourhood encourage both at the same time. There is therefore little point in getting rid of disorder if the structural conditions are not also addressed.

These factors detract from the quality of life in specific ways, but they are also of more general significance in that they may create a spiral that transforms roads, paths and squares into places of fear. If, for example, more and more people avoid a certain place after nightfall, the general atmosphere of the place will deteriorate, precisely because it is being deserted – which in turn means that others avoid it, until finally it becomes a no-go area. Fear of crime, whether justified or not, therefore has immense consequences: people avoid certain streets, paths or squares, and as a result they actually do become more empty and more frightening. This is the beginning of a “spiral of fear”: because fewer people are around, the person who happens to be in the area feels more afraid; because he feels more afraid, he avoids the place in future, etc. Many of those I surveyed in Switzerland said that the reason they were afraid was that there was nobody around who could come to their aid in an emergency or if they needed help. Other fears play a crucial role here; thus, elderly people rarely go out alone since they are afraid of falling and lying helpless on the ground.

“Transport”, whether individual or public transport, is an important factor in the problems faced by urban and district authorities. If citizens are asked to name the most serious problems facing their district, this subject invariably comes near the top of the list. In the annual surveys conducted across the USA, “Development/growth/traffic” and “Roads/infrastructure/transportation” are ranked 5th and 6th, after “Education” (ranked 1st), “Crime/violence” (2nd), “drugs/alcohol” (3rd) and “unemployment” (4th). Public transport comes out rather badly in terms of security, at least in the USA. According to a Gallup poll taken in 1998, only 12% of the respondents felt “very safe” and 24% “fairly safe” when using local transport services. On the other hand, 42% or 29% felt very safe or fairly safe respectively when moving around their own residential district, and 59% or 25%, when driving around in their own cars. It is worth noting here that, according to this US study, the sense of security in public transport has clearly deteriorated in recent years, but has improved in other areas (moving around or driving around in one’s own district), and at the same time the sense of security in the USA as a whole has plainly risen (in 2000, 46% of the respondents were of the opinion that there was less crime in their district than in the previous year; in 1990 the figure had only been 18%, in 1981 a mere 8%), and this is especially true of inner-city areas, that is to say the areas where public transport plays a particularly important role (Picture 2).

Public order in a particular district presents a number of different facets and is the result of steps taken by various institutions. The subjective sense of security is a more important – if not the most important – element in what is loosely termed “quality of life” in the post-modern era. The sense of
being able to live without fear of crime and to use public streets and squares and public transport without a care is most marked in periods when basic social provision is best guaranteed and most citizens are not experiencing problems that threaten their very existence. Breaking down subjective fear of crime is an important task and it demands the co-operation of all the institutions in the municipality. These include the local public transport authorities: they too have a special responsibility to address the subjective needs and fears of their customers. Both the police and the public transport operators should not shrink from giving clear information on adverse trends or problems in the district, even if they do not fall within their own area of responsibility.

As to the change in the function of the inner cities, with the increasing dominance of supermarkets and snack-bars and the simultaneous loss of the residential and communications function, the perceived threat of crime is admittedly only one aspect of the adverse trend in the urban environment, though an important one. It is necessary to arrive at a fundamentally different understanding of the problems by considering the root causes. The structural egotism of a fragmented society poses a threat to democratic structures, since democracy means living with and for others. Withdrawal into individualism will lead in the medium term to the erosion of democracies, even those that have hitherto been stable. Without a revival of communication and neighbourliness, no lasting change for the better is possible. It is important that all the institutions in the community be directly involved in dealing with the problems of citizens and that the latter have direct contact with them. If the community is to work together to find flexible answers to the challenges posed by local threats, a new understanding of communal responsibility and entrepreneurial activity is required.

A reliable analysis of the problems is particularly important here since it provides information about situations and circumstances that unsettle the customer and make him feel insecure, even if the problems are not directly related to public security and public order. If information is presented in a way that is impossible or difficult to understand, adding to the difficulty of obtaining the right ticket for the chosen means of transport, the individual’s sense of insecurity will increase and the way will be open to other factors deemed to be “dangerous”.

By way of local security diagnoses or general reviews, it is possible to refer to studies whose object is to examine the subject of “security and confidence” in a specific, localised context. Two points are of central importance here: first, the realisation that immediate surroundings have a particularly important role in shaping the perceptions of the customers (and affecting their behaviour accordingly); second, the recognition that positive change can only be achieved locally and on a small scale. A “multi-agency approach” to a problem is likely to achieve more than an individual approach. It is particularly important to break with the long-standing philosophy of “more of the same” (Watzlawick); we often find that more of something is not necessarily a guarantee of more success. Sometimes less familiar paths must also be trod, if a problem is to be solved. More security personnel, for example, is not always the right solution. It would seem to be more important to convey a realistic picture of the specific threat through public relations work and confidence-building measures. The deployment of security forces – suggestive of the military – in public transport is not suited to the purpose, as it gives the impression of a permanent, massive threat. Thus, in one study on the police presence it was established that the subjective sense of security first increased, as expected, as the police presence intensified, and subsequently declined as it became excessive. In other studies it has been possible to show that the awareness of a police presence tends to be associated with a greater fear of crime. It may be true that the effect of a police presence is not the same in familiar places as in unfamiliar ones. Moreover, there is clearly a threshold, beyond which it is counterproductive to the citizens’ or customers’ sense of security.

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The subject of “graffiti” is so complex, that only fragments of it can be addressed here. The literature on the subject is immense, even though most of the books are on the artistic aspects of graffiti. The term “graffiti”, from the Italian “il graffito”, was introduced into American English at the end of the sixties to denote daubings and inscriptions emanating from the subculture. But graffiti had existed as a means of communication much earlier on (Picture 3). It has been found on the walls of churches, prisons and castles. The National Socialists daubed the slogan “don’t buy from Jews!” as a way of spreading their propaganda, but the resistance also used the medium. The Scholls, for example, called for resistance against the Nazi regime mainly through so-called “template daubings”. The “Solidarnosc” graffiti on walls at the Gdansk shipyard went all over the world. This clearly shows that graffiti is a communication medium, which is – or can be – used by certain groups for the purposes of agitation. Today the “verbal” form of graffiti has rather been pushed to the background and “American graffiti” has come to the fore. The latter takes the form of spray ed or painted writing and pictures, referred to in sprayers’ jargon as “tags” and “pieces”. Tags first saw the light in New York at the end of the sixties, when gangs used them to mark out their territory (picture 3a). From the original “writers”, however, there emerged an increasing number of “artists”, who wished to stand out from the mass and win fame with larger pictures or objects. Then as now “getting fame” was the key to understanding graffiti. The lavish, pictorial displays, called pieces, have always been a particularly good way of becoming known, since they are bigger and more colourful and attract more attention than simple tags. Whether the so-called “graffiti films” (such as George Lucas’s “American Graffiti”), books like “Subway Art” by Martha Cooper or the hip-hop culture were responsible for graffiti’s reaching Europe relatively quickly and taking hold mainly in Western European towns is a matter of debate. It must be acknowledged, however, that the major graffiti movements were to be found in the Western European capitals. In Paris, for example, the use of templates produced a quite independent style, which contrasted with the original American graffiti. In the meantime the academic world has been examining the phenomenon of the graffiti scene very closely and has described its special features. As early as 1962 Bruno Bettelheim described graffiti as “symbolic wounds” to cities and civilisation, and the attempts to interpret the phenomenon psychologically and sociologically have since been legion, as has the number of books on graffiti in particular cities.

The following points are of particular relevance to our own study of graffiti in the context of public transport, particularly rail transport. Nearly all sprayers belong to a group, known as a crew, and sprayers who operate autonomously are the exception. Neither the nationality nor the social status of a member is accorded any importance within the group, the decisive factor being the quality and merit of the finished pictures. The common culture of the scene is reflected notably in its clothes, hairstyles and language. Pieces are sketched out beforehand and noted down in individual “black books”. These black books are the most carefully guarded items of any sprayer; each one contains a documentary record of his “fame”, and can be brought out if, for example, he seeks to join a different group. The tags of other sprayers should not be copied and the tags and pieces of other sprayers should not be painted over.

An essential element for the sprayers is the illegality of graffiti. Special “fame” is attained by “bombing”, the illegal spraying of walls or objects. Legally sprayed pictures are regarded as boring, regardless of their quality, since their production involves no danger and therefore holds no attraction. In the graffiti scene this outlook is fundamental to the notions of “fame” and “respect”, which are central to an understanding of the graffiti phenomenon.
If this initial point is taken into consideration, it is understandable that the spraying of a train rates fairly highly in the sprayer’s scale of achievements. The risk of being caught is particularly high here, as is the risk associated with the actual production of graffiti if the sprayer has to work on a railway track or on a moving train. On the other hand, the public profile of a “bombed” train is very high and fame and respect are always guaranteed. The most exquisite experience for a sprayer is to see a train running the morning after he has been working on it and there are books devoted exclusively to graffiti on trains. Train graffiti is seen as an urban crisis and as the basis of feelings of insecurity, but it is also treated as an art form (pictures 4 and 5).

Graffiti and those who spray it normally have a non-violent, even pacifist character, although a higher propensity to violence has been noted in isolated cases (towards train guards, for example, and even inside the graffiti scene), together with a higher incidence of train spraying and an increase in “criminal energy” (use of disguise, greater strategic planning, etc.). The depiction of violence is admittedly very much in evidence in individual pictures, but violence is not glorified. Sprayers thus regard themselves as non-violent; damage to somebody else’s property is seen as perfectly justified, being associated with the demarcation of territory, a phenomenon that was investigated and described by academics quite early on. Consumption of hard drugs, such as heroin or crack, or the excessive consumption of alcohol, is frowned upon by sprayers, since it makes them unfit for work.

The Internet is gaining increasing importance as a means of communication for sprayers and also as a forum in which to document their “fame”. Groups of sprayers as well as individuals, show their work on the Internet (pictures 6 and 7), crews are formed, information on places where spraying can be safely carried out (yards) is disseminated and views are exchanged (picture 8).

The Internet is also used for the purposes of advertising (e.g. spray-cans, picture 9, and suitable clothing, picture 10), like the magazines in which train graffiti, for example, is exhibited (picture 9a).

2.1. Possible preventive and punitive measures: What works? What does not work?

In considering preventive measures it is particularly important to recognise that any moves to make the daubing of certain walls, trams or trains legal or even to pay people for doing it are clearly doomed to failure. They would not lead to a reduction in the amount of illegal graffiti because sprayers who work predominantly or exclusively where graffiti is allowed or in exchange for money are held in contempt in the graffiti scene. In the same way the provision of special surfaces, on which graffiti may be painted, is not the right way to prevent the practice.

The use of an anti-graffiti lacquer has proved to be effective, however. This is a transparent paint, which provides a protective coating and prevents the enamel paint from penetrating the paint below, thus making cleaning very much easier. In nearly all the major German cities protective coatings of this kind are now applied to surfaces that are especially targeted by sprayers.

The fast and simple removal of tags and pieces has also proved to be effective, with the sprayer not always achieving the success he seeks and becoming involved in a “war of attrition” with the authorities that remove the paint. Also worthy of note here is a certain “displacement effect”: the districts or areas that are either protected or immediately cleaned of graffiti are avoided and the sprayers switch to other areas.

However, preventive measures to hinder the sprayers may be best implemented in conjunction with certain aspects of community crime prevention, and also with crime prevention measures in schools.
As to punitive measures, so-called “restitution, whereby sprayers are required to remove their own illegal graffiti as a punishment, has proved its worth, in Germany at any rate. Some cities even make their own “anti-graffiti” vehicles, containing the necessary cleaning materials, available for this purpose. (picture 37).

The rigorous prosecution of graffiti sprayers, involving fines, custodial sentences and compensation payments, must always be considered in the light of the possibility that it will exacerbate the situation in which a young person finds himself, with the risk that he will be driven still further into the graffiti scene.

The research projects that focus on the problem of youth sub-culture in the inner cities should be given more attention than they have received hitherto and should be taken into account when preventive measures are devised. These studies may at least help us gain a better understanding of the behaviour of young people (and not only in relation to graffiti) and to find a measured response to it.

Research projects, studies and seminars on the role of urban authorities in dealing with crime and urban insecurity should also be explored and their findings implemented in the cities concerned. On the other hand, preventive activity by the police, if properly thought out and rigorously pursued, makes a lot of sense and is very successful. Thus the State Office for Criminal Investigation Saxony, which was very successful in using preventive measures and sanctions to deal with right-wing extremism, has shown that a combined approach, in which leaflets are issued, parents are informed, sprayers and wounded parties are involved and offensive police action is taken, is an effective way of clamping down on unwanted graffiti (picture 11). With the establishment in Berlin of a supra-regional, interstate joint task force on graffiti, in which state and federal police co-operate, information can now be exchanged and co-ordinated action taken against sprayers (picture 12).

3. SECURITY IN PUBLIC TRANSPORT: RESULTS OF A SURVEY

Between April and December 2001 the author conducted a survey in a total of 19 European countries and 29 major cities. The mayors were sent a letter (picture 13) asking them for information on the subject of security in local public transport. Contact was also made with transport operators in Geneva, where a computerised documentation and analysis system is in place.

Of the countries canvassed, answers were received from a total of 17 cities from 12 countries (or the corresponding transport operators). These were:

- Belgium: Brussels
- Germany: Berlin, Bochum, Chemnitz, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich
- England: London
- Finland: Helsinki
- France: Paris
- Ireland: Dublin
- Netherlands: Rotterdam

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− Austria: Vienna
− Sweden: Stockholm
− Switzerland: Geneva
− Czech Republic: Prague
− Hungary: Budapest

In some cases the mayor passed on the questions to the city transport authority or the local passenger transport operator, so that there were no answers from the municipality as such. This illustrates the fact that many municipalities still fail to realise that questions related to problems of security and public order in public transport must also be the particular concern of such organs of local government as the mayor’s office and the city council. As in the general area of crime, where the municipalities refused responsibility for a long time and the police were regarded as the sole competent institution, a shift in thinking on the part of the city fathers is required: even where public transport is no longer the direct responsibility of the municipality (as a result of privatisation or the establishment of state enterprises), the problem of actual security and the subjective sense of security in buses and trains, at bus stops and stations is a problem for the city and the local authority.

The fact that some cities did not respond at all may be interpreted in a number of ways. It is certainly true that some cities still believe that by reporting on problems connected with security and public order in public transport they run the risk of damaging their image. It must, however, be acknowledged that this is a short-sighted attitude; those cities that take the matter up in an active and committed way (in Germany Berlin and Bochum, for example) show that they take the fears and anxieties of their citizens and customers seriously and are prepared to respond to them. But it may also fall to the workshops or the European Conference of Ministers of Transport, to request that municipalities deal more openly and more decisively with these problems.

### 3.1. On the range of the problems

The range and the importance of problems of security and public order are viewed differently. Some cities have sent illustrative pictures on the subject of graffiti and vandalism (pictures 14-32).

The RET, responsible for public transport in Rotterdam, writes as follows: “The kind of problems in our passenger transport system relevant for public security vary greatly. In general, these problems are a reflection of the problems in today’s society and unfortunately they also occur frequently in our public transport system.”

In Frankfurt around 1.5 million Euro is spent annually on repairing damage to stations and vehicles, and the transport operator in Helsinki reports: “The costs of vandalism and graffiti to Helsinki City Transport is about Euro 530 000/year. This amount covers the cleaning of graffiti inside and outside trams, trains and buses, broken seats, scratched windows and walls. There is also misuse of the emergency brakes of lifts and escalators. In addition same trams and trains have to be taken off the line because of graffiti. The cost of unused lines is difficult to calculate.” In Stockholm the annual cost of graffiti and vandalism is around 10 million Euro, the problem being more serious in commuter trains and in the underground. In Berlin the annual cost for the city trains and the underground is assumed to be over 12 million Euros. Picture 33 illustrates the trend in graffiti and vandalism in one federal state (Saxony) in recent years. It is clear that despite rigorous preventive and punitive action, there has been a definite increase, which must also be apparent in other places.
In Prague the level of vandalism has risen sharply in the past ten years. Only about 80 offenders are caught in any one year, and most vandals are never traced. The offenders who are caught are aged between 12 and 20.

Dublin reports: “Graffiti is an ongoing problem, and occurs in general on vehicles working in socially deprived areas.” On the subject of vandalism Dublin also reported: “Vandalism occurs both inside and outside the vehicle. Inside, it usually involves tearing cushions and back rests with knives, pulling seat frames from the floor, kicking out windows and damaging light shades. Outside the vehicle, vandalism is usually confined to stone throwing incidents, resulting in window breakage and panel damage. On-bus video cameras can assist in identifying on-bus vandals. Vehicles working in high-risk areas, particularly at night, are fitted with this equipment. The presence in the area of a mobile Inspector, who has contact with Gardai (the Irish Police Force, TF), ensures that there is a rapid response to a call for assistance from the driver. In one depot, the windows on all double-deck buses are fitted with a plastic film. This is designed to reduce the risk of a missile penetrating the glass and endangering the driver or our customers. This procedure is very successful in reducing injury to customers and driver. However, it is expensive to maintain, as it can be scratched with a knife or sharp object.” Chemnitz (D) also reported that “scratching” was very widespread and that the unsettling effect of dogs in public transport was a particular focus of attention, since it added to the passengers’ sense of insecurity.

3.2. Preventive measures

Helsinki submitted the following report: “In co-operation with Helsinki City Public Works Department, we have initiated a “Stop to graffiti and vandalism” project. The purpose of this project is to minimise the costs caused by removing the graffiti and scratches on windows and to prevent them. An attempt has been made to solve the problems by increased co-operation with police, communication and control. The most important measures in this project are:

− additional control in trams and trains;
− the graffiti will be cleaned immediately, “graffiti causes more graffiti”;
− if the trams and trains are clean, the follow-up control is easier, because the guards often know who produced the graffiti;
− before cleaning, the graffiti is photographed for later reference.
− the media will not been informed of graffiti.

The concrete target of the project is to cut the cleaning costs by 20%. In addition the inconvenience to the passengers will decrease. Other solutions - outside this project - are to cover the walls and windows with film, because it is easier and cheaper to change the film than the window or the wall. Where the criminal was caught trials have been conducted in co-operation with social authorities, in which he (or she) was made to clean the tram he/she painted. This solution has not been used very often and it has not been very successful for Helsinki City Transport.”

Rotterdam reported the following: “The solutions to these problems are as diverse as the problems themselves. At the moment, we are working on a fully closed boarding system, which is considered a basic facility in public transport. The necessary organisational, constructional and technical measures increase public security both for passengers and employees. In addition to the excellent effects of these measures on prevention and enforcement effect, an adequate scheme for the observance of safety should result in an optimum number of measures to increase safety in public transport. This approach was largely applied during the European Football Championship 2000 with very promising results. In addition to the responsibility of the RET itself, close co-operation with the other relevant partners in this
process (police, the legal and the municipal authorities) is laid down under a public transport enforcement arrangement. Unfortunately, incidents cannot always be prevented, so all parties involved have set up a ‘violence protocol’, which should lead to an adequate settlement after an incident.”

Brussels wrote: “In order to clamp down on this activity as much as possible, the STIB is cleaning these vehicles itself. As for the metro stations, a private cleaning company is required under the terms of its contract to get rid of graffiti within 72 hours. A protective coating is applied to the walls of the Metro stations. In 1999, following an upsurge in acts of vandalism and assaults on drivers, a further operations and investment programme, intended to improve security, was adopted. It provided in particular for:

- A stronger security presence on the network with the deployment of inspectors, stewards, guards and dog-handlers;
- Greater security in fixed installations and dead-end sidings through intruder-detection systems;
- Video-surveillance systems on metro carriages, trams and buses”.

Paris reported the following: “As to the security of people and goods, the most serious problem for our passengers is the increased incidence of pick-pocketing on the rail network. As to vandalism, two matters are of concern to us: first the throwing of objects at buses serving the suburban zones, which causes damage and more importantly increases our drivers’ sense of insecurity, and second, the daubing of graffiti tags and the scratching of windows on the rail network.

For tags and graffiti, apart from the human surveillance exercised by various officials, technical measures are taken to protect rolling stock and fixed installations: surfaces are covered with film or coated with varnish. Moreover, the efficiency of the procedures means that the cleaning work can be done as quickly as possible so that passengers may be given the quality of service they expect. Damage resulting from scratching (windows, lower body work) is still our principal concern since the RATP can find no satisfactory solution.”

Other cities [e.g. Stockholm (S), Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg and Chemnitz (D)] also report that the use of new, vandal-proof materials and anti-graffiti coatings on surfaces likely to be sprayed, together with tightened security measures, have helped bring about a reduction in the amount of damage done by vandals and in the cost of making it good. The products used include the so-called “sacrificial” wax coatings. These measures are part-financed (Chemnitz) by public grants. The object is mainly to remove graffiti quickly (in Brussels within 72 hours, in Frankfurt and Munich within 48 hours, in Berlin within 24 hours) or to withdraw uncleaned trains from service immediately (e.g. in Berlin, Geneva, Stockholm). In Dublin “non-porous roof and side-wall panelling” is used, which is easy to clean. “Moquette seat covering is chosen (dark colours) which masks felt tip pen, etc. Cleaning programmes and reporting of graffiti ensure that graffiti is maintained at a manageable level.”

Nevertheless, the reduction in criminal offences achieved by such measures is not always clear. The statement by the Hamburg transport authority to the effect that such a reduction led to a greater sense of security is rather contradicted by an answer to a question put on 3.7.01 in the Hamburg Senate. It read as follows: “On 30 May 2001, Mayor Runde made the following statement to councillors on the question of security in public transport facilities in so far as it affected citizens: ‘In the matter of security in public transport, a great deal has happened in the past few years. Considerable progress has been made. Unfortunately this progress has not been reflected in any change in the subjective sense of security.’”

According to a special survey, the number of criminal offences in Hamburg’s public transport did indeed fall from 1 984 in 1997 to 1 537 in 1999; though it rose again to 1 768 in 2000. It must,
however, be borne in mind that several million passengers use Hamburg’s trains and buses every year. In Munich, the transport operators maintain that a mere 4% of all offences happen in the underground, which carries 800,000 people travel every day. The Berlin authorities were admittedly able to achieve a massive reduction in the number of offences recorded in the urban railway and the underground between 1992 and 1998 (theft fell from 638 to 124 and assault from 947 to 403\(^{44}\)); nevertheless, the sense of security in the daytime has not improved, and at night-time, in the underground and on the buses, it has even deteriorated\(^{45}\). Even in Stockholm the possibility of reducing graffiti by such methods is viewed rather sceptically. In fact, the problem has rather worsened there in recent years, despite these measures.

3.3. Security personnel

Security in trains and buses is mainly the responsibility of people directly employed by the transport operator, though it is often the responsibility of private security firms (in Stockholm, for example, where these firms also collect information about, for example, the graffiti milieu), and sometimes of a combination of different officers (for example in Berlin, where the transport operator’s own personnel patrol with the police and Federal Border Guard and where private security firms are also used; in other cities the police and the security firms patrol together). It is always emphasized that this work is carried out in close co-operation with the police. In Paris around 1,000 people are employed by the transport operator (RATP) in the “Groupe de Protection et de Sécurisation des Réseaux”. Brussels (Belgium) has its own “Police Fédérale du Métro”, to watch over the buildings and grounds of the “Service Contrôle et Gardiennage de la STIB”. In Copenhagen (DK) it is reported that a “private company” has been very successful, deploying young people “who speak like the vandals” in the urban rail network. In an automated metro, due to come on stream in Copenhagen at the end of 2002, “metro stewards” are to be employed (picture 40).

In Frankfurt a third of the trains operating after 9.00 p.m. are accompanied by security personnel. In addition “meeting points” surveyed by cameras are equipped with intercom systems. Munich uses plain-clothes investigators to catch offenders: “In this way we were able to catch as many as 4 (!?, TF) offenders in 2001 (by the end of September, TF)”.

3.4. Video surveillance and electronic monitoring

In Copenhagen (DK) the local operators reported that video-surveillance in buses and trains was “very successful”. Cameras have now been installed in practically all city stations to differing degrees and also in city trains, trams and buses (in London and Brussels, for example).

3.5. Expulsions, etc.

In Frankfurt “a comparatively high number of people are expelled from transport facilities every day because they infringe regulations. They include those selling and looking for drugs, beggars and people sleeping rough.” This is certainly the case in many, if not all stations, and to some extent even in outdoor areas (as in Stuttgart, for example), though this is rarely stated explicitly by respondents.

3.6. Other matters

In Copenhagen the abolition of the sale of 10-ticket “carnets” on buses, which means that the bus driver handles less money, has proved to be very successful.
In Chemnitz (D) the seating arrangements in the parts of buses further away from the driver have been changed, so that the driver is able to have a better view of the rows towards the rear.

In Berlin only such trains are procured as allow access from the first coach to the last. Call boxes for passengers and transparent security screens have also been introduced.

Human contact and passenger control is deliberately employed in Berlin to increase the feeling of security on short trains during off-peak periods. It is only possible to get onto buses after 8.00 p.m. by going past the driver, who inspects the tickets.

In Frankfurt the end walls of the passenger compartments have been made transparent so that the driver can easily see into them.

In Dublin the introduction of “Autofare” has led to a fall in the number of robberies: “Since the introduction of Autofare, attacks on drivers, with robbery as the motive have all but disappeared. However, aggressive customers continue to be a problem, and to protect drivers from attack, we have security screens fitted to all our vehicles. As in the case of vandalism, on-bus video cameras are positioned above the driver, which will assist in identifying an assailant. Cab radio gives contact with Inspectors, and an assault siren attracts attention in the event of attack.”

In Stockholm events are staged in schools by the transport services for the information of 11-12 year-olds; similar events also take place in London.

Stockholm also reports a number of joint projects with industry, organisations and the municipality, though without providing specific information about them.

In Prague increased surveillance by police and security personnel of areas where the risk of crime is particularly high is regarded as an effective measure.

Also in Prague, the courts increasingly sentence people to community service, the work being to remove graffiti. However, the authorities there have still not had much experience of this “restitution”, which is used more often in Germany to very good effect (picture 37).

Prague magistrates have also made certain public places freely available to sprayers (walls, underground passages, industrial buildings), though this measure has not solved the problems or brought about a reduction in illegal graffiti.

It was expressly pointed out, by Stockholm for example, that the actual objective effects of punitive and preventive measures cannot be proven, or only with great difficulty; the measures are nevertheless being implemented more and more in order to raise the subjective sense of security of citizens and public. “The greatest problem caused by graffiti and malicious damage is that it contributes to insecurity and reduces the appeal of public transport.” Berlin also writes on this point: “The number of offences against the person on public transport must be rated as fairly low compared with the number in other public places, even though the public assumes the danger to be greater there. Increasing the subjective sense of security is therefore a priority in passenger security.” Accordingly a “security scheme for public transport” has been drawn up by the Berlin Council in collaboration with the local transport operators.
4. POTENTIAL FOR CRIME PREVENTION AND PROPOSED MEASURES:  
A PUBLIC TRANSPORT SYSTEM THAT MEETS CUSTOMERS' REQUIREMENTS  
AND PROVIDES A SERVICE

A security scheme that meets with the agreement of all concerned should be worth recommending to cities that wish to wage a focused and intensive struggle against the problem of insecurity and unlawfulness in public transport. Meeting customers’ needs and providing a service are without doubt the overriding goals of a modern service-orientated local public transport service. This is true for both privately and publicly owned undertakings and for any mixed forms in the sector. But catering for public need must also involve recognition of the fact that the subjective feeling of security plays an important role in the customers’ choice of transport. As long as the citizen prefers his own car, and hence individual transport, not only for reasons of comfort but also for reasons of security, public transport will have difficulty in competing. The solution to the problem therefore consists in actively addressing problems connected with security and public order, never ignoring them and attempting to deal adequately with the fears and needs of customers. A combination of security and order, cleanliness and comfort are the key to an attractive public transport system.

The following factors are important here:

− Technical modernisation in stations (information systems, sale of tickets, etc.) and on buses and trains;
− Awareness of customers’ requirements regarding frequency and ease of transport (less changing, more frequent connections);
− No overloading of coaches or vehicles (as a prevention against pick-pocketing!);
− An adequate degree of comfort;
− Value for money;
− Service (guidance, brochures, etc.);
− Security;
− Cleanliness.

By way of example, the measures adopted in Berlin (D) and Bochum (D) are presented in conclusion. Intensive work has also been undertaken in the former Eastern Bloc countries, as is shown by the example of Budapest (picture 34), where the transport operators commissioned an extensive report on the problems faced. Unfortunately it is only available in Hungarian.

Just how the available data can be processed, so that a regional approach to security might be worked out, is shown by the example of the Geneva transport operators (picture 36). They “intuitively” recognised that there was a connection between painted or sprayed vehicles on the one hand and the sense of security and the level of fare-dodging (!) on the other and they set out to investigate this connection using statistical and diagrammatic methods (comparable to “crime mapping”). In this way it was possible to build up a visually impressive picture of the problem areas, with which it was possible to devise targeted (and hence effective and low-cost) preventive strategies. Moreover, the following point was taken up at an ISO 1400 environmental protection project in Geneva:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUISANCE: visual nuisance</th>
<th>Graffiti, uncontrolled posting and vandalism at bus stops and on vehicles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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4.1. Berlin

The “security plan for local public transport”, worked out by the Berlin Senate (the Berlin popular assembly) in collaboration with the transport operators, proceeds on the basis of the following assumptions:

“According to a special survey conducted in the traditional way by the police crime statistics office, the number of offences in public transport fell to 8,043 in 1998 compared with 13,739 in 1997. In 1998, the Berlin transport operators (BVG) and the urban railway (S-Bahn Berlin GmbH) transported a total of 1,030 million passengers; in light of this figure, the risk of being the object of a threat or the actual victim of a crime is very remote. In 1998 the ratio of the number of recorded crimes in public transport (police input statistics) to the number of passengers transported was 0.000008. The Berlin public transport system is therefore safer than people think... Willingness to use public transport is influenced by individual judgement, and negative assessments are frequently based on fear of harassment, assault and other crimes. The latter are held to be characteristic of the public transport system and this perception fosters its negative image. Dirt, vandalism and social problems such as drug-taking and vagrancy, which are also found in public transport, may reinforce the assumption that the public transport universe is anonymous and uncontrolled.”

Of particular interest is an analysis of this question which shows how low the risks incurred in public transport are. For Berlin a comparison of the total number of crimes recorded by the police with the number of crimes against passengers on public transport yields the following figures (offences per 100,000 inhabitants) for 1998:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Berlin total</th>
<th>Public transport</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total theft</td>
<td>250.1</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pick-pocketing</td>
<td>556.8</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical injury</td>
<td>1,182.9</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex offences</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whereas 95% of customers feel “safe” on the urban railway in the daytime, only 47% feel the same in the evening and at night (after 8.00 p.m.). In other words, more than half of the customers no longer feel safe in the evening and night.

The report infers from the survey that the public mainly judge the hours of the evening and the night to be unsafe. “Fear is rooted primarily in the individual’s own experience and the experiences he has witnessed, but also in what he hears in his own personal circle and in the media. Crime and violence are given spectacular coverage by the media. Because most people do not have precise information about the prevalence of crime and the danger presented by particular places and situations, individual perceptions are of great significance. The media influence personal opinion and kindle anxieties.”
From a survey conducted on behalf of the transport operators, a breakdown of different people’s experience of crime in public transport shows that only a fraction of the respondents had had first-hand experience (personal experience/victimisation). Others had heard about an incident from relatives/acquaintances or had witnessed an incident and the rest had had no personal experience of any incident. “Reports about incidents in public transport in newspapers and on television may also be regarded as second-hand experiences. The respondents admittedly felt these reports to be exaggerated but many were nevertheless unsettled by them.”

About two-thirds of the respondents said that they sometimes had an unpleasant feeling when travelling in the underground, although nothing actually occurred. Very often this unpleasant, insecure feeling was not due to events that had anything to do with security; however, certain situations were cited, which may be categorised as follows. They include a feeling of insecurity caused by:

- particular persons/groups (58.8 %);
- structural factors, such as blind passageways, inadequate lighting, the lack of surveillance equipment (34.0 %);
- the actual or apparent absence of staff (11.2%).

According to the report, the current approach to security in public transport assumes “that passengers’ sense of security is both determined by subjective factors (such as being alone at empty stations, actual or supposed vulnerability to attacks, agoraphobia, lack of trust in the running of the transport operation, loss of direction) and unfavourably affected by actual shortcomings (such as insufficient surveillance, absence of staff, inadequacy of procedures for helping passengers in emergencies or lack of knowledge about them, blind spots and dark areas in railway stations, lack of cleanliness, insufficient information for passengers).”

In order to improve the passengers’ real and subjective sense of security, the main effort in Berlin is now to be concentrated on the following areas:

- Deployment of personnel;
- Structural/technical and operational measures;
- Improving outward appearances;
- Support for railways, sponsorship, Streetball-Night for young people;
- Improving information resources and data distribution;
- Increasing the number of security personnel (by employing beneficiaries of social benefit, unemployed persons, etc.);
- Introduction of a ban on transporting goods (this measure has already been adopted in other cities, to good effect);
- Ban on smoking and drinking alcohol;
- Payment of compensation as punishment for breach of contract in the framework of a transportation contract.

The report goes on to say: “In recent years new, effective strategies have been worked out to improve customer care and security; these strategies call for mobile customer care and security personnel, whose flexibility allows them to control not only the platforms, but also the vehicles and the whole station area; the personnel will be very well placed to learn about the security requirements of passengers by listening to the customers themselves. The checker, who until now never moved from his office, will be superseded by the mobile passenger service team. The care of the station will be ensured through a flexible deployment strategy. ... When this measure is implemented, emergency-
call/information columns (NIS) will also be installed. In this way a combination of technology and personnel will be in place for the greater security of passengers.”

Another priority in all measures pertaining to the urban rail network is to increase passengers’ subjective sense of security. There are plans to fit surveillance cameras in trains in the future, and emergency intercom systems that could link passengers to security centres are also envisaged.

Under the heading “Public relations work and promotion of social responsibility” the following is written: “An improvement in the social atmosphere might encourage respect for authority in public transport. To effect such an improvement, passengers should identify with their public transport service, regarding it as their own means of transport. Young people in particular should be involved here; attractive offers should be introduced to appeal directly to problem groups. ... The passenger should know how to behave in conflict situations, so that he can protect himself and exert a calming influence on others. The mutual mistrust and prejudice that exists between the passengers and the transport service employees or security forces must therefore be diminished. The transport operators are accordingly increasing their public relations effort. ... For example, suitable BVG employees are visiting schools at different points in the region, where they are able to talk to the teaching staff and the pupils with a view to encouraging a common appreciation of other people’s needs. Through activities such as the BVG-Club, an attempt is made to engage with young people on their own ground, to converse with them and convey a different notion of the value of public transport. Young people should be encouraged to feel that public transport is their personal concern, so that they realise that their own interests are affected if trains are unable to run because they have been damaged. In addition there is a constant flow of information targeted at specific groups, there are open days, works tours and lectures, particularly for schools and kindergartens, which aim to promote a better appreciation of public transport.”

The Berlin transport operators, working in collaboration with the IHK (chamber of commerce and industry), the Technical University of Berlin (university sports centre) and the Berlin State Police School, also devised a scheme to train “specialised service and security staff for public transport”, which was tried out in a pilot project conducted in September and November 1998. Thirteen members of the BVG staff, employed in the passenger security field, were given further specialist training. The course combined theory and practice to develop communication, conflict resolution and self-defence skills. The object of the training was not to enable staff to take on the work done by the police, but to equip them to defuse critical situations and ease conflicts.

4.2. Bochum

Rather than take such lavish, wide-ranging measures, which are clearly not feasible in all cities, the city of Bochum adopted another, more flexible approach. Germany’s first regional centre for security and prevention (ZeRP) was established there. The object of this centre was to co-ordinate and further improve the arrangements for security and public order in Bochum and the neighbouring cities and districts. Here too the authorities note: “There is no objective risk to security. The public nevertheless see things in stations or on vehicles which, when taken in conjunction with the frequently alarming news reports, have a negative impact on their sense of security.” The ZeRP co-ordinates general measures – against graffiti, alcohol, etc. – and has devised a set of “preventive instruments”: police and service personnel patrol together, moveable emergency telephone booths have been made available, police officers have been granted the same rights as service officials, a Schalke 04 supporters club has been established, “black spots” at certain stops have been removed, employee are trained in the defusing of conflicts and in the prevention of crimes against foreigners, events on security are staged for elderly persons and children, bus stops are sponsored by schools, constantly updated travel-information boards have been introduced, the authorities talk to young fare-dodgers instead of punishing them, etc. The
“pupils as transport stewards” scheme seems particularly interesting. Pupils in the 8th grade (15-16 year-olds) who have been given appropriate training by the police and transport operators and issued with service passes act as stewards in school buses, settling conflicts, preventing vandalism and serving as a contact (picture 35). At present there are more than 200 transport stewards in place.

The following achievements are cited:

− Fall in vandalism;
− Greater safety on the way to school;
− Better quality transport;
− Considerably fewer complaints from parents, pupils, teachers and drivers;
− Higher level of general contentment and better communication between all those concerned;
− Clear enhancement of moral courage and sense of responsibility in the pupils actively involved.

5. TERRORISM AS A THREAT IN PUBLIC TRANSPORT?

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the USA have raised the question of the threat to public transport posed by terrorism. A detailed answer to this question cannot be given at this point for the following reasons:

− The term “terrorism” is not clearly defined, despite the fact that it is used so much at present, or for precisely that reason.
− In any case there is no “terrorism” as such; there are different groups, motivated by religious, political and other concerns, who operate both at local and at trans-regional level.
− At the present time (end of 2001) there has been no official warning that local public transport is likely to be targeted by “terrorists”.
− Concern over “terrorist” threats to public transport must be distinguished from concern over “everyday” problems of security and public order in this area. Otherwise it will not be possible to do justice to either topic.

Despite these reservations, it must be acknowledged that local public transport is particularly vulnerable and susceptible to “terrorist” attack; it would be impossible – as attacks in Japan (Tokyo) and in Germany have shown – to give it blanket protection, but at the same time, a considerable amount of damage can be done at relatively little cost. It cannot therefore be ruled out that terrorist groups, or indeed individuals, will attempt to seize the opportunity it offers to arouse attention and bring their objectives to public notice. The assumption that used to prevail – namely that such groups would not carry out attacks of this kind because “ordinary people” would suffer and those responsible would therefore have to reckon with a collective condemnation of their action – can certainly not be sustained after 11 September 2001, indeed it had already ceased to be valid after the attacks on the Tokyo underground. For this reason it is necessary to draw up a properly substantiated analysis of the threat posed to public transport by such action. Like other analyses of security, it will have to be tailored to a specific situation, i.e. it must take account of factors in a particular region.
6. CONCLUSIONS

Security in public spaces is increasingly becoming an important and topical theme in the debate about society. Communal responsibility (in relation to the security of streets and open areas) is a factor in the debate, as is the responsibility of the bodies responsible for local public transport.

These responsibilities cannot be separated in the modern community, even if public transport is in private hands. Streets and open areas on the one hand, and bus stops and stations on the other are inextricably linked and often represent important centres of communication in a district. The drafting of a modern security plan for public transport therefore calls for close co-operation between the local authority, local businesses (shops, restaurants, entertainment centres, etc.) and the transport operators.

In view of the general significance and sociological implications of such a security plan, overall responsibility for it must fall to the local council.

A suitable security plan depends on a sound analysis of the security issues, which must take account of the actual security situation and of the citizens’ and customers’ subjective sense of security.

Security and public order are essential considerations if local transport is to be customer-orientated and service-orientated; in modern enterprises this point is taken for granted. The whole range of services offered must accordingly be examined in the light of these considerations and, where necessary, adapted.

A security plan must be drawn up in such a way that no section of the population is systematically excluded or disadvantaged. Public transport must fulfil its special responsibility by ensuring that appropriate provision is made for marginal groups, members of sub-cultures and the socially needy.

Measures to improve security and order in public transport must be harmonised and co-ordinated. If not they may be dysfunctional and the effects of one may invalidate those of another.

Responsibilities for security and public order in a public transport undertaking must be clearly regulated; to that end it is recommended that the undertaking sets up its own “task force”, which should also take account of the subjective sense of security. Such a “task force” should include sociologists and psychologists.

The analyses, solutions and conclusions of the work on security and order in public transport must be openly available to citizens and customers, this being in the undertakings own interest.

The studies carried out in many cities and districts in Europe, like the draft solutions and projects, do not lend themselves to publication, exchange and public discussion as easily as they used to. An attempt should be made to establish Europe-wide standards for security and public order in the form of “best practice models”. The European Union should be asked to sponsor innovative projects, as it does in other fields. In particular, it is important to step up communication and the exchange of information between Western and Eastern European cities.
NOTES


7. Most recently in a poll conducted by the Vienna “Kurier” in October 2000; cf. Feltes, Th., Im Namen des Gesetzes: Über Polizei und öffentliche (Un-)Sicherheit. In: Die Bundespolizei (Österreich) 3, 2001, pp. 52-60. Moreover, given the high risk of being a road accident victim, considerably higher than the risk of being a “traditional” crime victim, the problems of road safety, for example, merit particular attention. In Germany the likelihood of being the victim of a road accident is three times higher than that of being a crime victim, and the risk of being injured in a road accident is ten times higher than the risk of being mugged.

8. Th. Feltes, Die Angst des Opfers vom Hörensagen: Warum sind Nicht-Opfer ängstlicher als Opfer? (Ms. 2002)


10. Baumann, loc cit.


16. These figures must, however, be interpreted very carefully, since experience shows that these items are cited more frequently than they would be if open-ended questions were asked. This explains, for example, the different answer normally given if people are asked open-ended questions about the juvenile crime “problem”. If this answer is presented as an option, more than half of the respondents normally cite it as a problem. But if people are asked about the “most serious problems in the district”, it comes at the bottom of the list or under “others” and accounts for at most 5 to 10% of the examples cited.


18. op cit., Table 5, p. 5

19. op cit., p. 6

20. Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush, Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods – Does it lead to crime?


21. Sourcebook of criminal justice statistics online, Table 2.0015; www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t20015.pdf


26. Reuband op. cit., p. 115


34. M. Cooper, H. Chalfant, Subway Art, 1989

35. LKA Sachsen, KPK-Arbeitsgebiet Graffiti, Sachstandbericht 2000, Dresden


37. Cf., for example, the seminar report Youth Cultures and the Modernisation: a world in the making? Part of the European Council project “The Europe of cultural cooperation”

http://culture.coe.fr/../../../postsummit/citizenship/documents/eseminar981208refdoc.htm

38. Cf., for example, Crime and Urban Insecurity in Europe: The role of local authorities. CLRAE recommendation, at www.cm.coe.int/dec/2001/745/126.htm

39. Letters were sent to the following countries and cities: Belgium: Brussels; Germany: Bochum, Chemnitz, Munich, Cologne, Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg; Denmark: Copenhagen; England: London; Finland: Helsinki; France: Paris, Marseilles; Ireland: Dublin; Italy: Rome, Mailand; Netherlands: Amsterdam, Rotterdam; Norway: Oslo; Austria: Vienna; Poland: Warssaw;
40. Information on this was made available by the head of the transport company, Herr Christoph Stucki (stucki.c@tpg.ch), to whom I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks.

41. No responses were forthcoming from Amsterdam, Glasgow, Cologne, Copenhagen, Lisbon, Madrid, Mailand, Marseilles, Moscow, Oslo, Rome, St. Petersburg, Warsaw. The other responses were mainly given by the local transport operator, for Prague by Prof. Dr. Jan Musil of the police college and for Budapest by Endre Balogh (also from the police college), each with the agreement of the local transport operator. I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to these colleagues and to the city authorities, who helped with the survey.

42. Drucksache 16/6378, 10.7.01.

43. Reported crimes include threatening behaviour, coercion, criminal damage, obstruction as well as more serious offences.

44. Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, Drucksache 13/4172, p. 4.


47. Unfortunately, no comparable reports or schemes were presented by other non-German cities.


49. see: [http://www.tpg.ch/environnement/objectifs/objectifs_en.html](http://www.tpg.ch/environnement/objectifs/objectifs_en.html)

50. BOGESTRA ZeRP, Ordnungspartnerschaft ZeRP, Statusbericht und Auswertung 2000

51. A German press report claimed that a terrorist attack on the local public transport system of a major German city was planned in the aftermath to the attacks of 11 September. This was denied in December 2001 by the Ministry of the Interior, who at the same time pointed out that such warnings were irresponsible.
ANNEX

See Website:

www.thomasfeltes.de/htm/Vandalism_appendix.htm